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The New WTO Agreement on Financial
Services and Chapter 14 of NAFTA:




This article discusses the U.S. policy rationale for seeking free international trade in finan-
cial services and assesses whether U.S. policy goals have been met through recent trade
agreement negotiations. Free trade in financial services has been a goal of U.S. trade policy
since the early 1980s. Over a period of fifteen years, the United States concluded several
agreements on financial services with key trading partners. The most significant agreements
are the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Financial Services (FSA) and
Chapter 14 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on Financial Services.
In both of these trade agreements, U.S. negotiators succeeded at least partially in achieving
the U.S. goals of establishing a framework.of principles for financial services trade and
achieving national treatment and greater market access for U.S. financial institutions in key
markets. Neither trade agreement, however, achieves full liberalization. In the case of the
FSA, the framework of principles is subject to significant exceptions and only partial market
access concessions have been made by many countries. NAFTA achieved both a firmer
framework of principles and more concrete market opening results than the FSA, but some
barriers to trade still remain. These results are not surprising given the special status of the
financial services industry in the view of national governments and the enormous gap in
development of financial markets between the United States and other countries, especially
developing countries. FSA and NAFTA Chapter 14 can best be viewed as tentative first steps
towards achievement of U.S. policy goals that will only be fully realized after further negoti-
ations on sensitive issues of regulatory policy have been undertaken.
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I. Introduction. Globalization and New Trade Disciplines.
Any reader of a daily newspaper in the United States these days would surely agree
that the world is growing ever smaller and access to information and new technology is
driving economic growth.1 Our economy, in which globalization is a fact of life, is becom-
ing services-based. 2 These twin trends have led to an important new development in U.S.
trade policy - adding services as an agenda item in trade agreement negotiations. This
development is not unique. Globalization has also fueled U.S. efforts to impose trade
agreement disciplines on other governments in order to protect foreign investment 3 and
intellectual property,4 two other areas that were traditionally viewed as falling outside the
realm of trade matters.
Financial services, one of a far larger category of services traded by the United States,
can be singled out as perhaps the quintessential modern service industry. Nothing is "pro-
duced" in the sense of widgets being turned out on an assembly line, yet it has become one
of the most important U.S. industries in terms of national employment and gross domes-
tic product (GDP) figures and a significant contributor to improving the otherwise dismal
U.S. trade balance. 5 Moreover, the financial services sector lends itself well to internation-
alization. Since it deals in intangibles, money and information, the movement of such ser-
1. See Matt Murray & Raju Narisetti, Bank Mergers' Hidden Engine: Technology, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23,
1998, at B 1; see also Richard B. Schmitt, The Technology Gamble: Although New Technology is Risky
and Expensive, Global Competitors Can't Afford to Fall Behind, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1986, at B 1.
2. The United States in 1994 had a surplus of $8.1 billion in U.S. affiliate transactions in financial
services. Affiliate transactions in financial services include those services which are sold through
affiliates established in foreign markets by multinational corporations. In 1995, the United States
had a $4.4 billion surplus in cross-border financial transactions. Cross-border trade involves
sending individuals, information, or money across national borders. In cross-border financial
services transactions, the United States possesses a surplus with all other countries on a bilateral
basis. Because of the developments in the global capital markets and the internationalization of
industries, the activities of U.S. financial services firms are expanding increasingly overseas. See
Recent Trends in U.S. Services Trade: 1997 Annual Report, USITC PUB., Inv. no. 332-345, 3-21, 3-
25 (May 1997), available in ITC LEXIS 204.
3. NAFTA Chapter 11 and the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
both provide for the protection of foreign investment. In addition, the OECD Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI), which is currently being negotiated, would provide for a compre-
hensive framework for international investment. The MAI negotiations are to resume in Paris in
October with talks focusing on either completing the negotiations within a specified time frame or
shifting talks to the WTO. Michelle Sforza, A Bad Trade Deal, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1998, at C6.
4. Intellectual property provisions were included in Chapter 17 of NAFTA, as well as the WTO
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
5. During Congressional hearings on the results of the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, statistical data was presented on the importance of finan-
cial services and services generally to the U.S. economy. In 1992, the U.S. service sector employed
80% of the U.S. workforce, created 70% of GDP, and ran a record $61 billion trade surplus in
1992, that offset by two-thirds the U.S. $96 billion deficit in merchandise. Financial services alone
is more than 6% of GDP. Hearings on Trade Agreements Resulting from the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 103rd Cong. 120 (1994) (statement of Marc E. Lackritz, President, Securities Industry
Association on behalf of U.S. Coalition of Service Industries, Inc., Financial Services Group).
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vices is not hindered by geographic distances and, in principle at least, they should travel
easily across national borders. Until recently, however, such cross-border movement of
financial services was not permitted on a global basis. In essence, a national passport was
required by many countries in order to provide financial services under competitive condi-
tions and in some cases, to conduct a financial services business at all.
This treatment of financial services providers in international markets was of great
concern to the U.S. financial services industry,6 which looked to the global economy as its
future market. 7 Lobbying groups composed of the most influential financial institutions
sought to put financial services regulation affecting foreign providers under the discipline
of international rules, to enter closed foreign markets and to obtain for U.S. institutions
abroad the same type of treatment, namely national treatment, that was afforded foreign
financial institutions in the United States. The U.S. Government, cognizant of the signifi-
cance of financial services to international trade figures, took up the cause and elevated
financial services to a high priority item in trade agreement talks.
The most recent development in this U.S. effort was the announcement by the WTO8
on December 12, 1997 of the successful conclusion of a new round of negotiations on free
trade in financial services.9 The FSA, which will become effective no later than March 1,
6. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs: Status of Financial Services
Negotiations Now Underway Under the GATS of the WTO, 104th Cong. 29 (1995) (statement of
James F. Gwaltney, Executive Director, Ford Financial Services Group) ("The markets in the newly
emerging, as well as some of the developed countries of the world, represent a significant business
opportunity for many of our member companies. Yet, these countries restrict the ability of U.S.-
based financial services companies from gaining market access.") [hereinafter Senate FSA Hearing].
7. Id. at 44 (statement of Robert E. Rubin, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury) ("We are work-
ing very hard...to win new opportunities for our firms to compete worldwide. Our goal is to gain
commitments from the key developed and developing countries that they will open their markets
to our financial services firms..:').
8. The WTO is the successor organization to the GATT. It came into existence on January 1, 1995,
pursuant to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization of April 15, 1994.
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The WTO has substantially expanded powers
and a larger organizational structure than the GATT. See John H. Jackson, The World Trade
Organization: Watershed Innovation or Cautious Small Step Forward?, 18 WORLD ECON. 11 (1995),
for a description of the WTO and a comparison to the GATT. The GATT was one of three interna-
tional organizations for the conduct of international economic relations created at the Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire Conference of World Powers in 1947. The other two were the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank). GATT has come to refer to both the international institution head-
quartered in Geneva, Switzerland and to the multilateral agreement that embodies the results of the
various negotiating rounds among the contracting parties in reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers
to trade. The International Trade Organization, which was intended to be the international organi-
zation dedicated to trade matters with broader powers than the GATT, never came into existence
due to political opposition in the United States and other contracting parties. See ROBERT E. HUDEC,
THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (2d ed. 1990), (detailed history of the
GATT); see also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1997).
9. WTO PRESS RELEASE/86, SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE WTO's FINANCIAL SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS
Dec. 12, 1997 <http://www.wto.org/wto/services/press86.htm> [hereinafter WTO PRESS/86I; see
also PRESS STATEMENT BY WTO DIRECTOR-GENERAL RENATO RUGGIERO ON THE AGREEMENT ON
FINANCIAL SERVICES, Dec. 12, 1997 <http://www.wto.org/wto/services/fsdg.htm>.
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1999, is the culmination of a negotiating effort led by the United States to liberalize finan-
cial services trade that extended over some fifteen years.' 0 The FSA has been heralded by
the United States as a noteworthy achievement because of the greatly increased market
access to certain foreign markets now available to U.S. financial service providers."I The
other significant achievement of the United States in achieving free trade in financial ser-
vices was the negotiation of Chapter 14 of NAFTA, 12 which became effective on January 1,
1994. Chapter 14 succeeded in opening the Mexican market to both U.S. and Canadian
banks and is lauded by the United States as a model for future liberalization efforts in the
Western Hemisphere and elsewhere.
This article will examine U.S. efforts to liberalize financial services trade by tracing the
development of relevant trade agreement provisions negotiated by the United States in the
period from the early 1980s to the present. It will assess U.S. policy motives for aggressively
pursuing such negotiations and whether the trade agreements have been successful in
obtaining what the United States sought to achieve. Although financial services is defined
broadly in recent trade agreements to include banking, securities, insurance and other
financial services, 13 this article will have a special emphasis on banking, the financial ser-
vices sector of greatest significance in most national economies.14
Part II will examine the development of the U.S. policy agenda on free trade in finan-
cial services. It will set forth the economic arguments in favor of free trade in financial ser-
vices, as well as some countervailing arguments. It will also explore the political economy
of trade agreement negotiations and highlight several new trends in U.S. trade policy that
were evident during the FSA and NAFTA Chapter 14 negotiations. Part III will analyze the
U.S. policy agenda for, and the contents of provisions resulting from, the financial services
negotiations in the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement (IFTA), the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
10. The FSA forms part of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) concluded at the end of
the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, which ended in December 1993. General Agreement on
Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS]. Agreement on
the FSA could not be reached at the end of the Uruguay Round and negotiations were extended.
11. In the White House press release that announced the FSA, Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin and
United States Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky praised the agreement as one of three
WTO agreements conduded in 1997 that would provide new growth opportunities for U.S. com-
panies. The other two agreements are the Information Technology Agreement and the Agreement
on Telecommunications. They stated:
All three agreements cover sectors where the United States is the most competitive
producer and service provider in the world. All three unlock new opportunities for
our companies and workers at the moment they are the most competitive. All three
come in areas where the United States has minimal or non-existent trade barriers,
but the rest of the world -- particularly the fastest growing markets of the world --
present substantial market entry barriers for our companies.
See THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, DECEMBER 13, 1997, STATEMENT BY SECRETARY
RUBIN AND AMBASSADOR BARSHEFSKY REGARDING THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF WTO FINANCIAL
SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS, Dec. 13, 1997 [hereinafter Rubin and Barshefskyl.
12. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
13. "Other financial services" is a catch-all phrase encompassing the activities of consumer finance,
leasing and factoring companies.
14. The term "banking" is defined here to mean traditional commercial banking services, such as
deposit-taking and lending.
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Agreement (CFTA), Chapter 14 of NAFTA and the FSA. Part IV will discuss the strengths
and weaknesses of Chapter 14 of NAFTA and the FSA. Part V will highlight current trends
in U.S. policy on the future development of free trade in financial services. Part VI will
offer some concluding comments on U.S. policy on free trade in financial services, includ-
ing the importance of multilateralism.
This article concludes that the trade agreements did not achieve the ambitious goals of
the United States. This was due both to the exceedingly high expectations of the U.S. finan-
cial services industry, which was a primary moving force behind the negotiations, as well
as to opposition from certain developing countries, which did not share the U.S. enthusi-
asm for this trade agenda item. Further negotiations will need to be undertaken to com-
plete the project of creating free trade in financial services. Like free trade in goods, which
took more than fifty years and eight GATT15 negotiating rounds to achieve, 16 free trade in
financial services must be viewed as a long-term goal.
II. Development of the U.S. Policy Agenda on Free Trade in
Financial Services.
A. ECONOMIC THEORY OF FREE TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES.
1. The Theory of Comparative Advantage.
Until the mid-1980s, services were ignored in trade agreements. Services were tradi-
tionally regarded as valueless from an economic perspective. 17 The reason for this is not
hard to understand, given the conventional description of services as intangible, invisible,
15. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT]. One of the agreements accepted as part of the WTO Agreement was an
amended version of GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Annex IA to WTO
Agreement, supra note 8.
16. The Uruguay Round marks the eighth time since World War 11 that the contracting parties of
GATT have negotiated a reduction of trade barriers in a multilateral framework. The success of this
multilateral fornm in reducing protection has been remarkable. Average tariffs in major industrial
countries declined from about 40% in the mid-1940s to less than 5% after the Tokyo Round (1974-
1979). Robert E. Baldwin, Multilateral Liberalization, in THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 37 (J. Michael Finger & Andrzej Olechowski eds., 1987).
17. Adam Smith viewed service activities as unproductive labor and saw service workers as a burden
on society.
The labour of some of the most respectable orders in the society is... unproductive
of any value, and does not fix or realize itself in any permanent subject, or vendible
commodity, which endures after that labour is past, and for which an equal quanti-
ty of labour could afterwards be procured. [sic] [Tihe work of all of them perishes
in the very instant of its production.
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk II, ch. 3 (Ernest Rhys ed., 1910); see also William I. Drake
& Kalypso Nicolaides, Ideas, Interests and Institutionalization: "Trade in Services" and the Uruguay
Round, 46 INT'L ORG. 37 (1992), (discussion of the conventional view of services as unproductive).
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and perishable, as compared to goods, which are tangible, visible, and storable. 18 As a
result, services were not considered to be tradeable like goods, but rather something to be
consumed at the exact moment in time and physical location of production.19
In the 1970s and 1980s, trade economists began to reexamine the services sector. One
important area of inquiry was whether the traditional argument in favor of free trade in
goods, namely the theory of comparative advantage, 20 could be applied to trade in services.
The theory of comparative advantage states that, given certain conditions,2 1 each country can
improve its own productive efficiency and increase its national income (and consumption
possibilities) by specializing in the production of those commodities in which it has a relative
cost advantage and trading with other countries to obtain commodities in which it does not
have a comparative advantage.22 By each country pursuing this strategy, it was projected that
global economic welfare would be enhanced for all trading nations.23 Under this theory, trade
barriers should be eliminated since they stand in the way of enhanced economic efficiency
and global economic welfare.24 Although modem economic theory has refined the theories of
the classical economists, this notion of the universal benefits of specialization based on com-
parative costs has remained the central feature of liberal trade theory.25
18. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE WORLD BANK, LIBERALIZING INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS IN SERVICES: A HANDBOOK, at 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DTCI/7, U.N. Sales No.
E.94.1 .A. 1 (1994) [hereinafter LIBERALIZING].
19. GEZA FEKETEKUTY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES: AN OVERVIEW AND BLUEPRINT FOR
NEGOTIATIONS 67 (1988). The economist T.P. Hill has observed that:
Services are consumed as they are produced in the sense that the change in the con-
dition of the consumer unit must occur simultaneously with the production of that
change by the producer: they are one, and the same change ... the fact that services
must be acquired by consumers as they are produced means that they cannot be
put into stock by producers.
T.P Hill, On Goods and Services, 43 REV. OF INCOME & WEALTH 337 (1997).
20. The theory of comparative advantage or cost was posited in DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION ch. 7 (Ernest Rhys ed., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1911) (1817), as an
argument in favor of free trade. Ricardo's work built on Adam Smith's argument in SMITH, supra
note 17, bk. IV, ch. 9, against trade barriers and in favor of specialization by countries in the areas of
production in which they held an absolute cost advantage, meaning that an exporter with a given
amount of resources was able to produce a greater output at a lesser cost than any competitor.
Ricardo demonstrated that the driving force behind trade is the relative (not absolute) costs of the
goods produced. Producers in a country will specialize in those commodities whose costs are lowest
compared to those of producers in other countries. RICARDO, supra, at 81.
21. The essential conditions are a market economy and an efficient price system. "[Slupply and
demand in the two [trading] countries [must be] determined on the basis of market competition
[sic] and prices [sic] [must be reflective of] the value of services to society." FEKETEKUTY, supra note
19, at 96.
22. ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 172-173 (1987).
23. PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 19 (3d ed. 1994).
24. Brian Hindley & Alasdair Smith, Comparative Advantage and Trade in Services, 7 WORLD ECON. 369,
373 (1984).
25. GILPIN, supra note 22, at 172-173.
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2. Application of the Theory of Comparative Advantage to Financial Services Trade.
The application of the doctrine to services trade was viewed by some as problematic
due to the lack of a well-developed theory of trade in services addressing issues such as the
differences between goods and services and how to define when trade in services in fact
has occurred.26 In spite of such conceptual difficulties, trade economists generally concur
that the doctrine of comparative advantage can be applied to services.27 Several points
made in the economic literature are worth noting here.
a. Cross-Border Trade.
The notion that services are non-tradeable, due to the need for physical proximity of
supplier and consumer, has been abandoned. Economists have noted that some services
trade, using bank lending transactions as one of the most prominent examples, can occur
without such proximity due to the use of mail or telephone.28 Such services are referred to
by economists as "separated" services because the service is separated from both factors of
production (capital and labor) and consumers of the service, and are traded much the
same way that goods are traded. They represent a relatively small category of traded ser-
vices. 29 However, rapidly developing information and telecommunications technologies
have increased the possibility of such cross-border services trade occurring without physi-
cal movement of consumers or producers or other factors of production. 30
b. Foreign Investment and Capital Movements.
In addition to separated services, services transactions can also occur in three other
ways: through movement of the consumer of services, through movement of a factor of
production (capital or labor), or through movement of both the factors of production and
the consumer of the service. 31 In order for such "non-separated" services to be tradeable,
26. FEKETEKUTY, supra note 19, at 76-79,94-95.
27. See Hindley & Smith, supra note 24, at 386; see also ALAN V. DEARDORFF, Comparative Advantage and
International Trade and Investment in Services, in TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN SERVICES: CANADA/U.S.
PERSPECTIVES 68-69 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1985).
28. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, International Trade in Services and its Relevance for Economic Development, in
THE EMERGING SERVICE ECONOMY 8 (Orio Giarini ed., 1987).
29. Gary P Sampson & Richard H. Snape, Identifying the Issues in Trade in Services, 8 WORLD ECON. 171,
173 (1985).
30. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Splintering and Disembodiment of Services and Developing Nations, in
WRITINGS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 433-446 (V. N. Balasubramanyam ed., 1997). A study by
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Programme on Transnational
Corporations, entitled THE TRADABILITY OF BANKING SERVICES: IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS at 127, U.N.
Doc. ST/CTC/168, U.N. Sales No. E.94.II.A12 (1994) [hereinafter TRADABILITY] analyzed the policy
implications for developing countries of the increased tradability of banking services, concluding
that there was some limited potential for increased participation by such countries due to develop-
ments in information and telecommunications technologies.
31. Sampson & Snape, supra note 29, at 172-73. Bhagwati, supra note 28, at 7-8. Sampson and Snape
point out that for separated services, the standard theories of international trade which assume the
international immobility of factors of production apply. The other three categories of services are
not addressed by theories which assume the immobility of factors of production or consumers
between countries. This "non-separation" feature is the essential difference between trade in goods
and trade in some services. Sampson & Snape, supra note 29, at 174.
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capital and labor must be allowed to move freely across national boundaries, and con-
sumers must be free to purchase services in another country if they travel cross-border.32
U.S. policy has been to support free capital movements, including funds used for foreign
investment purposes, and to oppose free movement of labor.
Which of these movements is of greatest significance will vary from service to service.
In the financial services sector, the issue of foreign investment is a critical issue since many
service providers would like to set up a permanent establishment in the form of a repre-
sentative office, agency, branch, joint venture, or subsidiary in a foreign country. Free
movement of capital is also an important issue both in order to effect financial transac-
tions and transfers from the foreign investment. Freedom of movement for employees of
financial institutions and the right of consumers to buy financial services abroad are of
lesser importance for financial services.
c. Liberalization and Efficiency Gains.
Free trade in services requires freedom of movement of factors of production, of "sep-
arated" services, and of consumers of services. Economic theory concludes that the broad-
er the front across which the liberalization of trade operates, the more likely efficient allo-
cation of resources will result, and that liberalizing trade in some modes of service deliv-
ery, but not others, will not necessarily improve the allocation of resources. 33
The typology of classifying services according to mode of supply, which was devel-
oped by economists, has been adopted by trade negotiators and incorporated into the lan-
guage of trade agreements. However, the classification system has been modified and refers
to cross-border trade, commercial presence, movement of personnel of the provider and
movement of consumers. International financial services trade occurs through all four
supply modes. 34 In the trade agreements analyzed in this article, commitments to liberal-
ize trade are offered separately according to each mode of supply and liberalization is not
uniform across all modes.
3. Limiting Cases: The Arguments in Favor of Protectionism and the Special Needs
of Developing Countries.
If one accepts the normative doctrine of comparative advantage as applied to services
trade,35 the only logical policy position to adopt is that all trade barriers to services trade
32. For the argument that discussions of trade in services are only about the right of establishment and
the ability to move factors of production internationally, see Herbert G. Grubel, There is No Direct
international Trade in Services, AM. ECON. REv., PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS (1987).
33. Sampson & Snape, supra note 29, at 177-78.
34. Fariborz Moshirian, Trade in Financial Services, 17 THE WORLD EcoN. 347,357-361.
35. Comparative advantage theory is composed of two parts: one is normative or prescriptive and the
other is positive or descriptive. Normative theory seeks to answer the question of whether the pat-
tern of specialization of production on the basis of comparative cost advantage is economically effi-
cient and socially desirable and what government policies regarding international trade should be.
Positive theory seeks to determine why certain countries have a comparative advantage in some
commodities and what causes the flow of exports and imports among countries. Hindley & Smith,
supra note 24, at 370.
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must be removed because they interfere with maximization of global economic welfare.36
From the perspective of individual countries, however, trade restrictions may be desirable
instruments of national policy. This is especially, although not exclusively, true of those
countries that the positive doctrine of comparative advantage suggests will not be compet-
itive in services industries.37 Those countries will seek to restrict trade in a variety of ways.
While there are some economic arguments in favor of protectionism, 38 the most common
justification is that other compelling interests outweigh the efficiency gains to be had from
free trade.3 9 The primary arguments that are advanced in the financial services sector
against removal of trade barriers are the following: (1) the need for national control over
monetary policy, which is often implemented through commercial bank operations; (2)
the desire that access to capital remain under domestic ownership and domestic political
control; (3) the need to protect fledgling financial service firms from ruinous foreign com-
petition from large multinational financial institutions; (4) the need to protect domestic
consumers through prudential regulatory objectives that may be undermined by the entry
of foreign financial institutions; and (5) the need to provide balance-of-payments support
to avoid shortages of foreign exchange. 40
In financial services, developed countries will often have a comparative advantage
because the industry is dependent on both highly educated workers and access to
advanced information and data processing technology.4 1 Developing countries often lack
36. There are two other arguments against trade barriers to financial services trade, apart from the effi-
ciency gains that will result from a more efficient allocation of resources. First, an undesirable redis-
tribution of income from users of financial services to protected local institutions will occur. This
will happen because users will be required to pay more for financial services than if there is foreign
competition in the market. If the user of financial services is a producer of goods and other services,
the higher costs will result in correspondingly higher costs for the end product or service. Second,
limiting users of financial services to substandard or inefficient services provided by protected local
institutions will retard the economic development process. This is due in part to higher transaction
costs that may discourage economic activity. The presence of foreign financial institutions will force
local institutions to become more competitive, thereby leading to allocational and dynamic gains
for the economy as a whole. See INGO WALTER, GLOBAL COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: MARKET
STRucTuRE, PROTECTION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION 119-120 (1988).
37. Id. at 117.
38. Most studies call into serious question the viability of such arguments. See Hindley & Smith, supra
note 24, at 373, 383 (discussing positive optimal tariff argument and infant industry argument);
BRIAN GRIFFITHS, INVISIBLE BARRIERS TO INVISIBLE TRADE 70-73 (1975) (discussing infant industry
argument); WALTER, supra note 36, at 114 (discussing terms-of trade argument).
39. Some developing countries might choose social or development goals over efficiency gains when
there is a conflict. See LIBERALIZING, supra note 18, at 45-47. Some models of the political economy
of protectionism explain trade barriers in terms of rent-seeking behavior on the part of market par-
ticipants, who may find it less costly to lobby for government protection than to adapt to market-
place changes. For a discussion of the literature, see WALTER, supra note 36, at 115.
40. WALTER, supra note 36, at 116-21; see also MARIO KAKABADSE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES:
PROSPECTS FOR LIBERALISATION IN THE 1990s 63-66 (1987) (arguing for protectionism in financial ser-
vices); GRIFFITHS, supra note 38, at 70-81 (arguing for protectionism in services generally).
41. See WALTER, supra note 36, at 107; see also U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN SERVICES 71 (1987) (suggesting that continuing surpluses in service
industries suggests that the United States has a comparative advantage in most service sectors). For
a discussion of comparative advantage in financial services, see H.W. Arndt, Comparative
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these factors and therefore will have a comparative disadvantage. 42 For this reason, devel-
oping countries may become highly protectionistic. 43 However, as the development
process continues, one would expect such countries to increasingly favor liberalization of
the financial services sector as their comparative advantage positions change and they
become aware of the real economic costs of protectionism. 44
B. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS.
1. The Language of Trade Negotiations.
Trade economists and trade negotiators speak in different tongues. The doctrine of
comparative advantage posits mutual gains for both exporting and importing countries.
Indeed, it predicts efficiency gains in the event of a unilateral lowering of trade barriers.45
This is at odds with the position taken by trade negotiators, which sees the negotiation
process as a zero sum game in which opening import markets is viewed as a cost which
must be traded off against the gains achieved by exacting concessions from other coun-
tries.46 This is the language of the GATT negotiations, which economists scoff at.47
In the context of the FSA talks, negotiators from the United States and other devel-
oped countries emphasized to developing countries the virtues in economic terms of free
trade in financial services and the gains to producers and exporters in such countries of
importing cheaper and more efficient banking and insurance services. 48 Such negotiations
often reached an impasse because these economic arguments were not compelling to trade
negotiators used to talking in terms of gains and losses. Developing countries viewed these
arguments as attempts by the developed countries to exact concessions with little or no
corresponding gains, particularly given the strong competitive position of the U.S. finan-
cial services sector. The United States, in turn, began to emphasize reciprocity as the means
to achieve gains in free trade.
Advantage in Financial Services (Australia Japan Research Centre, Pacific Economic Papers, No.
160, June 1988). Arndt concludes that the source of comparative advantage in all the major finan-
cial service exporting countries was due to a large domestic market for financial services and conse-
quent economies of scale and development of specialized skills. Id. at 19.
42. See Murray Gibbs & Mina Mashahekhi, Elements of a Multilateral Framework for Trade in Services,
14 N.C.J. INT'L. L. & COM. REG. 1 (1989). But see Bhagwati, supra note 28, at 31 (stating that it can-
not be said with certainty that developing countries will not have a comparative advantage in bank-
ing and insurance since there may be opportunities for trade in similar services); TRADABILITY, Supra
note 30, at 127 (developing countries that develop the proper technological infrastructure may find
increased trade opportunities in banking).
43. WALTER, supra note 36, at 114.
44. ML However, it has also been argued that developing countries will not have significantly increased
opportunities even if liberalized trade occurs due to the fact that comparative advantage is embod-
ied in the stock of human capital and that the comparative advantage of developed countries win
continue to hold. Cillian Ryan, Trade Liberalisation and Financial Services, 13 THE WORLD ECON.
349,365 (September 1990).
45. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 147.
46. Brian Hindley, International Trade in Services: Comments, in THE EMERGING SERVICE ECONOMY 26
(Orio Giarini ed., 1987).
47. Id.
48. Bhagwati, supra note 28, at 27.
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It seems clear from the FSA negotiations that the maximization of global economic
welfare is not the primary goal of the WTO. Political objectives of the Members are equally
important in the negotiating process. Unfortunately, economic analysis offers no solution
to the political problem addressed by concessions in the GATT process.
2. The Role of Interest Groups.
The negotiations over the liberalization of financial services trade illustrate several
new trends in U.S. trade policy, namely, the important role played by interest groups and
the rise of reciprocity and regionalism. Each of these trends will be discussed in turn.
Interest groups played an important role in the financial services trade negotiations.
This took two forms: (1) services industry advisory committees provided advice on negoti-
ating positions and rendered opinions on the results of trade negotiations pursuant to a
mandate contained in U.S. trade legislation; and (2) U.S. financial services industry groups
and individual firms provided information about trade barriers and gave advice on negoti-
ating issues through the lobbying process. Pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974, the President
is required to establish industry advisory committees on trade matters for all important sec-
tors of the economy, including services. 49 The role of such advisory committees in connec-
tion with the negotiation of trade agreements is to consult on negotiating objectives and
bargaining positions and to render an advisory opinion at the end of negotiations on
whether the results promote the economic interests of the United States, fulfill U.S. negoti-
ating objectives, and provide for equity and reciprocity.50 The most important advisory
committees covering the services negotiations under NAFTA and GATS, including financial
services, were the Industry Sector Advisory Committee on Services for Trade Policy Matters
(ISAC 13) and the Services Policy Advisory Committee (SPAC). The members of ISAC 13
and SPAC were high-ranking officials of financial services firms and industry associations.
The lobbying groups that were active included the U.S. Coalition of Service Industries,
Financial Services Group, the Bankers Association for Foreign Trade, the Securities Industry
Association, the Investment Company Institute, and the American Financial Services
Association. 51 Many large multinational financial services firms were also active on an indi-
vidual basis in the lobbying effort. In addition to providing information and advice to the
U.S. trade negotiators, the industry groups often sent representatives to Congress to testify
on private sector concerns in the NAFTA Chapter 14 and FSA negotiations.
The clear focus of these interest groups was on achieving substantial market opening
concessions from key trading partners. Industry groups pooled information received from
their members on trade barriers in countries of significant commercial interest and sub-
mitted to U.S. trade negotiators lists of the most significant barriers they sought to have
eliminated. In addition, the ISAC 13 and SPAC reports on the NAFTA Chapter 14 and FSA
negotiations made clear that such groups were scrutinizing the results of the negotiations
and were conditioning their endorsement of the trade agreements on achievement of ade-
quate market opening concessions. These sorts of activities by interest groups put pressure
on the U.S. Government to seek very specific concessions from its trading partners.




3. The Rise of Reciprocity.
The term "reciprocity" will be familiar to travelers through the trade literature land-
scape. There are at least two current uses of the term. One use signifies the practice of
according the same treatment to a foreign financial institution doing business in a host
country as financial institutions of the host country receive in the home country of the
foreign financial institution in question. This is the approach taken by the European Union
(EU) in the Second Banking Directive. That is not the meaning of the term as used here,
because the U.S. Government has consistently opposed this type of reciprocity. 52
A second meaning of the term and the one used here refers to the process of requiring
equivalent concessions from other countries in exchange for making concessions in trade
negotiations.53 This process was observable in the FSA negotiations when the United
States refused to bind its market-opening concessions on a most-favored-nation (MFN)
basis unless a critical mass of commercially important countries agreed to open their bor-
ders to foreign financial service providers.
This approach is different than the one taken by the United States in prior GATT negoti-
ations involving tariff cutting in the goods sectors. Seeking reciprocity in some form has
always been part of the trade negotiating process. Previously, however, the U.S. position was
to seek concessions from other countries over the course of successive GATT negotiating
rounds and the decision to accept an offer in any one round was based on a rough estimate
of whether equivalent trade expansion opportunities were being offered. 54 In effect, the
United States measured trade concessions in terms of their overall effect, not in terms of spe-
cific and equivalent concessions that were made in return for U.S. concessions. This phe-
nomenon has been observed in trade negotiations and trade disputes outside of the financial
services sector.55 It has been referred to in various ways. One prominent commentator has
referred to it as full reciprocity, which emphasizes reciprocal market access and level playing
fields. 56 It has also been termed a shift from diffuse to specific reciprocity.57 The predicted
impact of a policy of specific reciprocity is a greater sectoral and country-specific focus and
an analysis of whether effective market access has been reciprocally achieved. 58 Both of these
tendencies were evident during the FSA negotiations. The danger of such a policy is that it
limits negotiating flexibility allowing trade-offs among sectors. 59
This movement in the U.S. policy position has been attributed to a decline in U.S. eco-
nomic power and an accompanying shift in global power relationships. 60 As a conse-
quence, the United States has shifted its focus away from its traditional concern with broad
geopolitical goals, namely the maintenance of global political and economic welfare
through an international trading system containing a code of conduct and a dispute settle-
52. The United States has instead adopted a policy of national treatment of foreign financial institu-
tions in its federal banking legislation. See infra note 114.
53. WILLIAM R. CLINE, "RECIPROCITY": A NEW APPROACH TO WORLD TRADE POLICY? 7 (1982).
54. PATRICK Low, Trading Free: THE GATT AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 29 (1993).
55. Id. at 29-30 (tracing this form of reciprocity to the Tokyo Round negotiations on non-tariff trade
barriers).
56. Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Douglas A. Irwin, The Return of the Reciprotarians: US. Trade Policy Today,
10 WORLD ECON. 117 (1987).
57. Ahnlid, infra note 550, at 72-73.
58. Low, supra note 54, at 30.
59. CLINE, supra note 53, at 31.
60. Low, supra note 54, at 15-19.
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ment system. 6 1 In the area of financial services, at least, the United States is now pursuing
concrete economic objectives, namely an improvement in its trade balance, by seeking rec-
iprocal trade concessions in this sector on a country by country basis. 62
4. The Rise of Regionalism.
Another trend is the U.S. willingness to negotiate financial services trade agreements
on a bilateral and regional level, in addition to pursuing multilateral liberalization through
the WTO. In addition to the bilateral IFTA and CFTA, the United States negotiated bilater-
al agreements with Japan in 1995 covering insurance and other financial services. 63 In
addition to NAFTA, the United States is pursuing other regional initiatives that will involve
financial services liberalization under the Free Trade Area of the Americas and the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.
There are both political and economic arguments against regional trading arrange-
ments. In the political sphere, prior U.S. policy had been to avoid regional trading arrange-
ments on the grounds that they were inherently discriminatory and would lead to the break-
up of the world trading system into regional groupings pursuing protectionist policies. 64 The
U.S. policy was instead to pursue trade liberalization on a multilateral basis only through the
GATT mechanism.65 The multilateral GATT system is in principle nondiscriminatory
because the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle prevents a preferential system in which
some WTO Members receive concessions that are denied to other WTO Members. 66 The
inherently discriminatory nature of regional trade agreements is confirmed by the fact that
they are deemed a violation of the MFN principle, unless they fall within the exception 67 for
61. For a discussion of the traditional U.S. goals, see KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 12-13 (1970).
62. The following interchange occurred during Senate Banking Committee hearings on the FSA in
1995: Senator Shelby: "*.. we've shown goodwill ... we want reciprocity. Isn't that the bottom line?"
Treasury Secretary Rubin: ". .. we have remarkably open markets and we feel that this should be
matched by other countries in the world"..." for free trade to, both substantively and to be politi-
cally sustainable around the world, it has to be two-way free trade..." Senate FSA Hearing, supra
note 6, at 21, 28.
63. Measures by the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States Regarding
Insurance, Oct. 1, 1994, Japan-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 661 (1995) [hereinafter Insurance Measures].
Measures by the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States Regarding
Financial Services, May 1995, Japan-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 617 (1995) [hereinafter Financial Services
Measures]. Bowing to pressure from WTO Members, including the United States, Japan bound
these commitments on a multilateral basis in the FSA. Schedule of Japan.
64. Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview, Columbia University Department
of Economic Discussion Paper Series, No. 693 (1992), at 1.
65. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 158.
66. There are exceptions to this principle. For example, the Generalized System of Preferences grants
special advantages to developing countries with respect to tariffs and is an exception to the MFN
principle in article I of GATT. GATT, supra note 15, pt. IV.
67. In the absence of the exception contained in Article XXIV, a free trade area like IFTA would violate the
article I MFN undertaking because trade concessions made to other members of the regional arrange-
ment by parties to the free trade agreement who are also WTO Members are not unconditionally
extended to other WTO Members. For a more detailed discussion of compatibility of free trade areas
with GATT Article XXIV, see Andreas Lowenfeld, What the GATT Says (Or Does Not Say) in
BILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND CANADA IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (William Diebold, Jr., ed., 1988).
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free trade areas (FTA) 68 and customs unions69 contained in Article XXIV of GATT.70 The
United States has taken the position that IFTA, CFTA and NAFTA are consistent with Article
XXIV of GATT.71
In the area of services, regional trading arrangements are permitted pursuant to Article
V of GATS. 72 The shift in U.S. trade policy towards pursuing free trade through regional
trading arrangements in the services sector was due to frustration over the slow pace of
GATT negotiations on services and growing doubt that the GATT was a viable mechanism
for achieving the results that the United States sought. Such policy shift is a change from the
official position taken by the U.S. Government in preparation for services negotiations in
the GATT Uruguay Round that a multilateral agreement covering all sectors was preferable
to other pathways to liberalization. 73 Bilateral agreements were rejected by the U.S. at that
time on a number of grounds, including the fact that they would lead to discriminatory
rules and divergent bodies of rules. 74
In the economic sphere, some economists have argued against regional trading arrange-
ments on the grounds that they would lead to reduced global economic welfare.75 The argu-
68. A free trade area is a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other restric-
tive regulations of commerce are eliminated. GATT, supra note 15, art. XXIV, § 8(b).
69. A customs union is the substitution of one customs territory for two or more existing territories so
that the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce among the members are eliminated
and a common external tariff is put into place. Id. art XXIV, § 8(a).
70. The conditions that must be met to qualify for the Article XXIV exception are the following: duties
and other regulations of commerce are eliminated on substantially all trade among the parties to
the customs union or free trade area (Id. art. XXIV, § 8(a),(b)), duties and other regulations of com-
merce are not on the whole higher or more restrictive with respect to third party countries than
what the constituent countries imposed prior to formation of the customs union or free trade area(Id. art. XXIV, § 5(a),(b)), any interim plan for the formation of a customs union or free trade area
shall include a timetable for completion within a reasonable period of time (Id. art. XXIV, § 5(c)),
and the contracting parties must be notified and approve of the formation of the free trade area or
customs union (Id. art. XXIV, § 7).
71. No such arrangements notified to GATT (now WTO) have ever been challenged on the grounds
of non-compatibility with the MFN principle. John H. Jackson, Regional Trade Blocs and the
GATT, 16 WORLD EcON. 121, 127 (1993). This fact does not confirm that all such regional trading
arrangements are in fact GATT-compatible but simply that the GATT parties have failed to chal-
lenge the agreements. This may have been done for reasons other than the fact that the GATT
parties found them to satisfy the requirements of section XXIV. For example, the United States
failed to challenge some of the early European Community (EC) arrangements, presumably on
the grounds that the United States believed that economic integration would foster European
recovery efforts after World War II.
72. WTO Members may enter into regional economic integration agreements covering trade in ser-
vices provided that certain conditions are met. GATS, supra note 10, art. V. These conditions are
that the agreement covers substantially all service sectors and all modes of supply (Id. art. V
(1)(a)) and that existing discriminatory measures are eliminated and new or more discriminato-
ry measures are prohibited. Id. art. V(1)(b). Any such agreement must be designed to facilitate
trade among the parties to the agreement and not to raise additional trade barriers to Members
outside the regional grouping. Id. art. V(4). Such arrangements must be notified to the Council for
Trade in Services. Id. art.V (7).
73. U.S. NATIONAL STUDY ON TRADE IN SERVICES 55 (1984) [hereinafter SERVICES STUDY].
74. Id. at 54-55.
75. Bhagwati, supra note 64, at 18.
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ment is that regionalism, defined as preferential trading arrangements (PTA) among groups
of nations, can lead both to trade creation and trade diversion.76 Viewed in global terms,
trade-creating PTAs increase trade among member countries, but do not decrease trade
between the region and the rest of the world. Trade-diverting PTAs increase trade among
partners at the expense of third countries as a result of protectionist policies on a regional
level. Support for regionalism comes from economists who view PTAs as trade-creating
while opposition comes from those who believe the effects are trade-diverting. 77 Economic
theory does not provide any conclusive answers as to whether regional trading arrangements
augment or detract from global economic welfare.
78
C. LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR FREE TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES.
In order to liberalize trade in financial services, trade barriers must be identified, a
method for removing them devised and a forum for negotiating such changes chosen. The
U.S. Government, as well as academics, international economic policy think tanks and
international organizations, conducted studies on this topic, from which three important
conclusions emerged: (1) the nature of trade barriers in the services sectors is different
than in the goods sectors, (2) the process of negotiating services trade liberalization will be
even more difficult than for goods trade, and (3) there is no ideal international forum for
negotiating removal of services trade liberalization, although GATT is the most likely
forum due to its large membership and familiarity with trade issues. These points will be
discussed in turn below.
76. Jacob Viner introduced the concepts of "trade creation" and "trade diversion" to explain the eco-
nomic effects of customs unions and free trade areas. Jacob Viner, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE 40
(1950). Regional integration arrangements may, but do not necessarily, produce increases in wel-
fare, either for member countries or for the world as a whole. Whether welfare increases or not
depends on production patterns prior to integration. One commentator has offered the following
illustration. Assume that the United States and Mexico form a FTA in which they agree to eliminate
all tariffs between themselves but maintain tariffs on products imported from third countries. As a
result, the United States begins to import shoes from Mexico. We can assume that, if the United
States produced shoes before the FTA, its production costs must have been higher than those in
Mexico. The result of the FTA will be that production shifts from higher to lower cost producers,
resulting in trade creation and a gain in welfare. If, on the other hand, shoes were originally import-
ed by the United States from Korea, we can assume that both the United States and Mexico were
producing shoes at higher costs. The result of the FTA will be to encourage the United States to
import from Mexico, even though it is a higher cost producer, because of the effects of the tariff on
shoes imported from Korea. In this case, the FTA will have a trade diversionary effect, because trade
is diverted from a lower cost to a higher cost producer, resulting in a decline in welfare. Jaime De
Melo & Arvind Panagariya, Introduction, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 6-7 (De
Melo & Panagariya eds., 1993).
77. Id. at 7.
78. ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND DEEPER INTEGRATION 4 (1996). There is a
substantial body of economic literature discussing the recent trend in U.S. policy towards conclud-
ing regional trading arrangements. For a critical view of this tendency, see JAGDISH BHAGWATI &
ANNE 0. KRUEGER, THE DANGEROUS DRIFr TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS (1995). For an
examination of both sides of the issue, see LAWRENCE, supra, at 1-9.
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1. Barriers to Trade in Financial Services.
The chief barriers to free trade in goods are tariffs79 (taxes imposed at national bor-
ders on imported goods that make such goods more expensive than their domestically
produced counterparts or substitutes) and non-tariff barriers (such as quotas which oper-
ate to restrict the flow of imported goods by limiting the amount of such goods that are
allowed into a country or limiting the amount that may be imported at a favorable tariff
rate). 80 Trade agreements have traditionally focused on reducing such tariff and non-tariff
barriers to trade in goods through a process of negotiation of mutual concessions among
trading partners. 81 This was the way that the GATT process worked for many years.
Substantial tariff reductions were achieved among GATT (now WTO) members through
eight successive rounds of negotiations extending over a fifty year period. Beginning with
the Tokyo Round in 1973, the GATT membership began to focus on non-tariff barriers to
trade (NTBs). The effects of NTBs are much less transparent than those caused by tariffs.
The Tokyo Round achieved some success in reducing NTBs with the establishment of
codes in such areas as standards, import licensing procedures, customs valuation, and gov-
ernment procurement.82
In contrast, barriers to trade in services are not taxes and volume limitations on
imports, but rather, national laws and regulations that restrict, impede, or prohibit the
inward flow of services from foreign providers. Just as service movements are invisible
since no tangible goods are involved, the regulatory regimes that impede free flow of ser-
vices are often difficult to detect. When they are detected, they are very often tied up with
sensitive public policy issues that make it difficult, if not unthinkable, to remove them.
Services trade barriers can be classified into two general categories: those prohibiting
cross-border trade and those restricting cross-border factor movements. 83 An additional
distinction can be drawn between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory measures. 84
Nondiscriminatory barriers are those which are imposed generally on all persons, compa-
79. The first significant study on the topic, entitled Invisible Barriers to Invisible Trade, was written for
the Trade Policy Research Council in London by economist Brian Griffiths in 1975. This study
identified banking as one of the service sectors most in need of liberalization and included a tabular
listing on a country by country basis of restrictive measures in banking imposed by a group of
developed and developing countries. This study revealed that most of the countries regulated for-
eign banks with respect to the establishment of new branches, capital requirements, asset portfolio
composition, maximum interest rates payable on deposit liabilities, repatriation of profits and
employment of nationals. Some countries prohibited the entry of foreign banks entirely. See
GRIFFITHS, supra note 38, at app. 1; see also INGO WALTER, BARRIERS TO TRADE IN BANKING AND
FINANCIAL SERVICES (1985); WALTER, supra note 36; KAKABADSE, supra note 40; PHEDON NICOLAIDES,
LIBERALIZING TRADE IN SERVICES: STRATEGIES FOR SuccEss (1989); FEKETEKUTY, supra note 19; WORLD
BANK AND U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, THE URUGUAY ROUND: SERVICES IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY (1990).
80. See MELVYN B. KRAUSS, THE NEW PROTECnONISM 6-7, 13-14 (1978); see also JACKSON, supra note 8, at
154-55 (1997).
81. See Hindley, supra note 46, at 35-36.
82. Robert Stern and Bernard Hoekman, The Codes Approach in Finger & Olechowski, supra note 16, at
59.
83. NICOLAIDES, supra note 79, at 55.
84. GRIFFITHS, supra note 38, at 34.
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nies and financial institutions, but which do not discriminate, either in law or in effect,
between foreign and domestic enterprises.8 5 Discriminatory measures are those imposed
on foreign enterprises, resulting in more favorable treatment of domestic competitors. 86
An illustration of the difference is a national law requiring banks to maintain a certain per-
centage of their assets in a liquid form paying less interest than other alternative invest-
ments. If such a measure, which is a common form of bank regulation, is imposed equally
on all banks, regardless of nationality, it is a nondiscriminatory measure. On the other
hand, if foreign banks are required to hold a larger percentage of their assets in a lower-
yielding form than domestic banks, the measure is discriminatory. 87 Although both types
of measures may impede trade, the extent to which efforts should be made to remove
nondiscriminatory as well as discriminatory trade barriers remains an open issue for gov-
ernments in trade negotiations. 88
In the financial services sector, protectionism most often takes one of two forms: (1)
exchange control restrictions, which hinder or prevent the capital flows that are necessary in
many financial transactions, including bank lending,89 and (2) restrictions on the establish-
ment of foreign banking affiliates, including discriminatory barriers to entry and discrimina-
tory operating constraints. 90 The traditional view is that the first category of restrictions falls
within the jurisdiction of the IMF while the second category is within the jurisdiction of the
GATT (now WTO). However, this distinction has come under attack from those calling for
increased international coordination on monetary and trade issues. 9 1
All countries regulate market entry by banks and imposing conditions on such entry
is not viewed as a trade barrier per se. Examples of nondiscriminatory entry requirements
include minimum capital requirements and requirements of management integrity and
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 34-35.
88. The FSA and Chapter 14 of NAFTA address discriminatory barriers. The EU, however, has mandat-
ed removal of nondiscriminatory barriers in the area of banking as well. See Sydney J. Kay, Is
National Treatment Still Viable? U.S. Policy in Theory and Practice, 5 J. INT'L BANKING L. 365, 367
(1990).
89. Exchange control restrictions serve the purpose of protecting the financial resources of a country.
The weakest form of control is a requirement to notify all foreign exchange transactions to the gov-
ernment, mainly for statistical purposes. A moderate form of control is government action in the
market affecting the supply and demand to keep the value of its currency (with respect to that of its
trading partners) within a predetermined range. The strongest form of exchange control is compre-
hensive control with government setting the rate and handling all currency exchange transaction.
See RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 613-616 (3d ed. 1995). The
Articles of Agreement of the IMF regulate the use of exchange control restrictions for current trans-
actions but not for capital transactions of IMF members. IMF Articles of Agreement, art. VIII §
2(a), art. XIV § 2. June 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501 (current version at 29 U.S.T. 2203,
T.I.A.S. No. 8937) [hereinafter IMF ARTICLES]. See Kenneth Dam, THE RULES OF THE GAME, REFORM
AND EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 98 (1982).
90. See ALAN H. GELB & SYLVIA B. SAGARI, BANKING IN THE URUGUAY ROUND: SERVICES IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY 52 (1990).
91. See Sir Joseph Gold, Legal and Institutional Aspects of the INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM:
SELECTED ESSAYS 23 (1979) (discussing the issue of IMF jurisdiction on exchange control issues;
John H. Jackson, Managing the Trading System: The WTO and Post-Uruguay Round GATT Agenda
in MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY: FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRETON WOODS 142-143 (Peter B. Kenen
ed. 1994) (calling for increased international coordination on monetary and trade issues).
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competence.92 However, regulations intended to keep out foreign competition are consid-
ered unacceptable. These range from absolute prohibitions on foreign bank entry to limi-
tations on equity participation in domestic institutions.
A similar distinction can be drawn in connection with operating restrictions. Only those
that affect the ability of foreign banks to compete with domestic banks can properly be viewed
as trade barriers. These discriminatory regulations can be grouped into three types: (1) inten-
tional operational constraints, (2) accidental operational constraints, and (3) preferential treat-
ment measures.93 Intentional operational constraints are those that explicitly discriminate
against foreign banks and are often intended to limit foreign bank operations to certain seg-
ments of the financial market while preserving other segments entirely for domestic banks.94
Examples include restrictions on deposit-taking activities from the public, restrictions on the
number or location of foreign banks, requirements that government funds be held on deposit
only at domestic financial institutions, regulations that restrict foreign bank access to central
bank discount operations, and restrictions on ability to offer certain banking services other
than deposit-taking and lending, such as securities underwriting.95 Accidental operational con-
straints are those regulations that are applied equally to foreign and domestic banking opera-
tions, but have a negative impact on the ability of foreign banks to compete with domestic
institutions because of the different nature of their operations. 96 Examples are limits on maxi-
mum permissible asset-capital ratios and lending limits on loans to individual borrowers,
which are based on the amount of capital that a bank maintains.97 These may have a differen-
tial impact on foreign banks because they treat affiliates of foreign banks as independent legal
entities and take into consideration only the capital kept on deposit by the foreign bank affili-
ate, which is often a small percentage of the total capital of the foreign bank. The effect is to
constrain foreign bank business operations in some circumstances. Preferential treatment mea-
sures refer to measures that have a favorable impact on foreign banks due to the nature of their
operations. 98 An example is a regulation that imposes lower reserve requirements on foreign
currency or non-resident deposits. This type of regulation favors foreign banks that normally
hold a greater proportion of foreign currency liabilities than do domestic banks.99
It should be noted that barriers to the establishment of financial service firms are
imposed by countries at all levels of development and not exclusively by developing coun-
tries. 100 Exchange controls, which also may serve as a trade barrier, are still used for eco-
nomic policy reasons in developing countries, but they were also commonly used in indus-
trialized countries in the post-World War II era. 101
92. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-27 (1994).
93. See GELB & SAGARI, supra note 90, at 56.
94. Id. at 52.
95. Id. at 56.
96. Id. at 52.
97. Id. at 56-57.
98. Id. at 57.
99. Id.
100. A U.S Government study released in 1979 noted that none of the highly developed, industrial coun-
tries completely excluded foreign commercial banking presence and most of them had liberal entry
policy. Restrictions did not follow geographic patterns and did not correspond to levels of econom-
ic development of the country or of its banking system. DEPT. OF THE TREAS., REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TREATMENT OF U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 24 (1979)
[hereinafter 1979 Study].
101. See GELB & SAGARI, supra note 90, at 52.
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2. Removing Barriers to Trade in Financial Services.
The national laws and regulations that impede free trade in services are in the nature
of NTBs in trade in goods. Prior to the GATS and FSA negotiations, experts predicted that
removing services trade barriers would be a long and arduous process. This was based on
the experience of negotiating the removal of NTBs in the GATT, which has been only par-
tially successful. 10
2
Financial services was considered an especially sensitive area because of political
opposition to interfering with the exercise of sovereign legislative power in an area where
there is a felt need for regulation. 10 3 It is a widely held view that banks hold a special posi-
tion within a national economy.' 04 Although banks are organized as private, for-profit
institutions in many countries, they also serve a quasi-governmental function due to the
role they play in implementation of national monetary policy.'05 In addition, since banks
often hold funds on deposit for individuals, governments, and businesses and perform
other important financial intermediation services, there is a high degree of interest in reg-
ulating to protect depositors and the safety and soundness of both individual banks and
the banking system as a whole.' 0 6 This is referred to as prudential regulation and is the
basis for most restrictions on bank operations. The primary legal issue that arises in liber-
alizing trade in financial services is how to dismantle discriminatory laws that impede free
trade without interfering with the legitimate right of governments to regulate based on
prudential concerns.
Removing barriers to trade in services by requiring national laws and regulations to be
changed does not imply complete deregulation. The issue of permissible regulation has
been addressed in trade agreements through the so-called prudential regulation exception.
The prudential regulation exception permits national governments to maintain regulatory
restrictions if they can be tied to legitimate policy goals and are not designed simply to
keep foreigners out.' 07 The issue of national economic policy concerns has been addressed
in trade agreements through exceptions for emergency economic measures taken for bal-
ance of payments purposes tied to permissible exchange control measures permitted by
the IMF Articles10 8 and through exceptions for nondiscriminatory measures taken for
monetary control purposes. 109
102. The effects of NTBs are difficult to quantify and, therefore, equivalent concessions are hard to cal-
culate. In addition, removing such barriers often intruded on economic policy objectives of the
GATT contracting parties. See Hindley, supra note 46, at 39.
103. See WALTER, supra note 36, at 114.
104. See id.
105. See MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 20-23 (3d ed. 1990) (description of U.S. Federal Reserve
Board implementation of monetary policy objectives through controls on U.S. commercial banks).
106. See GERALD CORRIGAN, ARE BANKS SPECIAL?, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, 1982 ANNUAL
REPORT 5-18 (1982).
107. See GATS, supra note 10, Annex on Financial Services, cl. 2; NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1410(1).
108. See GATS, supra note 10, Art. XII (1)(2). The IMF Articles of Agreement prohibit restrictions on
current transactions except: (1) in the event of scarcity of a foreign currency or (2) in the event an
IMF member elected to maintain restrictions in effect on the date it became a member, pursuant to
the transitional arrangements provisions of article XIV. IMF ARTICLES, supra note 89, art. VIII § 2.
109. NAFTA, supra note 12, art 1410 (2).
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The prudential regulation exception merely acknowledges the continued ability of gov-
ernments to regulate for safety and soundness reasons on a nondiscriminatory basis. It does
not address the manner in which the trade liberalization process should address the issue of
differences in national regulation. The preferred method would be adoption of an interna-
tional set of rules to govern financial services. This would require amendment or repeal of
national laws. The likelihood of standardization is low due to the differences among national
regulatory systems and the political resistance that would be encountered in attempting to
make such changes. 1 0 A less intrusive approach would be mutual recognition of laws, regu-
lations, and administrative practices of other countries and is the approach taken by the
EC. 111 However, this approach presumes agreement on certain minimum regulatory
requirements and changes to national laws to conform to such requirements. 112 The most
widely accepted approach is national treatment, which is the principle that foreign institu-
tions will be accorded treatment that is no less favorable than that accorded domestic institu-
tions. This is the policy position that is consistently advocated by the U.S. Government.11 3 It
is also the standard embodied in U.S. law.1 14 An alternative approach is reciprocity, which
accords foreign financial institutions from a particular country the same treatment that a
domestic institution would be accorded in that foreign country. This is the position adopted
by many countries in their banking regulation, including the EU countries. 115 Although
110. An example from U.S. banking regulation is the attempt to amend or repeal the Glass-Steagall Act
restrictions on engaging in both the commercial banking and securities businesses, which has been
unsuccessful due to opposition from securities industry lobbyists. The Financial Services
Competition Act of 1997 introduced as H.R. 10 attempted to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act. See
Financial Services Competition Act of 1997, in H.R. Rep. No. 105-64 (1997). However, the Act did
not pass. Financial services modernization is now being considered again by Congress with the bill
entitled the Financial Services Act of 1998. H.R. 10, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).
111. Sydney J. Key, Mutual Recognition: Integration of the Financial Sector in the European Community, 75
Fed. Res. Bull. 591,602 (1989).
112. Id.
113. See National Treatment of Banks: Hearing on S.2193 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 24, 29 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 National Treatment Hearing] (state-
ment of Secretary of Treasury Donald T. Regan).
114. See International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101 et seq. (1994) [hereinafter IBA]; Foreign
Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3111 (1994) [hereinafter FBSEA].
The legislative history of the IBA indicated that the U.S. policy regarding foreign enterprises doing
business in the United States had been national treatment. The IBA established the principle of par-
ity of treatment between foreign and domestic banks in like circumstances. S. Rep. No. 1073, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1-2 (1978). The FBSEA introduced enhanced regulation of foreign banks operat-
ing in the United States and is generally consistent with the national treatment principle.
115. The reciprocity requirement of the EC's Second Banking Directive contains two elements: (1) effec-
tive market access; and (2) national treatment. Effective market access requires EU banks to receive
access comparable to that given by the European Union countries to third country banks operating
in their markets. The national treatment standard the European Union has adopted is reciprocal
national treatment rather than unconditional national treatment. The national treatment provision
provides that an EU bank operating in a third country should receive the same treatment as that
country's domestic banks. The requirement of reciprocity only applies to subsidiaries of foreign
banks and not branches. See Council Directive 89/646, art. 9 on the Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of
Credit Institutions; Hal S. Scott, Reciprocity and the Second Banking Directive, in THE SINGLE
MARKET AND THE LAW OF BANKING 97-194 (Ross Cranston ed., 2d. ed. 1995).
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there have been attempts made in the United States to adopt legislation changing the legal
standard to reciprocity, such proposed legislation has been consistently opposed by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury 1 6 and has never passed Congress.117
3. Forum for Financial Services Negotiations.
Multilateral efforts were favored over other options, such as bilateral negotiations.
118
GATT was considered the most appropriate forum for such discussions,'119 although the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 120 and the Bank for
116. Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan stated that a policy of national treatment rather than rec-
iprocity was supported by the U.S. Department of the Treasury because a policy of reciprocity
would be nearly impossible to administer, might provoke retaliation against the U.S. and would
hinder financial services liberalization in other countries. See 1984 National Treatment Hearing,
supra note 113, at 14-16.
117. The Fair Trade in Financial Services Act of 1993 (FTFSA) was an attempt to change the U.S. policy
of unconditional national treatment to a policy of reciprocal national treatment in order to open
up foreign financial markets. S.1527, 103rd Cong. (1993). The FTFSA legislation was not passed as a
result of disagreements between House and Senate conference committee members. See Financial
Services Fair-Trade Stripped From Banking Bill, 199 JEI Rep. 29 (1994). The National Treatment in
Banking Act of 1994 was introduced to replace the FTFSA. H.R. 4926, 103rd Cong. (1994). The new
measure was different from the FTFSA in that it only focused on the overseas entry and expansion
opportunities available to U.S. banks and not on securities firms and insurance companies. The bill
passed the House on September 30, 1994, but the legislation was not passed in the Senate due to
lack of time at the end of the session. See House Passes National Treatment in Banking Bill, Senate
Fate Unclear, 63 BANKING REP. (BNA) 476 (Oct. 3, 1994).
118. See GRIFFITHS, supra note 38, at 91-97 (favoring multilateral codes as best way to promote liberaliza-
tion); WALTER, supra note 36, at 220 (favoring GATT-style framework of principles and code on
financial services); SERVICES STUDY supra note 73, at 54-57 (1984) (strongly favoring a multilateral
agreement with a framework of principles and sector specific agreements under auspices of GATT).
119. Id: at 54-57 (GATT favored due to large number of member countries and contractually binding
nature of framework of principles).
120. Since its founding in 1961, the OECD has promoted the liberalization of trade in services, as well as
goods, and free capital flows. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Dec. 14, 1960, art. 2, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 88 U.N.T.S. 179. These policy goals are reflected
in the CODE OF LIBERALIZATION OF CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS AND THE CODE OF LIBERALIZATION
OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS (collectively "Codes"), which are legally binding obligations of members to
maintain the existing level of liberalization and to pursue further liberalization in the future. The
Codes were substantially revised in the 1980s to cover new financial services and technological
developments. See OECD, CODE OF LIBERALIZATION OF CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS (1992);
OECD, CODE OF LIBERALIZATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS (1992). For an analysis of the updates to
the Codes, see OECD, LIBERALIZATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE OECD
AREA (1990). The results were not wide-ranging due to the limited size of the membership of the
OECD, which is composed of the 24 most developed countries. These members include Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Other reasons for the lack of success of these
OECD efforts were the large number of reservations that members took and failure to apply the
Codes by members. See GRIFFITHS, supra note 38, at 87-91. The OECD has conducted a number of
studies on trade liberalization. See REPORT BY THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON TRADE AND RELATED
PROBLEMS TO THE SECRETARY-GEN. OECD, POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
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International Settlements (BIS) 12 1 were mentioned as possible alternative forums for financial
services talks. 122
4. U.S. Policy on Removing Barriers to Financial Services Trade.
U.S. policy goals on financial services were set forth in U.S. National Treatment Studies
on banking produced between 1979 and 1994 and the U.S. National Study on Trade in
Services produced in 1984 for GATT. These studies also provided information regarding
trade barriers in selected countries that were used in trade agreement negotiations.
a. U.S. National Treatment Studies.
National treatment studies of banking institutions were conducted in 1979, 1984,
1986, 1990, and 1994 by the U.S. Department of the Treasury 12 3 pursuant to
Congressional mandates. 124 The Studies examined national laws impeding financial ser-
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1972). In the areas of financial services, see COMM. ON FIN. MATTERS, OECD,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES: BANKING 3 (1984) [hereinafter BANKING]; COMM. ON FIN.
MATTERS, OECD, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES: SECURITIES 9-10 (1987) [hereinafter SECURITIES].
The OECD report on banking discussed the restrictive practices of the OECD member countries
and concluded that national policies limiting the right of establishment were the most significant
obstacle to trade in banking services. The report on securities identified three general categories of
barriers: (1) official government policies limiting the participation of foreigners in the securities
market; (2) official regulations or officially accepted private practices which exclude foreign inter-
ests from the domestic market; and (3) obstacles to cross-border activities in securities. SECURITIES,
supra, at 9. Nondiscriminatory measures were viewed as significant trade barriers. See idi at 10.
121. BIS is a cooperative forum for central banks from leading industrial countries and developing
countries that addresses bank regulatory issues of international interest through the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Committee). Its recommendations are not legally bind-
ing on members. The most successfil effort of the Basle Committee has been in the capital adequa-
cy area. See Lawrence Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking
Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1998) (recent survey of work on the Basle Committee).
122. See WALTER, supra note 36, at 220 (discussing OECD); GELB & SAGARI, supra note 90, at 55 (dis-
cussing BIS); Sydney J. Key and Hal S. Scott, International Trade in Banking Services: A Conceptual
Framework, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE REGULATORY RESPONSE 39
(John Fingleton ed., 1992) (discussing GATT, OECD and BIS).
123. 1979 Study, supra note 100; U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT TREATMENT OF U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKING ORGANIZATIONS (1984 Update) [hereinafter
1984 Study]; U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TREATMENT
OF U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKING ORGANIZATIONS (1986 Update) [hereinafter 1986 Study]; U.S. DEPT. OF
THE TREASURY, NATIONAL TREATMENT STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN TREATMENT OF U.S.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Study]; U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL
TREATMENT STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN TREATMENT OF U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 Study].
124. The 1979 Study was mandated by section 9 of the International Banking Act of 1978, which
required the Secretary of the Treasury in conjunction with other Federal banking agencies to con-
duct a study of the extent to which U.S. banks were granted or denied national treatment abroad.
The 1984 and 1986 Studies were updates to the 1979 Study and were prepared at the request of
Senator Jake Gan, the ranking Republican of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs. The 1990 and 1994 Studies were prepared pursuant to the Financial Reports Act of
1988, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5351-5352 (1988), which instructs the Secretary of the Treasury to report to the
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vices trade of countries that the United States considered commercially important 125 and
set forth policy recommendations for U.S. action to seek to remove such trade barriers. 126
Only banking activities were examined in the 1979 and 1984 Studies, but the later reports
also covered securities activities. The 1990 and 1994 Studies also examined whether the
United States accorded national treatment to foreign financial service providers. An
important conclusion of the 1979 Study was that U.S. banks generally received equitable
treatment abroad and therefore, the U.S. Government should enter into negotiations on
lowering barriers in those countries where U.S. institutions did not receive national treat-
ment and competitive equality. 127 Between 1979 and 1990, the Studies showed a lowering
of trade barriers in the countries examined. 128
Congress every four years beginning December 1, 1990, on foreign financial institutions in the
United States and the kinds of services they offer, and the extent to which foreign countries deny
national treatment to U.S. banks and securities firms, including U.S. efforts to eliminate discrimina-
tion. See 1990 Study, supra note 123, at 3.
125. In 1979, 140 countries (21 individual and 6 groups) were selected for the study. See 1990 Study,
supra note 123, at 3. The countries chosen had a significant banking presence in the United States,
represented potential opportunities for growth and expansion by U.S. banks and were the home
countries of foreign banks with a significant international and U.S. presence. See 1979 Study, supra
note 100, at 31-33. Sixteen countries were chosen for review for the 1984 Study where U.S. banks
were previously not afforded national treatment, but desired an active presence. See 1984 Study,
supra note 123, at ix. The 1986 Study covered 18 banking markets and extended coverage for the
first time to 8 securities markets, chosen on the basis of their importance as financial centers. See
1986 Study, supra note 123, at 2. The 1990 Study covered 21 banking and 18 securities markets in 27
countries or regions. See 1990 Study, supra note 123, at 2. The 1990 Study was broader and more
detailed than the previous studies. Id. In 1994, the Study covered banking and securities in 30 coun-
tries. See 1994 Study, supra note 123, at 1.
126. In 1979 and 1984, the recommendations for U.S. action included: (1) remedial action should be
taken towards those countries in which U.S. banks are not given national treatment; (2) continue to
encourage and support the principle of national treatment through bilateral contacts and multilat-
eral forums; and (3) the Treasury and other governmental agencies should continue its efforts in
gathering information about the banking policies, practices, and regulatory and legislative develop-
ments of foreign countries in order to determine the appropriate action to be taken. See 1984 Study,
supra note 123, at xii. In the 1990 Study, there was discussion that even though the United States is
committed to the principle of national treatment, Congress was feeling the pressure to take some
type of action because of the movement by several countries toward a policy of reciprocity or recip-
rocal national treatment and the slow progress in some Asian and Latin American financial mar-
kets. See 1990 Study, supra note 123, at 7. The 1994 Study identified a three-pronged strategy for
future liberalization: (1) GATS (2) intensive bilateral discussions; and (3) other initiatives that pro-
mote capital market development and integration. See 1994 Study, supra note 123, at 10-12.
127. See 1979 Study, supra note 100, at 136.
128. From 1979 to 1984, the level of national treatment received by U.S. financial institutions
improved. During that five year period from 1979 to 1984, Canada, Finland, Japan and Spain sig-
nificantly decreased their barriers to foreign banks. Canada passed its 1980 Bank Act that allowed
foreign banks to establish commercial banking subsidiaries in Canada and Spain enacted legisla-
tion in 1978 that reopened Spain to foreign banks for the first time in 40 years. See 1984 Study,
supra note 123, at vi, vii. By 1990, significant improvements had been achieved in Canada with
the CFTA and in the European Community under the Second Banking, the Investment Services
and the other financial services directives. See 1990 Study, supra note 123, at 10.
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The 1994 Study indicated that significant improvements had been made since 1990 in
according national treatment to U.S. firms providing financial services abroad due to
intensive multilateral and bilateral negotiations by the United States with various trading
partners, citing in particular NAFTA, bilateral negotiations with Japan, China, Korea, and
Taiwan, and the GATS negotiations in the Uruguay Round.129 Also cited as a reason for the
improvement was the implementation of the EU single market in financial services. 130
In the 1994 study, the remaining problem areas in banking' 3' were restrictions on for-
eign bank establishment, 132 discriminatory requirements regarding maintenance of bank
capital, 133 high concentration of the banking industry and official tolerance of restrictive
business practices by private banks, 134 and lack of transparency in developing and imple-
menting laws and regulations. 135 In securities, the remaining problem areas 136 were
restrictions on entry,137 discriminatory capital requirements, 138 limitations on market
share imposed after establishment, 139 limitations on stock exchange memberships for for-
eigners, 140 exchange controls and restrictions on foreign investment,1 41 and limitations on
129. See Cover letter from Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury, to Al Gore, President of the Senate,
and Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Dec. 1, 1994), in 1994 Study, supra
note 123.
130. See icL
131. See 1994 Study, supra note 123, at 7, 8.
132. Examples cited included complete prohibition on new entry (Brazil), formal moratoria on issuance
of new domestic banking licenses (Chile, Czech Republic, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand),
requirement of establishment of subsidiaries (Canada and Mexico), discouraging use of branches
(Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Poland, Russia, South Africa), requirement of a joint venture
thereby effectively prohibiting 100% foreign ownership and with higher capital requirements than
domestic institutions (Indonesia), limits on establishment of branches (China, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand), reciprocity requirements (India), prohi-
bition on participation in local currency business (China, Russia), global ceilings on foreign banks'
share of total banking system assets (Canada) and investment screening with no transparency on
criteria for review. Id.
133. Examples included tying limits on lending and foreign exchange transactions to locally held (dota-
tion) capital (EU - applies to branches of EU banks but not branches of banks of EU member
countries) and unduly high requirements for foreign institutions (Brazil, Korea, Turkey). Id. at 8.
134. Examples included Singapore and Malaysia; where foreign banks were not allowed to use local
ATM networks nor to establish their own networks. Id. at 8, 9.
135. Id. at 9.
136. See i at9, 10.
137. Examples included complete prohibition on new entry (Brazil), no issuance of new brokerage
licenses (Malaysia and Turkey), prohibition on the entry of foreign securities firms in any form
other than unlicensed "nameplate" operations (South Africa), and prohibition of wholly foreign
owned securities subsidiaries (Korea, Malaysia, and Pakistan). See id. at 9.
138. An example cited was Indonesia where foreigners can only enter the market through joint ventures,
which are subject to discriminatory capital requirements. See id.
139. An example is the severe limitations placed on foreign investment advisers management of public
and private pension funds in Japan. See id.
140. In Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, access to the local stock exchanges is unavailable or access is
extremely limited by numerical limitations or reciprocity requirements. See id. at 10.
141. Examples of restrictions on foreign access to securities listed on local stock exchanges included: ceil-
ings on the percentage of foreign ownership, prohibitions on purchases by foreign individuals and
ceilings on the purchases made by foreign institutional investors (China, India, Indonesia, Korea,
Taiwan, and Thailand). See id
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foreign firm participation in domestic capital market activities. 142 The 1994 Study also
examined U.S. laws on banking, securities, and insurance with respect to foreign competi-
tors and concluded that such laws generally provided national treatment. 143
The recommended course of action for the United States in the 1994 Study had three
elements.14 4 First, the United States planned to continue to seek substantially full market
access and national treatment on a multilateral basis in the GATS for U.S. financial institu-
tions in a broad range of commercially important developed and developing countries. 145
Second, the United States planned to continue to conduct bilateral financial market discus-
sions with certain East Asian trading partners, including Japan, China, Korea, and
Taiwan. 146 Finally, the United States planned to work within international organizations to
encourage development of financial markets in other countries. 147 In addition, the United
States planned to promote development of financial markets and integration on a regional
basis through regulatory cooperation in the Western Hemisphere and in Asia. 148
b. U.S. National Study on Trade in Services.
The U.S. National Study on Trade in Services (Services Study) 149 was prepared in
1984 for submission to GATT and was intended to serve as a medium for exchange of
information with other governments regarding issues in liberalizing such trade. 150 The
Services Study focused on key issues in services trade151 and key service sectors.152
Banking was an important focus of the Services Study, with a separate section devoted
to the types of restrictions that existed. 153 The three main categories of restrictions were
142. Examples cited were the restrictive regulation on the issuance of corporate securities and the broad
administrative measures on capital account transactions imposed by Japan. See id.
143. Id. at 67.
144. Id.at 10-12.
145. The United States conducted intensive discussions with certain key countries, including Japan,
Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Hong Kong, Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Venezuela, India and Egypt, where there were significant barriers to market access and national
treatment or where countries were unwilling to bind current practices and laws providing liberal
treatment. See id. at 95, 96. Negotiations were also held with Eastern European countries that were
developing market-oriented economies, including Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics,
Romania, and with South Africa, which was rejoining the international economic community as
political conditions changed. See id. at 96. Another set of important negotiations were conducted
with OECD member countries on areas where significant barriers remained. See id.
146. It was hoped by the United States that the agreements reached on a bilateral basis with these coun-
tries would be extended to other countries on an MFN basis in the Uruguay Round GATT negotia-
tions. See id. at 11.
147. The World Bank, the IMF and the OECD were named. See id. at 11.
148. The two areas of geographic focus were Latin America and Asia. See id. at 12.
149. See SERVICES STUDY, supra note 73.
150. Id. at 1.
151. The major issues for examination were 1) competition between private firms and government
monopolies; 2) distinguishing trade in services from investment in services, and 3) the role of
immigration and labor in trade in services. Id.
152. Ten service industries were examined: accounting, telecommunications, banking, insurance,
motion pictures, franchising, aviation, travel agents, legal services and maritime. Id.
153. Id. at 137.
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identified 154 as (1) restrictions on entry,155 (2) discriminatory regulations that imposed
larger operating costs on foreign banks or that denied competitive opportunities to foreign
banks, 156 and (3) nondiscriminatory government regulations aimed at non-banking
objectives that hindered the operations of foreign banks. 157 The Services Study concluded
that the United States should pursue the development of international rules that accord
national treatment and market access to foreign financial service providers. 158 Several
important conclusions and underlying themes of the Services Study are relevant here. The
Services Study argued for dropping the traditional distinction that governments have
made between trade and investment issues and covering investment by services firms with-
in the GATT framework. 159 While recognizing that international trade depends on move-
ment of people, the Services Study also argued against negotiating immigration or labor
issues within the GATT, arguing that GATT was an inappropriate forum and immigration
rules should not be subordinated to trade rules. 160 The Services Study recommended a
multilateral agreement covering all sectors 16 1 and incorporating the following general
principles: national treatment, least restrictive regulations, nondiscrimination, market
access, transparency, due process, and dispute settlement. 162
D. FROM GATT TO GATS: THEORIZING A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES
LIBERALIZATION.
Beginning in the 1980s, the United States lobbied strenuously to include services as a
negotiating item in a new GATT round and was joined by some members of the OECD. 163
The United States threatened to abandon the GATT if trade in services was not placed on
the negotiating table. 164 A group of developing countries led by India and Brazil agreed to
a new round of GATT negotiations in a position paper presented to the GATT on the con-
dition that services not be included.165 After several years of effort on the part of the
154. Id.
155. Examples of entry restrictions included: prohibiting the establishment of any presence by a foreign
bank or limiting the level of foreign equity participation in domestic banks. See id. at 138.
156. Regulations that discriminated against foreign banks included: limits on government deposits,
restrictions on the type of financial assets that can be acquired, or restrictions on local retail
banking. See id.
157. Nondiscriminatory government regulations hindering the operation of foreign banks included: for-
eign exchange controls, immigration controls and professional licensing requirements. See id.
158. Id. at 141.
159. Id. at 38.
160. Id. at 39.
161. The other alternative structures that were examined were multilateral understandings for individual
sectors, bilateral agreements for individual sectors, and bilateral agreements covering all sectors.
These approaches were rejected for a variety of reasons, including the fact that such approaches
would deviate from the concept of MFN treatment in favor of a preferential system based on recip-
rocal opportunities and would not lead to a uniform body of rules to govern services trade. Id. at
54-55.
162. Id. at 55-57.
163. See Trade Comm., INT'L ECON. REV. May 1985, at 14, 15.
164. See Terrence G. Berg, Trade in Services: Toward a Development Round of GATT Negotiations
Benefitting Both Developing and Industrialized States, 28 HARv. INT'L. L.J. 1 (1987).
165. See Trade Comm., INT'L ECON. REV. July 1985 at 12.
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United States, the GATT contracting parties had agreed in principle to include services in
the new GATT round, as set forth in the Ministerial Declaration delivered at Punta del
Este, Uruguay in September 1986.166 A Group of Negotiations on Services was established
and it was within that forum that the decision was made to separate the services negotia-
tions from the GATT negotiations and to produce a separate agreement for the services
sectors. 167 This compromise was acceptable to the developing countries who feared a
trade-off between concessions in the goods and services sectors. 168
In the financial services sector, the U.S. Treasury Department lobbied actively against
including financial services within the general services agreement and sought a separate
sectoral agreement, arguing that regulation of financial institutions was substantially dif-
ferent from that governing other services. 169 The negotiations were held within the spe-
cialized forum of the Committee on Trade in Financial Services. 170
Although the GATS negotiations were severed from the very beginning from the
GATT negotiations in the Uruguay Round, the structural model of GATT had a strong
hold over the thinking of both theoreticians and trade negotiators. The chief theorist was
John H. Jackson, but other writers supported the same structure, 17 1 and their position
became the initial U.S. negotiating position.
Jackson posited a three-tier structure. Tier one was to be composed of an umbrella agree-
ment that incorporated certain basic principles, such as MFN treatment, national treatment,
transparency and measures dealing with institutional structures, and dispute settlement. Tier
two was to be composed of an optional protocol in which a core group of like-minded
nations agreed on a more significant set of obligations that would apply to many service sec-
tors. Tier three was to be composed of various sectoral agreements to be negotiated over a
period of decades that would conform to the umbrella agreement, but would contain provi-
sions addressed specifically to reducing the trade barriers found in specific industries.172
One significant deviation of the GATS from this theoretical model will be noted here.
In the course of the negotiations, developing countries opposed the concept of a princi-
ples-based approach for services, and the most important principles (national treatment
and market access) were removed from the umbrella agreement and relegated to scheduled
166. The Punta del Este Declaration, which marked the official beginning of the Unguay Round, stated
that the objectives of the services negotiations were to establish a multilateral framework of princi-
ples and rules for trade in services, produce an elaboration of possible disciplines for individual sec-
tors, conduct the negotiations under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization as a
means of economic development for all countries, and ensure that the framework should respect
the policy objectives of national laws and regulations applying to services, and take into account the
work of relevant international organizations. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Rounc, GATT
Doc. No. MIN.DEC, at 10 Sept. 20 (1986).
167. See THE GATr URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 2359 (Terence P. Stewart ed.,
1993).
168. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Services, in THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 207 (J. Michael Finger & Andrzej Olechowski eds., 1987).
169. See Stewart, supra note 167, at 2355.
170. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, RECENT TRENDS IN U.S. SERVICES TRADE, 1997 ANNUAL
REPORT 4-6 (1997).
171. See FEKETEKUTY, supra note 19, at ch. 10, 11; WALTER, supra note 36, at ch. 9.
172. JOHN H. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN SERVICES: A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 17-18
(1988).
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commitments of countries, subject to reciprocal concession negotiations. 173 The practice
of negotiating separate sectoral agreements was initiated, with the FSA being an example.
III. U.S. Policy and the Evolution of Trade Agreement Provisions on
Free Trade in Financial Services.
A. THE NEGOTIATING AGENDA FOR TRADE IN SERVICES.
Congress mandated negotiations on trade in services and set forth a negotiating agenda
for services in various pieces of U.S. trade legislation in the 1970s and 1980s. The term "ser-
vices" in this legislation was apparently intended to cover many service sectors. 174 Individual
sectors, such as financial services, were not enumerated in the statutory definitions.
The first U.S. trade legislation to indude a reference to trade in services was the Trade
Act of 1974,175 which expanded the definition of international trade to include services and
foreign direct investment related to trade in goods or services. 176 Pursuant to the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984, a stated objective of U.S. trade negotiations was to encourage the expan-
sion of international trade in services through the negotiation of agreements (both bilateral
and multilateral) that reduce or eliminate barriers to international trade in services and U.S.
service industries in foreign commerce. 177 The U.S. negotiating objectives for services trade
were (1) to reduce or eliminate barriers that denied national treatment and restricted estab-
lishment and operation for U.S. service providers in foreign markets and (2) to develop
internationally agreed rules, including dispute settlement procedures, consistent with U.S.
commercial policy, which would reduce or eliminate such barriers or distortions and help
ensure open international trade in services. 178 Both negotiating objectives were expressly
made subject to certain enumerated domestic objectives, including consumer protection. 179
This has remained the negotiating agenda for the United States in the area of trade in ser-
vices, including trade in financial services. These objectives are repeated in the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,180 which provided authority for the President to
participate in the Uruguay Round of GATT trade negotiations. 181
173. See Bhagwati, supra note 30, at 469-473.
174. See e.g., STAFFS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE AND THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93rd
CONG., REPORT ON TRADE AcT OF 1974 (Comm. Print 1974) (services included, but were not limited
to, shipping, aviation, and insurance).
175. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1982, 1986 (1975). The Trade Act of 1974 granted
negotiating authority to the executive branch to participate in the Tokyo Round of GATT negotia-
tions.
176. See 19 U.S.C.§ 2411(d)(1) (1994).
177. Trade and TariffAct of 1984, Pub. L. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, 3000,3001 (1984) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2102(3) (1994)).
178. See 19 U.S.C. § 2114a(a) (1994). A similar provision was included for foreign direct investment,
requiring removal of trade barriers, expansion of the national treatment principle and reduction of
unreasonable barriers to establishment. 19 U.S.C. § 2114a(b)(1) (1994).
179. See 19 U.S.C. § 2114a(a)(2) (1994). A similar provision was included for foreign direct investment.
See 19 U.S.C. § 2114a(b)(2) (1994).
180. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1121-25
(1988) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2901(9)) (1994).
181. See 19 U.S.C. § 2902(e) (1994).
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B. U.S.-ISRAEL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT.
The first time the United States incorporated provisions on financial services in a trade
treaty was in the 1985 Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area between the
United States of America and the Government of Israel (the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement
or IFTA). 182 IFTA was a first for the United States in at.least one other important respect,
namely it was the first free trade agreement signed by the United States that purported to
cover all trade sectors and sought to reduce both tariff and non-tariff barriers. 183
These two "firsts" were the product of important U.S. trade policy concerns. One con-
cern was the significant positive impact of services on both U.S. gross domestic product
and balance of trade figures. This led U.S. policymakers to seek liberalization in services
trade in trade negotiations as a means of furthering this trend. The second concern was
with the continued viability of the multilateral GATT system as a means for reducing trade
barriers in all areas, including services trade. This led the United States to pursue free trade
agreements, both bilateral and regional, which included services trade provisions. Both of
these policy concerns are repeated in later trade negotiations on services. A third element
of IFTA that is relevant to a better understanding of the later trade agreements is the
framework of principles that it developed. Although IFTA covered only a very limited cate-
gory of banking services, and the parties agreed to abide by the provisions on a best-efforts
basis only,184 meaning that they were not legally binding, most of the important principles
developed in IFTA negotiations were incorporated in and expanded on in later treaties. A
study of IFTA is therefore instructive in understanding later treaties. These points will be
discussed in turn.
1. Developing Disciplines for Services Trade.
It was the United States that proposed including provisions on trade in services in
IFTA. At the time of the negotiations, the volume of services trade between the United
States and Israel was relatively small, with the exception of tourism, and not a source of
182. See Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Isr., 24 I.L.M. 653. Negotiations on IFTA were con-
cluded on February 26, 1985 and the agreement was signed on April 22, 1985. IFTA was negotiated
by the United States under negotiating authority granted in Title IV of the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984. See 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1985). It was implemented into U.S. law pursuant to the United States-
Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-47 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112
(1985) on June 11, 1985). It became effective after Israeli government approval and notice to GATT
on August 11, 1985. The bill that led to passage of the IFTA Implementation Act was H.R. 2268,
which passed the House on May 7, 1985 and the Senate on May 23, 1985. Details of the legislative
history are presented in H.R. Rep. No. 99-64,99th Cong. (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 61.
183. The only similar effort had been a reduction of automobile tariffs under the U.S.-Canada
Automotive Pact in 1966. Agreement Concerning Automotive Products, Sept. 16, 1966, U.S.-Can.,
17 U.S.T. 1372 T.I.A.S. No. 6093. In addition, the United States had entered into a unilateral free
trade arrangement in the Caribbean Basin Initiative, in which it granted one-way trade concessions
to certain Caribbean countries. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706
(Supp.I 1983).
184. After the IFTA was concluded, there was an attempt made to negotiate legally binding provisions
for the insurance sector, as well as certain other non-financial service sectors. See infra Part III. B.3.,
note 224.
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trade disputes. 185 However, both sides anticipated an increase in services exports as a result
of IFTA and therefore had an interest in lowering trade barriers. 186
The United States had other motivations for seeking to include services in IFTA apart
from wanting to maintain a good relationship with Israel. Achieving an agreement on free
trade in services would further highlight for the world trading community the importance
of this issue. 187 In addition, the negotiations would be used as a test run for further negoti-
ations to be conducted within the GATT framework. 188 Not only would such an exercise
highlight problem areas that needed to be addressed, but it would give the United States
latitude to experiment in an arena where there was relatively little to lose if the effort back-
fired. 189 Finally, the IFTA provisions could be used as a model for future treaties that cov-
ered services trade. 190
There was dissension within the U.S. Government, with some officials taking the posi-
tion that including trade in services in the negotiations would slow down the process since
this was the first time the United States had negotiated a free trade agreement, as well as
the first time it was attempting to liberalize barriers to services trade. 191 In the end, howev-
er, the importance of the services issue to the United States took precedence, and provi-
sions on services were included.
2. Trend Towards Regionalism.
IFTA represented a dramatic departure in trade policy for the United States, which up
until this time had strenuously pursued a policy of multilateralism through the GATT mecha-
nism. The United States had been in favor of including rules for trade in services within
the multilateral framework of GATT since the early 1980s. It recognized that the absence of
such a regime was limiting access by U.S. service providers to foreign markets192 and took
the initiative within the GATT framework to call attention to the need for rules in this
area. By the time a free trade agreement with Israel was proposed, several concrete steps
had been taken. The United States had succeeded at the GATT Ministerial meeting in
November 1982 in having an informal group established to study trade in services. At the
meeting of the GATT contracting parties in November 1984, the United States received
approval for a formal consideration of broadening GATT to cover services. 193
Despite these achievements, the United States was disappointed with the pace of
progress towards a new round of GATT negotiations and especially with the failure of the
GATT contracting parties to make greater progress towards a negotiating agenda at the
185. See Carol Balassa, Negotiation of Services in the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area in THE U.S.-ISRAEL FREE
TRADE AREA AGREEMENT 5.01, 5.02 (Andrew James Samet & Moishe Goldberg eds., 1989); see also
FEKETEKLUTY, supra note 19, at 176, 181-83.




190. Id. at 5.02; see also Doral Cooper & Nancy Adams, Overview of the US. -Israel Free Trade Area
Negotiations: An American Perspective, in THE U.S.-ISRAEL FREE TRADE AREA AGREEMENT 1.04
(Andrew James Samet & Moishe Goldberg eds., 1989).
191. Balassa, supra note 185, at 5.02.
192. Balassa, supra note 185, at 5.01, 5.02.
193. Id.
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November 1982 GATT Ministerial meeting. 194 As a result, some U.S. Government officials
began to question the future viability of the multilateral GATT process.' 95 When Israel
suggested a free trade area in 1983, the United States was therefore willing to begin prelim-
inary negotiations on the issue. 196 United States Trade Representative William E. Brock
favored liberalizing trade on a bilateral basis as a means to stimulate the GATT process and
so strengthen the GATT system.197
Some commentators have interpreted the United States entry into regional trade
agreements like IFTA as a turning away from multilateralism and the MFN principle. The
United States in fact had reasons for entering into IFTA that had nothing to do with multi-
lateralism.198 Nonetheless, I FTA represented a new trend of negotiating broad-based bilat-
eral and regional free trade agreements, which have become an important component of
U.S. trade policy.
3. Framework Agreement for Trade in Services.
IFTA has been described as "an experiment in bilateral free trade for the United
States"199 The United States was writing on a blank slate, not having any prior U.S. trade
agreement to look to for guidance. In the area of financial services, the tentative nature of
the provisions, their non-binding character, and their incomplete coverage, compared to
later trade agreements, can be explained at least in part by this fact.
Trade in services was covered in a non-legally binding Declaration on Trade in Services
(Declaration) referred to in Article 16 of IFTA.200 Although the United States had intended
194. Cooper & Adams, supra note 190, at 1.02.
195. United States-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 99th Cong. 10-11 (1985)[hereinafter Free Trade Area Agreement] (statement of
Congressman Gingrich).
196. Cooper & Adams, supra note 190, at 1.02. For a negotiating history of IFTA, see ORIT FRENKEL,
CONSTRAINTS AND COMPROMISES: TRADE POLICY IN A DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF THE U.S.-ISRAEL FREE
TRADE AREA 110-121 (1990).
197. See Cooper & Adams, supra note 190, at 1.02 (statement by Doral Cooper, Assistant USTR for
Bilateral Affairs). Ms. Cooper stated that since the United States began negotiations with Israel,
there has been more enthusiasm expressed by other trading partners in liberalizing trade on a mul-
tilateral basis. Id.
198. The United States had an economic incentive to enter into IFTA, namely that it feared losing export
trade with Israel as a result of a free trade agreement entered into between Israel and the European
Economic Community. Free Trade Area Agreement, supra note 195, at 11 (statement of Rep. Frenzel).
See FRENKEL, supra note 196, at 82-83; Cooper & Adams, supra note 190, at 1.03, 1.05. The United
States also had political motivations, namely the need to strengthen its relationship with its only sta-
ble ally in the Middle East. This entailed providing support for Israel's troubled economy. See PEGGY
BLAIR, A U.S.-ISRAL FREE TRADE AREA 77 (1985), reprinted in Free Trade Area Agreement, supra note
195. A free trade agreement that would stimulate trade was viewed as a better alternative to the polit-
ically controversial proposal to increase foreign aid. Charles Sawyer & Richard Sprinkle, U.S.-Israel
Free Trade Area, Trade Expansion Effects of the Agreement, 220 J. WORLD TRADE 528,529 (1986).
199. Alexander Platt, Free Trade with Israel: A Legislative History, in THE U.S.-ISRAEL FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 2.02 (Andrew James Samet & Moishe Goldberg eds., 1989).
200. Section 16 recognizes the need to minimize restrictions on exports and binds the parties to develop
means to cooperate towards this end in accordance with the Declaration on Trade in Services. See
Declaration on Trade in Services, Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Isr., reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 679 (1985) [here-
inafter Declaration].
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to negotiate legally binding commitments, 20 1 uncertainty about whether U.S. negotiators
could bind the states to a specific course of action on services regulation 202 led the parties
to reduce their commitments to best-efforts undertakings. 20 3
A broad range of services was covered by the Declaration, which defined trade in ser-
vices as the export of a service from a supplier nation and the import of the service by
another nation.204 The various modes of supply are not enumerated. Although the lan-
guage is ambiguous, the negotiating history suggests that only three of the four modes of
supply covered in the later trade agreements were intended to be covered in IFTA, namely
cross-border movement of services, consumption abroad, and temporary movement of
personnel of service providers. It did not refer to permanent establishments in the host
country as a mode of supply.205 The exclusion appears to have been intentional due to
concerns about the possibility of overlap and conflicts if investment issues were included
in IFTA in view of the 1952 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
United States and Israel, which arguably already covered investments in services. 20 6
Financial services are covered by the Declaration, which sets forth banking services,
insurance, and other financial activities in a non-exhaustive listing of covered sectors.20 7
However, covered banking services are limited to the activities of representative offices,20 8
and the activities of agencies, branches or subsidiaries are not included. 209 There were two
reasons for this limited treatment of banking. First, the negotiators were concerned that
there were certain aspects of American banking law in which foreign banks were not grant-
ed national treatment with respect to branches and subsidiaries. 210 An example was the
International Banking Act of 1978 requirement that all directors of a foreign bank be U.S.
201. Balassa, supra note 185, at 5.03.
202. The problem arose due to the significant regulatory authority of the states in such important ser-
vice areas as banking and insurance. Without the best-efforts undertaking, Israel would have been
asked to take on greater obligations than the United States because the services sectors regulated at
the state level in the United States would have fallen outside the scope of IFTA. See id. at 5.12-5.15;
FEKETEKUTY, supra note 19, at 180-181. Where state and local governments regulated services trade,
the parties agreed to consult with such political units to assure their compliance with the terms of
the Declaration. Declaration, supra note 200, § 4.
203. This approach was based on a precedent in the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations when, faced
with a similar issue in the Standards and Government Procurement Codes, the United States
reduced its commitments to best-efforts undertakings. Balassa, supra note 185, at 5.12.
204. Declaration, supra note 200, § 1.
205. See Feketekuty, supra note 19, at 180. "Establishment issues are ... covered only insofar as a com-
mercial presence is required in the other country to carry out cross-border trade.' Id.
206. Israel and U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, 217 U.N.T.S. 252.
The solution was to focus the IFTA services provisions on trade, rather than investment issues,
which were the focus of the FCN Treaty. See Balassa, supra note 185, at 5.05, 5.08.
207. Declaration, supra note 200, § 1.
208. Id.
209. A representative office may only provide information regarding the services offered by the bank but
may not engage in any banking business. An agency is usually limited to making loans. A branch
may make loans and accept deposits. Representative offices, agencies and branches are extensions of
the bank in question. In contrast, a subsidiary is incorporated under the laws of the host country
and is a separate legal entity.
210. Balassa, supra note 185, at 5.09-5.10.
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citizens.21 1Second, there was concern that even if there were no violation of federal banking
statutes, including all foreign banking services would limit the discretionary authority of
banking regulators.2 12 IFTA began the practice of segregating banking issues into a special
category of sensitive issues for negotiation that was continued in later trade agreements.
There are three framework principles set forth: open market access,2 13 national treat-
ment,2 14 and transparency.215 Open market access, although not defined in the Declaration,
is generally understood to mean that national laws that prohibit entry by foreign suppliers
must be eliminated. Harmonization or standardization of national laws is not contemplated.
Instead, IFTA states that differences in national regulatory regimes in specific sectors will be
taken into account in the liberalization process.216 National treatment means that foreign
suppliers will be able to market or distribute on the same basis as nationals, including a com-
mercial presence where necessary to facilitate export or required by the host country.217
Transparency means that the parties will publish laws and regulations relating to trade in ser-
vices and will notify the other side of discriminatory provisions. In addition, foreign service
suppliers will have access to domestic channels for judicial review. 218
In addition to these core principles, three other important issues are addressed. First,
although no dispute settlement provisions are included, consistent with the non-legally
binding nature of the Declaration, periodic consultation and regulatory review procedures
are established.2 19 Second, the issue of discriminatory treatment of foreign service suppli-
ers through the exercise of administrative agency discretion is addressed by requiring the
parties to consult with their regulatory agencies to assure that they accord national treat-
ment to foreign service suppliers. 22 0 Third, public monopolies may not discriminate
against foreign suppliers in activities outside their area of special reserved rights. 22 1
Further liberalization was contemplated at the time of treaty signing, with both sides
agreeing to explore the possibility of undertaking legally binding obligations for services
within eighteen months after the signing of the Declaration. 222 This review occurred in
the fall of 1986 and negotiations were initiated on legally-binding sectoral annotations for
tourism, telecommunications, and insurance. 22 3 These agreements were never finalized. 224
By 1986, negotiations had commenced in the GATT Uruguay Round, which would cover
services. It was felt that because Israel was a GATT contracting party, further IFTA negotia-
tions would be redundant.
211. 12 U.S.C. § 72 (1994).
212. Balassa, supra note 185, at 5.11.
213. Declaration, supra note 200, § 2.
214. Id.§3.








223. FEKETEKUTY, supra note 19, at 178, 181-83.
224. This information was supplied in a conversation on July 22, 1998, with the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative (David Ranz, Israel Desk, reporting on a conversation with Carol Balassa of the
USTR, and an IFTA negotiator for the United States).
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IFTA established several important precedents for services trade that were adopted
and further refined in later trade agreements. First, it set forth a framework of broad prin-
ciples that were to be applied across a wide range of service sectors. These principles
included market access, national treatment, and transparency. Second, IFTA recognized the
special regulatory problems associated with banking. However, IFTA avoided dealing with
the difficult issues by severely limiting the banking services to which it applied. Third,
IFTA envisioned future negotiations on important service sectors in which the sensitive
regulatory issues of such sectors would be addressed and separate sectoral annexes in
which the resulting liberalizing concessions would be set forth.
C. U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT.
Three and one-half years after IFTA, the United States and Canada incorporated
legally binding provisions on financial services in the 1989 U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement (CFTA). 225 CFTA was a significant agreement in another respect - it created
the world's largest free trade area 226 between two large industrialized countries that were
each other's best trading partners.227 Although the concept of financial services liberal-
ization was novel, the idea of a free trade agreement between the parties had surfaced on
several occasions in the past, but had never been consummated due to political opposi-
225. See United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M.
281 [hereinafter CFTA]. Although preliminary discussions were held as early as 1983, formal nego-
tiations were not commenced until May 1986. They were concluded in October 1987, with the final
draft of the CFTA completed in December 1987. See Jane Sneddon Little, At Stake in the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement: Modest Gains or a Significant Setback, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY 192 (Philip King ed., 1990). United States President Ronald Reagan and
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney signed the CFTA on January 2, 1988. The CFTA was
negotiated by the United States under authority granted in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. 19
U.S.C. § 2114 (1994). It was implemented into U.S. law pursuant to the United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851, 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1994)). CFTA became effective on January 1,
1989. The bill that led to passage of the USCFTA Implementation Act was H.R. 5090, which passed
the House on August 9, 1988 and the Senate on September 19, 1988. Details of the legislative history
are presented in S. Rep. No. 509, 100th Cong. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2395.
226. In 1987, merchandise trade between Canada and the United States totaled almost $133 billion, with
U.S. exports of $60 billion and U.S. imports of $73 billion. Bilateral trade in services was also signif-
icant and approached $31 billion in 1987, with U.S. exports of $20.5 billion and imports of $10.2
billion. See U.S. DEP'T OF COM., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ADVANCE REP. OF U.S. MERCHANDISE TRADE,
Dec. 1987.
227. There is an important difference in the significance of bilateral trade to the two economies. In 1987,
U.S. trade with Canada accounted for less than one-fourth of U.S. exports and less than one-fifth of
U.S. imports. U.S. exports to Canada, expressed as a percentage of total U.S. exports, grew during
the 1980s from 18% in 1980 to 23.6% in 1987. By contrast, in 1987, the United States accounted for
almost three-fourths and two-thirds of Canadian exports and imports, respectively. See id. The U.S.
market has also been of growing importance for Canadian exports, accounting for almost 77% in
1985-1986, compared to 62% in 1980. Canadian exports to the United States account for almost
20% of Canadian GNP, while U.S. exports to Canada represent only 1.3% of U.S. GNP. See IMF,
INT'L FIN. STATS., Feb. 1988; DIRECTION OF TRADE STATS. Y.B., 1987.
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tion on both sides.228 By the early 1980s, both sides had developed political support for a
free trade agenda and were able to overcome earlier reluctance to such a pact.229 In the
area of trade in services, the United States was anxious to develop a set of rules that would
guide future trade relations and prevent a return to protectionist trade policies in
Canada.2 30 The United States sought to achieve progress in a bilateral context, where
multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of GATT on trade in services and
investment issues had met with resistance, with the hope that the resulting agreements
could later be applied in a multilateral context.23 1
1. Negotiating Objectives.
CFTA continued the U.S. policy trend begun in IFTA of extending trade agreement disci-
plines to services in a regional context. However, CFTA placed far greater emphasis on achiev-
ing concrete results in liberalizing financial services trade. In fact, removing barriers to finan-
cial services trade was a condition to U.S. acceptance of a free trade agreement.2 32 This was
the result of the significance of financial services to both economies. 233
Like IFTA, CFTA recognized that there were special regulatory problems in the area of
financial services. CFTA treated banking and securities as a special case of services trade in
228. One commentator has characterized the failure to reach an accord earlier as the product of protec-
tionist sentiments on the U.S. side and nationalist sentiments on the Canadian side. See Murray G.
Smith, The Free Trade Agreement in Context: A Canadian Perspective, in THE CANADA-U.S. FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT. THE GLOBAL IMPACT 37 (Jeffrey J. Schott & Murray G. Smith eds., 1988). For a
detailed history of the negotiations prior to CFTA, see Sperry Lea, A Historical Perspective, in
PERSPECTIVES ON A U.S.-CANADIAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 11-29 (Robert M. Stern et al. eds., 1987).
229. The negotiations for the FTA were initiated at the request of the government of Canada. The
Canadian motivation for seeking closer ties with the United States in the 1980s was based on con-
cerns about the disadvantages of Canada's small domestic market, its increasing dependence on the
U.S. economy, and growing protectionist activity in the United States. From the United States' side,
its agreement to negotiate was an acknowledgement of the importance of its trading relationship
with Canada. For a detailed negotiating history of the USCFTA, see Jeffrey J. Schott, The Free Trade
Agreement: A U.S. Assessment in The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: The Global Impact 7-12
(Jeffrey J. Schott & Murray G. Smith eds., 1988).
230. In the early 1980s, economic relations between the two countries were strained due to the introduc-
tion by the Trudeau administration of national programs designed to assert Canada's economic
sovereignty in the face of majority foreign ownership in several sectors of the economy. One of
these programs, the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) was designed to ensure that only
foreign investment proposals of significant economic interest to Canada could be allowed to pro-
ceed. This program led to several years of disinvestment activity that did not cease until the
Canadian Government replaced FIRA with the Investment Canada program, which was much
more receptive to foreign investment. See Earl Fry, The Canada- U.S. Free Trade Agreement: An
Overview, in THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE IMPACT ON SERVICE INDUSTRIES 1-2 (Earl
H. Fry & Lee H. Radebaugh eds., 1988).
231. See Little, supra note 225, at 192; Schott, supra note 229, at 1.
232. David Ruth, The U.S.-Canada Services Agreement: Review and Assessment, in THE CANADA-U.S.
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT. THE IMPACT ON SERVICE INDUSTRIES 56 (Earl H. Fry & Lee H. Radebaugh
eds., 1988).
233. DEBRA P. STEGER, A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 53 (1988).
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a separate Chapter 17.234 All other covered sectors, including insurance,235 were subject to
rules set forth in Chapters 14, 15 and 16.236 While Chapter 17, by its express terms, is self-
contained, certain provisions contained in other chapters have limited applicability to
financial services.2
37
There are a number of reasons that the negotiators wanted to treat financial services in a
separate chapter. First, each country had a special agenda in the area of financial services that
it did not want to lose sight of in the course of negotiating an agreement on other types of ser-
vices.238 The U.S. goal was to remove for U.S. banks some of the restrictions applicable gener-
ally to foreign banks operating in Canada. The Canadian negotiators focused on restrictive
U.S. legislation that prevented Canadian banks from engaging in the United States in the sort
of full-service, national banking operation they were used to pursuing in Canada. Second,
both parties acknowledged that financial services is a sensitive area and involves a unique set
of issues not common to other service areas. Therefore, both countries favored having the
agreement negotiated by financial services experts. Third, the United States did not want to
entrust dispute resolution in the area of financial services to a tribunal with no expertise in
this area, and was especially concerned that decisions by U.S. banking regulators, such as the
Federal Reserve Board, would be overruled by the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Commission,
which was created to handle dispute resolution, among other matters. 239 As a result, dispute
resolution involving financial services was to be handled separately by consultation between
the Canadian Ministry of Finance and the U.S. Department of the Treasury.240
234. See CFTA, supra note 225, art. 1706. Article 1706 defines a financial service broadly as any service of
a financial nature offered by a company authorized to do a financial institution's business by either
Canada or the United States (or a political subdivision thereof) or a holding company thereof,
except for underwriting and selling insurance policies.
235. See CFTA, supra note 225, at annex 1408.
236. Chapter 14, the general services chapter of CFTA, contains a framework of principles, including
national treatment. Chapter 15 deals with the temporary entry of business persons and Chapter 16
contains investment provisions.
237. See CFTA, supra note 225, art. 1701(1), which states that no other provision of CFTA applied to
financial services, with certain limited exceptions. These exceptions include the Article 1601(2)
commitment to remove certain investment restrictions related to foreign ownership of Canadian
controlled financial institutions. See id. art. 1601(2). While the enumerated exceptions do not
include Chapter 15, by its terms that chapter applies to entry of professional personnel in the bank-
ing and financial services industry engaging in commercial transactions. See id. annex 1502.1,
sched. 1. Certain provisions of Chapter 20 ("Other Provisions") are also made applicable and oper-
ate as limitations on the liberalizing commitments made in Chapter 17. See id. ch. 20, see also id., ch.
17. These relate to measures impacting on 1980 Tax Convention between the parties, restrictions
imposed reasons for balance of payments taken in accordance with enumerated international law
obligations, or actions taken in the interests of national security. See id. arts. 2001-2003. Monopolies
may be established, but may not engage in discriminatory sales practices or anticompetitive prac-
tices. See id. art. 2010. Chapter 21 provisions relating to collection of statistical data, amendment of
the agreement, entry into force, duration and termination are also applicable to Chapter 17 finan-
cial services activities. See id. arts. 2101, 2104-2106.
238. See Andre Saumier, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the Services Sector, in TRADE-OFFS
ON FREE TRADE: THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 327-29 (Mark Gold & David Leyton-
Brown eds., 1988).
239. CFTA, supra note 225, art. 1802. Disputes must first be submitted to the Free Trade Commission for
resolution. If no resolution is reached, the next step is arbitration. Id. arts 1805-1806.
240. See CFTA, supra note 225, art. 1704(2).
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2. The Structure of the Financial Services Provisions.
Unlike IFTA, Chapter 17 of CFTA does not contain a framework of principles that will
guide future dealings between the parties. Instead, it addresses specific trade barriers in the
banking and securities sectors that the parties regarded as particularly significant and
agreed to eliminate. In the language of trade negotiators, Chapter 17 succeeded in achiev-
ing a rollback of trade barriers relating to the right of commercial establishment and cer-
tain operating restrictions applicable to foreign banks,241 rather than a mere standstill, i.e.,
agreeing to maintain the status quo and to avoid imposing new trade barriers in the
future.24 2 In the area of cross-border services trade, a standstill was agreed to but no
attempt was made to liberalize existing rules.243 Another limitation is that Chapter 17 is
not applicable to state and local governments. 244 Therefore, it does not seek to remove all
barriers to free trade, but only the most significant ones at the federal level.
The negotiating process in the financial services area focused on removing as many
national laws that inhibited free trade in financial services as possible. This was a chal-
lenging process since the structure of banking regulation in the two countries is very dif-
ferent. Regulatory barriers to free trade existed under the laws of both countries. In the
case of Canada, the Canada Bank Act 245 sought to limit the size and operations of the
foreign banking sector due to protectionist motives. 246 In the case of the United States,
foreign banks were able to enter and operate freely.247 However, outmoded legislation
applicable to both U.S. and foreign banks restricted securities activities 248 and interstate
241. See CFTA, supra note 225, arts. 1702, 1703.
242. But see id ch. 14, art. 1402(8).
243. See id. arts. 1702(4), 1703(4). This standstill provision is subject to a carve-out for prudential regu-
lation. Id.
244. See id. art. 1701(2).
245. Foreign banks operating in Canada were subject to special rules on size of assets, capital require-
ments, branching restrictions and transactions with related entities that were not applicable to
domestic banks. Canada Bank Act of 1980, § 302 (asset cap), § 116 (capital rles), § 48 (branching)
and §174 (transactions with affiliates). Foreign ownership of Canadian banks was also limited.
Canada Bank Act of 1980, § 110.
246. John W. Swendsen, A Banking Perspective: Will It Make a Difference?, in THE CANADA-U.S. FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT-. THE IMPACr ON SERVICE INDUSTRIES 184-85 (Earl H. Fry & Lee H. Radebaugh
eds., 1988).
247. Prior to the passage of the IBA in 1978, foreign banks in the United States operated at a compara-
tive advantage to domestic banks. Among other things, they were not subject to the McFadden Act,
which restricted interstate banking. This advantage was eliminated by the IBA.
248. The Glass-Steagall Act, part of the Banking Act of 1933, consists of four provisions that create a
legal separation between commercial banking and investment banking. These sections are section
16, which prevents national banks from underwriting, selling and dealing in securities, 12 U.S.C. §
24(7) (1994), section 21, which prohibits investment banks from taking deposits and engaging in
commercial banking, 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1994), section 20, which prohibits affiliations between
commercial banks and firms engaged principally in the underwriting of stocks or other securities,
12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994), and section 32, which prevents an individual involved in investment bank-
ing from serving as an officer, director or employee of a bank, 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1994). Commercial
banks and non-bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies have in many instances been granted
regulatory approvals to engage in certain aspects of the securities business, including sponsoring
mutual funds, operating discount and full-service brokerage businesses, and underwriting and
dealing in a wide range of securities, including corporate debt and corporate equity.
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banking.2 49 Canadian banks argued that this legislation made it impossible for them to
conduct in the United States the sort of full-service, nationwide banking they were able
to carry on in Canada and the Canadian negotiators sought to have such restrictions
removed. 25 0 The U.S. negotiators, however, took the position that it was impossible to
change such legislation due to political opposition.251 These U.S. restrictions continue to
be an issue in trade agreement negotiations.
The United States made four commitments. First, the United States permitted Canadian
banks, as well as all other foreign banks operating in the United States, and American banks to
deal, underwrite, and purchase debt obligations of Canadian Government entities, to the
same extent that domestic and foreign banks in the United States were permitted to deal,
underwrite, and purchase debt obligations of U.S. Government entities. 25 2 This was a com-
promise that the United States offered in response to the Canadian request to amend the
249. Prior to enactment of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
(Riegle-Neal Act), commercial banks were prevented from branching interstate due to the
McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1994), and state law. Under the McFadden Act, national banks
were limited to operating branches in the municipality where they were headquartered or any-
where else in their headquarters state, provided the relevant state law allowed them to do so. This
provision applied to state chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. 12
U.S.C. § 321 (1994). There was no federal law prohibiting interstate branching by state-chartered
banks that were not members of the Federal Reserve System. However, state laws in many cases
prohibited out-of-state banks from opening up branches within their borders. The Riegle-Neal
Act changed this regulatory scheme and now permits both national and state banks to open
interstate branches (a) by opening new branches if a state has passed legislation expressly permit-
ting all out-of-state banks to open de novo branches and (b) through mergers between insured
banks with different home states without regard to whether such mergers are prohibited by any
state law. A state had the option to opt out of this regulatory scheme by passing laws that applied
equally to all out-of-state banks and that expressly involved merger transactions involving out-
of-state banks. Similarly, prior to passage of the Riegle-Neal Act, interstate banking, referring to
the ability of bank holding companies to own bank subsidiaries in more than one state, was lim-
ited by the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (d)(1998),
which prohibited a bank holding company operating a bank in one state from owning a bank
located in a different state, unless the law of the second state expressly permitted a foreign bank
holding company to make such an acquisition. No state law permitted this until the 1980s when
regional interstate banking compacts came into existence. Such compacts permitted foreign bank
holding companies from one state in a region that was a party to the compact to enter another
state also party to the compact. The Riegle-Neal Act revised this system by repealing the Douglas
Amendment and allowing interstate acquisitions by bank holding companies to proceed without
regard to whether state law prohibits such a transaction.
250. See Ruth, supra note 232, at 56.
251. See id., at 57; Jeffrey J. Schott and Murray G. Smith, Services and Investment in THE CANADA-
U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE GLOBAL IMPACT 143 (Jeffrey J. Schott and Murray G. Smith,
eds., 1988); The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 1988: Hearing on H.R. 5090 Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 81-82 (1988) (state-
ment of Peter A. Lelkin, Counsel, American Ins. Assn.).
252. See CFTA, supra note 225, art. 1702(1).
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Glass-Steagall Act.253 This compromise was satisfactory to the Canadians, since it captured
most of the business that Canadian banks wanted to conduct in the United States.254
Second, the United States guaranteed Canadian banks operating in the United States
the right to maintain interstate branches that were originally grandfathered under the
IBA. 255 The major Canadian banks had a significant number of units that benefitted from
this provision and thus, in effect, enjoyed greater interstate banking rights than American
banks. Since the IBA was subject to review after ten years, the U.S. CFTA provided safe-
guards that the interstate branching privileges of Canadian banks would be retained.
Third, the United States extended to Canadian banks the benefits of any future
amendments to the Glass-Steagall Act.256 The fourth commitment, which was identical for
both countries, required each country to continue to provide the other's financial institu-
tions with the rights and privileges they enjoyed as a result of existing law and policy, sub-
ject to (1) normal regulatory and prudential considerations, and (2) the obligation of each
country to consult, to liberalize further the rules governing its markets, and to extend the
benefits of such liberalization to the other's financial institutions.257
Canada also made four commitments, which were responsive to U.S. negotiators
attempts to receive national treatment and market access for U.S. banks.258 First, U.S. per-
sons were no longer subject to legal restrictions that limited foreign ownership of
Canadian-controlled financial institutions.259
Second, U.S.-controlled Canadian bank subsidiaries were no longer subject to certain
provisions of the Canada Bank Act regarding asset size, capital, branching and affiliate
transactions that discriminated against foreign banks.
Third, Canada guaranteed that it would not use its review powers governing U.S. bank
entry in a manner inconsistent with CFTA. The fourth commitment was the same as the
fourth U.S. commitment discussed above.
The significance of the CFTA financial services provisions for an understanding of
later treaty negotiations is the heavy emphasis placed on achieving concrete market access
through a roll-back of existing regulatory barriers, rather than setting up a framework of
principles that would guide future liberalization. While some principles are discernible,260
it was clear that it was bilateral concessions that the parties were after. The resulting
approach has a piecemeal look to it. The text of Chapter 17 failed to address the significant
253. Carl J. Lohmann & William C. Murden, Politics for the Treatment of Foreign Participation in
Financial Markets and their application in U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, in UNDERSTANDING
THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 157 (Donald M. McRae & Debra P. Steger eds., 1988).
254. See Lohmann & Murden, supra note 253.
255. CFTA, supra note 225, art. 1702(2).
256. Id. art. 1702(3).
257. Id. art. 1702(4).
258. Id. art. 1703(1)-(4).
259. As concerns banks, the twenty-five percent ceiling on total non-resident shareholdings was lifted
for American residents, but the ten percent limit on shares held by any one person, resident or
non-resident, remained in place.
260. These are transparency, (CFTA, supra note 225, art. 1704 (1)), and consultations among financial
services regulators on issues arising under Chapter 17, (Id. art. 1704(2)). There are no other dis-
pute settlement provisions in Chapter 17.
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regulatory barriers in a comprehensive manner or provide helpful guidance on the course
that future trade negotiations in this sector would take. Fortunately, NAFTA, which was
concluded only a few years after CFTA, filled some of these gaps.
D. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT.
Building upon the financial services provisions of CFTA, the 1994 North American
Free Trade Agreement among the United States, Mexico and Canada (NAFTA)26 1 succeeded
in achieving substantial liberalization of financial services investment and a standstill agree-
ment on financial services trade. The agreement was considered significant in that Mexico
agreed to open up its financial services markets, which had been historically closed to for-
eign trade and investment. Liberalization was to occur over a six year transition period. In
return, the United States and Canada agreed to extend some of the benefits negotiated
under CFTA to Mexico. With respect to the United States and Canada, the provisions of
CFTA were incorporated by reference, 262 but no further liberalization occurred. NAFTA,
which created the world's largest free trade area,263 was heralded as an important step
towards Western Hemisphere economic integration.264
1. Negotiating Objectives.
As in the case of CFTA, achieving success in the financial services sector was consid-
ered of paramount importance to the United States during the negotiations. 265 The United
261. See NAFTA, supra note 12. Negotiations were commenced on February 5, 1991 and concluded on
August 12, 1992, and the agreement was signed on December 17, 1992. NAFTA was negotiated by
the United States under negotiating authority granted in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988. 19 U.S.C. § 2902 (1994). It was implemented into U.S. law pursuant to the North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1993, Pub.L. 103 182, 107 Stat. 2057 (Dec.
8, 1993). 19 U.S.C. § 3301 (1998). It became effective on January 1, 1994. The bill that led to passage
of the NAFTA Implementation Act was H.R. 3450, which passed the House on November 17, 1993
and the Senate on November 20, 1993. Details of the legislative history are presented in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2552.
262. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1401(4), annex 1401.4.
263. It was estimated at the time of implementation that the NAFTA countries generated over U.S. $6
trillion in annual output and were populated by more than 360 million producers, workers and
consumers. ECON. REP. PRESIDENT 310. The North American services market was also sizeable, esti-
mated to be as large as U.S. $4.2 trillion. Jan. 1993 NEWSLETrER, U.S. Coalition for Service Industries.
264. Writers on regional economic integration have likened NAFTA to the founding of the European
Economic Community (EEC), suggesting that NAFTA, like the Treaty of Rome that established the
EEC in 1957, is only a first step in a much longer journey towards full economic integration and
monetary union, which will be accomplished in fits and starts over several decades. See GARY CLYDE
HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, WESTERN HEMISPHERE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 1-3 (1994). It should
be noted that NAFTA does not by its terms contemplate a deeper form of integration such as estab-
lishment of a customs union, although it does provide for further liberalization of trade and invest-
ment and accession of additional parties. See NAFTA, supra note 12, arts. 1403(3), 1404(4), 2204.
265. Telephone Interview with Barry S. Newman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
International Monetary and Financial Policy during the NAFTA negotiations (Sept. 15, 1998)
[hereinafter Newman Interview]. See United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Fin., 102d Cong. 450,474 (1991) (submitted material by the USITC) (stating
that the United States had a strong interest in liberalization of Mexican financial services law that
would allow greater access by U.S. firms) [hereinafter FTA Hearing].
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States had two primary motives in achieving a financial services agreement in NAFTA -
(1) to gain access to the Mexican market and (2) to encourage economic and legal reforms
as a precondition to increased integration in the Western Hemisphere.
a. Market Access.
U.S. financial institutions had a strong interest in seeking market access to the newly pri-
vatized and underdeveloped Mexican financial services markets. 266 Economic projections
indicated that there would be gains for the U.S. financial services industry as a result of a free
trade agreement with Mexico. 267 During Congressional debate on NAFTA, one member of
the House of Representatives expressed the view that it was the financial services industry
that was the driving force behind NAFTA. 268 Indeed, there was a marked involvement by the
U.S. financial services industry in the negotiations. The U.S. negotiators 269 engaged in
numerous briefings of industry groups270 throughout the negotiations and solicited individ-
266. REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY SECTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SERVICES (ISAC 13) ON THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 18 (Sept. 14, 1992) [hereinafter ISAC REPORT].
267. FTA Hearing, supra note 265, at 474. In the banking sector, it was predicted that U.S. exports of ser-
vices to Mexico would likely expand at a moderate rate if an FTA removed Mexican foreign invest-
ment restrictions and if Mexico continued to reform its financial service industry. In insurance, the
likely impact was a significant increase in U.S. investment in Mexico if certain barriers to foreign
investment were removed, leading to a moderate increase in U.S. exports. In contrast, the overall
impact on the U.S. services sector of increased trade with Mexico was predicted to be negligible due
to the small size of exports to Mexico as a proportion of U.S. services trade. See also CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGETARY AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF NAFTA 163-64 (July 1993) (economic
effects on U.S. providers in financial services likely to be very small but positive).
268. Congressman Henry Gonzalez expressed the view during House of Representatives hearings on
NAFTA that, although the financial services provisions had not been the focus of the debate, such
provisions were "the driving force" behind NAFTA, due to the amount of money that banks would
make as a result. He went on to say:
[w]hile proponents of NAFTA couch their support in the lofty ideology of so-called
'free trade' what we actually have in NAFTA are fat cats who see fatter profits from
their investments in Mexico ... banks will gain a lot from this, and at the same time
they will avoid a lot of American regulation, which got the savings and loans and in
some cases the banks into the problems that were so expensive for this country and
for this congress and for this society in the 1980s.
See 139 Cong. Rec. H8552-01, H8558 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (letter by Rep. Henry Gonzalez read
in the record).
269. The U.S. Treasury Department took the lead on negotiating the provisions on banking and securi-
ties, while the Commerce Department handled insurance matters. Experts from the Federal
Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the
Securities and Exchange Commission advised the negotiators and participated in the negotiations.
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of State were also involved. In
addition, certain state regulators and Congressional staff were consulted throughout the negotia-
tions. Financial Services Chapter of NAFTA: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking, Fin. and
Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong. 116 (1993) [hereinafter Financial Services Hearing] (letter of Barry S.
Newman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Monetary and Financial
Policy, to Rep. Henry Gonzalez dated Oct. 25, 1993 included as an addendum to the Hearing).
270. These included the U.S. Coalition of Service Industries, Financial Services Group, Bankers
Association for Foreign Trade, Texas Bankers Association, Securities Industry Association,
Investment Company Institute and American Financial Services Association. Id. at 118.
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ual points of view in preparing negotiating documents and positions.27 1 In addition,
Treasury Department and Commerce Department officials consulted regularly with the offi-
cial industry trade advisory groups that federal legislation mandated be included in all trade
negotiations, primarily the Services Policy Advisory Committee (SPAC) and the Industry
Sector Advisory Committee on Services (ISAC-13). 272 In the view of one of the chief
Treasury Department officials in the financial services chapter, this cooperative process
explained the success of the financial services negotiations for the United States. 273
Not all observers took such a benign view of this alliance between the U.S. trade nego-
tiators and private industry. In Congressional debate, Congressman Henry Gonzalez stated
that the financial services chapter was written by "all the leading, most powerful mega-
banks and their attorneys" and questioned whether such a group was capable of acting "to
protect the general interest."274 Congressional hearings were held to address concerns
about the potential for evasion of American financial regulation by U.S. banks operating in
Mexico, which might lead to losses that would have to be paid for by U.S. taxpayers275 and
charges of widespread corruption in Mexican banks and the absence of effective banking
regulation in Mexico. 276 The evidence presented was apparently not strong enough to
defeat the NAFTA.
b. Western Hemisphere Economic and Financial Law Reform.
The second motive of the United States was to consolidate and encourage the expan-
sion of recent Mexican economic and banking law reforms277 that indicated a movement
to a free market orientation. 278 The NAFTA financial services provisions were also viewed
271. Id. at 112 (statement of Barry S. Newman). Private industry provided information regarding the
types of trade barriers that hindered or prevented entry and operations by U.S. institutions. Such
information was used by the U.S. to establish negotiating priorities. Newman Interview, supra note
265.
272. Id. at 114 (letter of Barry S. Newman).
273. Id. at 112 (statement of Barry S. Newman).
274. 139 Cong. Rec. H9661-01, H9661 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1993) (statement of Rep. Henry Gonzalez).
275. Federal banking and securities regulators and a state insurance regulator provided testimony to
Congress that NAFTA would not permit U.S. financial institutions to evade regulation and would
not jeopardize the safety and soundness of such institutions. See Financial Services Hearing, supra
note 269, at 74-78 (statement of John P. LaWare, Member of the Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve Board); Id. at 87 (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, commissioner, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission); Id. at 98 (statement of Allene D. Evans, Board Member, Texas State Board
of Insurance, and Chairperson of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners).
276. See The North American Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking, Fin.
and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong. 89 156-160 (1993) (statement of Steven Davidson) (raising the
possibility of additional risk because of new activities for banks in Mexico not permitted under
U.S. law and inadequacy of Mexican banking regulation); (statement of Jack Guenther) (stating
that Mexican banking regulation adequate); see also Abuses Within the Mexican Political
Regulatory and Judicial Systems and Implications for the North American Free Trade Agreement:
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong. (1993).
277. Mexico had recently privatized its banking sector and made significant changes to its foreign invest-
ment laws. Carlos M. Nalda, NAFTA, Foreign Investment and the Mexican Banking System, 26 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 379,392 (1992).
278. OLIN WETHINGTON, FINANCIAL MARKET LIBERAIuzAnON: THE NAFTA FRAMEWORK 8 (1994).
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by the United States as providing an incentive for market-oriented economic reforms in
other Latin American countries that had begun to show renewed interest in regional eco-
nomic integration and free trade agreements. 279 Such reforms were regarded by the United
States as a precondition to removing trade and investment barriers in those countries and
establishing a hemispheric free trade area.280 In this regard, the United States was cog-
nizant of the precedential value of a financial services agreement for other integration
efforts in the Western Hemisphere. 281
c. The Negotiating Agenda.
The United States had three major goals for the financial services provisions of
NAFTA: (1) to provide a comprehensive set of rules to govern trade and investment in
financial services;282 (2) to guarantee substantial market access to Mexico for U.S. banks,
securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial institutions; 283 and (3) to pre-
serve the stability and integrity of financial markets by upholding the right of U.S. regula-
tors to oversee financial service activities. 284 These three goals were satisfied (1) by incor-
porating core principles, the most significant for the United States being national treat-
ment (including equal competitive opportunity)285 and the right of establishment for all
financial service sectors; (2) by providing "immediate and significant" market access to
U.S. firms as of the date of entry into force of NAFTA; 286 and (3) by incorporating an
exception to the obligation to remove trade barriers for nondiscriminatory prudential reg-
ulation.287 These points will be discussed in turn in the next section.
2. The Structure of the Financial Services Provisions.
a. Comparison to CFTA.
Like CFTA, NAFTA treated financial services as a specialized service industry, with a
279. Id. at 8, 9. Examples of such regional integration were the Andean Pact, Caricom, the Central
American Common Market and MERCOSUR. HUFBAUER & SCHOrr, supra note 264, at 97-129.
280. HUFBAUER & SCHyr, supra note 264, at 2.
281. WETHINGTON, supra note 278, at 11; see HUFBAUER & SCHO'rr, supra note 264, at 146. "NAFTA provi-
sions on financial... services will likely provide a model for hemispheric talks." Id.
282. While national treatment and right of establishment were considered key objectives, other princi-
ples were also sought by the United States, including the right to conduct cross-border trade, MFN
treatment, the right to offer new financial products and transfer data abroad for data processing,
the right to staff with home country nationals, and transparency of regulation. See Financial
Services Hearing, supra note 269, at 107-109 (statement of Barry Newman).
283. Id.at 107-112.
284. Id.
285. Equal competitive opportunity refers to the obligation to remove facially neutral, i.e., non-discrimi-
natory, laws that operate to place foreign competitors at a competitive disadvantage. See
WETHINGTON, supra note 278, at 11.
286. Id. at 12. (U.S. Treasury negotiators took the position that no permanent market share limitations
on the size or scope of U.S. operations in Mexico and Canada were acceptable).
287. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1410(1).
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separate Chapter 14 devoted to that topic. 288 Following the CFTA model, the U.S. negotia-
tors emphasized immediate and substantial market access in Mexico, which was
achieved. 289 Additional market access concessions were not obtained by U.S. service
providers in Canada. 290
However, in most other respects, NAFTA Chapter 14 represented a significant departure
from the CFTA approach, achieving a far more comprehensive financial services accord. Most
importantly, it succeeded in establishing a framework of principles that would be used to
guide future trade and investment in financial services. 29 1 Second, NAFTA dealt more com-
prehensively with the issue of cross-border trade in financial services than did the CFTA.292
Third, Chapter 14 covers all financial services, including insurance.293 Fourth, Chapter 14
undertakings apply to state and provincial governments, not just to the federal govern-
ment.294 Finally, Chapter 14 contains provisions for dispute resolution and enforcement. 295
NAFTA therefore represents a more principled and unified approach to financial services lib-
eralization with greater potential for effective compliance than CFTA.
b. Sector Coverage.
The scope of Chapter 14 is very broad, covering any service of a financial nature,
including insurance, as well as incidental services.296 All four modes of supply are covered.
The right of establishment provision297 covers the commercial presence mode. The cross-
border trade provision 298 covers cross-border supply, consumption abroad and presence
of natural persons.
NAFTA binds the Parties directly at the federal level of government and the Parties
have undertaken to ensure that state and provincial governments and certain self-regulato-
288. Chapter 14 is contained in Part Five of NAFTA ("Investment, Services and Related Matters"), which
also includes chapters covering cross-border trade in services (Chapter 12), foreign direct invest-
ment (Chapter 11), and temporary entry of business persons (Chapter 16). Those other chapters
were based in large part upon the comparable chapters in CFTA, with some notable additions, as in
the case of a detailed dispute settlement mechanism for investment disputes in Chapter 11. Chapter
14 on financial services is not self-contained. Other sections of NAFTA are also applicable, either by
specific cross-reference within Chapter 14 or elsewhere or because they are generally applicable. Of
particular importance are rules of origin contained in Chapter 12, a number of the investment pro-
visions of Chapter 11, including the dispute resolution provisions, rules for temporary entry of
financial service personnel contained in chapter 16 and the dispute resolution provisions of
Chapter 20 (as modified by the more specialized dispute resolution provisions of Chapter 14). See
NAFTA, supra note 12, chs. 11, 12, 14, 16, 20.
289. Id. annex VII, Schedule of Mexico.
290. The U.S. attempts to seek further liberalization in the areas of direct branching by U.S. financial
institutions and cross-border trade were rejected by Canada. Newman Interview, supra note 265.
291. Id. arts. 1401-1415.
292. Id. art. 1404.
293. Id. arts. 1401,1416.
294. Id. art. 105.
295. Id.arts. 1413-1415.
296. Id. art. 1416, def. of "financial service.'
297. Id. art. 1403.
298. Id. arts. 1404, 1416.
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ry organizations comply with the provisions of NAFTA. 299 Local governments and other
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are not so bound. The activities of public enti-
ties, i.e., a central bank, monetary authority, or financial institution owned or controlled
by a Party, are excluded from the provisions of Chapter 14.300
c. Framework of Principles.
The development of a framework of principles was important for several reasons.
First, NAFTA did not liberalize all trade in financial services among the three parties and a
framework was therefore needed to guide future negotiations among the parties. Second,
in view of the fact that NAFTA is styled as a multilateral agreement with a provision for
accession by other state parties, 301 a framework was necessary to guide negotiations with
new entrants. Finally, a framework places NAFTA squarely within the GATT tradition of a
nondiscriminatory and principles-based approach to trade liberalization, which has
proved conducive to the process of trade liberalization.
There are two types of principles set forth - substantive and procedural. The most
important principles established by Chapter 14 from the U.S. perspective were substan-
tive rights -- the right of establishment 302 and the right to national treatment.30 3 Other
substantive principles were the right to maintain cross-border trade,304 the right to
most-favored-nation treatment, 30 5 the right to offer new financial products and to
transfer information for data processing purposes, 306 and the right to select senior man-
agement and boards of directors without onerous nationality requirements. 30 7 The prin-
ciples included in the framework are in many instances compromised by country-specif-
ic reservations that each Party was allowed to take.308 The applicability of the principles
299. Id. arts. 105, 1402. The self-regulatory organizations covered are those that a foreign provider would
need access to in order to provide financial services.
300. Id. arts. 1401(3), 1416, def. of "public entities.' The excluded activities included the operation of a
public retirement plan and fiscal operations of a Party or its public entities.
301. Id. art. 2204.
302. Id. art. 1403.
303. Id. art. 1405.
304. Id. art. 1404.
305. Id. art. 1406.
306. Id. art. 1407.
307. Id. art. 1408.
308. Pursuant to article 1409, these reservations were set forth in schedules for each of the NAFTA
Parties (Schedule(s)) attached to Annex VII. NAFTA, supra note 12, annex VII, Schedules of
Mexico, Canada and United States. There are three parts to each Schedule. Part A contained reser-
vations in effect on January 1, 1994, the date of NAFTA implementation, that do not conform to
the provisions of Articles 1403-1408. Federal non-conforming measures had to be scheduled by
January 1, 1994. U.S. state and Canadian provincial measures could be reserved if scheduled by
January 1, 1994 (or by January 1, 1995, in the case of certain U.S. states). Id. Annex 1409.1. Part B
contained negotiated exceptions to Articles 1403-1408. The important market opening concessions
made by Mexico were set forth in Part B of its Schedule. Part C contained additional commitments
of a NAFTA Party that modify or expand its obligations under Chapter 14. The rationale for catego-
rizing a particular item as a reservation or as an additional commitment is not always clear. The
purpose of these reservations was to grandfather, i.e., preserve, certain existing discriminatory or
non-conforming measures or to take exceptions to specific provisions. Grandfathering meant that
inconsistent laws were not required to be amended or' repealed.
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is also limited by the operation of across-the-board exceptions, including the prudential
regulation exception 30 9 and an exception for nondiscriminatory measures taken for
monetary and exchange rate policy reasons.3 10 In addition to these substantive princi-
ples, there are two important procedural principles established - transparency 31' and
dispute resolution. 312
(i) Substantive Principles.
(a) Right of Establishment.
Financial service providers of a NAFTA Party may establish a commercial presence in
another NAFTA Party through one or more separate financial institutions, may expand geo-
graphically, and may own financial institutions without being subject to special ownership
requirements for foreigners, 3 13 subject to reservations listed in the Schedules.314 Although
NAFTA recognized the principle that financial institutions should have the right to decide
the form of juridical entity through which they conduct business, 315 the Parties retained the
right to require a subsidiary form of organization until such time as U.S. law permits nation-
wide branching. 316 Canada and Mexico required this provision due to U.S. laws restricting
interstate branching, which they viewed as a significant barrier to market access. 317 After the
date of entry into force of NAFTA, the United States liberalized these restrictions through
passage of the Riegle-Neal Act.318 The NAFTA Parties have agreed to reconsider the sub-
sidiary form of organization requirement in view of this change in U.S. law.3 19
The right of establishment was strengthened by importing into Chapter 14 many of
the protections afforded investors under Chapter 11.320 These protections include the
309. Id. art. 1410(1).
310. Id. art. 1410(2). This provision was induded at the request of Mexico. Newman Interview, supra
note 265.
311. Id. art. 1411.
312. Id.art. 1412-1416.
313. Article 1211 contains the rules of origin which apply by cross-reference and limit the right of estab-
lishment and other rights granted under Chapter 14. Such rights may be denied if, for example, the
service is being provided by an enterprise owned or controlled by nationals of a non-Party and that
enterprise does not have substantial business activities within a Party's territory. Id. art. 1211(2).
Canada has imposed a more stringent requirement that an enterprise be controlled by one or more
residents of the other Party. Id. annex VII(B), Schedule of Canada.
314. Id. annex VII, Schedules of Canada, Mexico and United States.
315. Id. art. 1403(1).
316. Id art. 1403(3).
317. WETHINGTON, supra note 278, at 3. If U.S. banks were allowed to branch into Mexico and Canada,
which did not have restrictive branching laws, they would have had a competitive advantage over
Mexican and Canadian banks entering the United States.
318. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, § 114,
108 Stat. 2238,2366 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 43 (1994)).
319. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1403. The Financial Services Committee of NAFTA plans to consider
this revision in the light of the Riegle-Neal Act. Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, Report for the NAFTA Commission Meeting (Sept. 1998), <http://www.infoex-
port.gc.ca/nafta/1412-e.asp>. The branch form of establishment is more desirable than a subsidiary
because it requires commitment of less capital.
320. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1401(2).
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right to repatriate capital in hard currency, 321 subject to a balance of payments crisis
exception,322 freedom from unlawful expropriation, and the right to receive full, fair and
effective compensation in the event of expropriation. 323 An investor in the financial ser-
vices sector may have recourse against a NAFTA party through application of the dispute
settlement provisions of Chapter 11.324 These provisions are the product of U.S. concerns
about foreign direct investment and reflect the U.S. view of adequate compensation in the
event of expropriation. 325
(b) National Treatment.
NAFTA provides for national treatment requiring that investors in financial institu-
tions, financial institutions, and cross-border providers of financial services are to be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that provided to domestic persons in like cir-
cumstances. 326 This undertaking is subject to substantial reservations taken in national
schedules. 327 National treatment must grant equal competitive opportunities 328 to foreign
service providers and may be achieved by either different or identical treatment.329
(c) Most-Favored-Nation Treatment.
In the event that a NAFTA party grants better than national treatment to a non-
NAFTA party, it must grant the same treatment to the investors in financial institutions
and their investments, financial institutions, and cross-border financial service providers
of other NAFTA parties under the MFN principle. 330 A special case of this type of treat-
ment is the recognition of prudential regulatory measures by a NAFTA party. If such
recognition occurs, other NAFTA parties must have the right to demonstrate that they
maintain equivalent regulation and receive similar treatment. 331
(d) Cross-Border Trade.
Like the CFTA, NAFTA only succeeded in achieving a standstill with respect to cross-
border trade, meaning that the status quo was frozen as of the effective date. New measures
321. Id. art. 1109.
322. Id. art. 2104.
323. Id. art. 1110.
324. Id. arts. 1115-1138.
325. For a comparison of the U.S. position and the evolving international standard, see Patrick M.
Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modem Tribunals and the International Law of
Expropriation, 85 Am. J. INT'L L. 474 (1991).
326. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1405.
327. Id. annex VII, Schedules of Canada, Mexico and United States.
328. Id. art. 1405(6).
329. Id. art. 1405(5). This provision recognizes that identical treatment may disadvantage foreign
providers.
330. Id. art. 1406(1). This might occur if a NAFTA party entered into a bilateral treaty with a non-
NAFTA party granting better treatment.
331. An example is the Canada-U.S. Multijurisdictional Accord on Securities Offerings, which is intend-
ed to facilitate cross-border securities offerings by allowing Canadian firms to use, for U.S. securities
law offerings, financial statements prepared in accordance with Canadian accounting standards.
SEC Release No. 33-6902, International Series Release No. 291 (June 13, 1991); Release No. 34-
29355, International Series Release No. 292 (June 21, 1991). WETHINGTON, supra note 278, at 111.
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restricting cross-border trade may not be adopted, subject to the right of the parties to take
reservations in their Schedules. 332 Both the United States and Canada have reserved the
right to take any measure restricting cross-border trade with the other,333 and Mexico has
also reserved the right to take specified measures restricting cross-border trade in the
future. 334 The reason for the lack of progress on this issue was the reluctance of Canada
and Mexico to permit an increase in the delivery of financial services without a commer-
cial presence subject to local regulatory controls. 335
Despite these limitations, NAFTA moved beyond CFTA in two respects. First, Chapter
14 sets forth the principle that consumers may freely purchase financial services when visit-
ing another NAFTA party.336 However, NAFTA countries are not required to permit finan-
cial services providers of another NAFTA country to do business or to solicit business within
their territories. 337 Therefore, this principle is weaker than it appears on its face. Second,
Chapter 14 contained a commitment to consult on future liberalization of cross-border
trade, and also set forth a definite time frame 338 and a partial agenda for such talks. 339
(e) Other Substantive Principles.
New financial services may be provided and information transferred across borders
for purposes of data processing.340 Nationality requirements for senior management may
not be imposed and no more than a simple majority of the board of directors must be
composed of nationals of the host country.341
(ii) Procedural Principles.
(a) Transparency.
While CFTA contained a bare-bones requirement that government procedures be made
transparent, Chapter 14 of NAFTA contains assurances of greater disclosure and expedited
treatment in government action with respect to foreign financial service providers. 342 The
two main areas covered are promulgation of financial services regulations and processing of
applications. 343 In the case of regulations, interested persons must be given an opportunity
332. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1404(1).
333. Id. annex VII(B), Schedule of Canada and United States. The purpose of this reservation was to
exclude securities trade between U.S. and Canada from the standstill. WETHINGTON, supra note 278,
at 115.
334. Id. annex VII(B), Schedule of Mexico.
335. Newman Interview, supra note 265.
336. Id. art. 1404(2).
337. Id.
338. Such talks must occur no later than January 1, 2000. Id. art. 1404(4), annex 1404.4.
339. Expanding the scope of cross-border trade in insurance services and removing Mexican limitations
on cross-border insurance trade were on the agenda. See id. annex 1404.4.
340. Id art. 1407. This provision takes account of the rapid rate of change in this industry due to tech-
nology and was considered necessary to allow parties to introduce innovative financial products
without the need to enter into further negotiations. See WETHINGTON, supra note 278, at 118-119.
341. SeeNAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1408.
342. Id. art. 1411.
343. See id
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to review proposed regulations and comment on them. 344 This requirement will prevent
NAFTA parties from enacting rules adverse to a foreign party's interest without giving that
party an adequate opportunity to participate in the rule-making process. In the case of appli-
cations, regulatory agencies must disclose the requirements for application and must act on
applications within a specified number of days. 345 This will alleviate the problem of abuse of
regulatory agency discretion that disadvantages foreign service providers.
(b) Dispute Resolution and Remedies.
Providing for dispute settlement by financial services experts was an important issue
during the negotiations. 346 Unlike CFTA, which merely provided for the possibility of con-
sultations between the parties on issues arising under the financial services chapter,
NAFTA Chapter 14 sets up an institutional mechanism for government-to-government
settlement of financial services disputes and enforcement of awards. 347 First, Chapter 14
sets up a Financial Services Committee to supervise implementation of Chapter 14, to
consider issues referred to it by a NAFTA party and to participate in dispute settlement.348
Second, the general dispute settlement provisions of Chapter 20 are made applicable to
financial services except as expressly modified by Chapter 14. 3 49 A three-tier procedure is
established, consisting of (1) consultations among the parties with the optional participa-
tion of financial regulatory officials, 350 (2) conciliation and mediation through the Fair
Trade Commission, 35 1 the primary administrative body under NAFTA, 352 and (3) formal
arbitration in front of a panel of financial services experts. 353 Parties are required to follow
these steps in order and utilize arbitration only if the more informal methods have been
tried and failed. 354 Third, remedies are provided for enforcement of arbitration awards. A
final report of an arbitral panel is binding on a NAFTA party,355 but if such Party does not
comply with its terms, a complaining Party may suspend application of benefits under
NAFTA.356 This suspension may only apply to the financial services sector.357 In other
words, cross-retaliation is not permitted.358
As discussed previously, the specialized dispute settlement provisions of Chapter 11
apply with respect to financial services investment disputes between investors and NAFTA
parties. It is therefore an exception to the rule that NAFTA provides only government-to-
government dispute settlement and is desirable for U.S. investors in financial services
344. See id. art. 1411(1).
345. See id. art. 1411(2)-(4).
346. Newman Interview, supra note 265.
347. See NAFTA, supra note 12, ch. 14.
348. Id. art. 1412.
349. See id. art. 1414(1).
350. See id. arts. 1413, 2006, annexes 1412.1, 1413.6.
351. See id. art. 2007.
352. Id. art. 2001.
353. See id. arts. 1414, 2008-17.
354. See id.
355. Id. art. 2018.
356. See id. art. 2019.
357. See id. art. 1414(5).
358. See i art. 2019(2) (regarding cross-retaliation).
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because it provides recourse in the event of nationalization or expropriation. The invest-
ment dispute settlement provisions call for binding international arbitration under the
rules of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), two widely
accepted bodies of rules for international arbitration. 359
d. Market Access Achieved in Mexico.
The success of U.S. efforts to achieve market access in Mexico can be judged by ana-
lyzing Mexico's Schedule to Annex VII. 360 The market opening concessions made by
Mexico were substantial. From the perspective of U.S. financial service providers and
investors, the most significant provisions were those permitting investors to apply to
acquire or establish Mexican-chartered financial institutions. 361 Such institutions are
referred to in Mexico's Schedule as "foreign financial affiliates." Foreign financial affiliates
in the banking, securities, and insurance industries were allowed to enter in stages over a
transition period ending on January 1, 2000.362 During that transition period, foreign
financial affiliates were subject to various limitations on market access including the fol-
lowing: (1) limits on individual firm size for banks, securities firms, and insurance compa-
nies, expressed as maximum capital limits, (2) limits on aggregate market share for all
banks, securities firms, and insurance companies, and (3) limits on the maximum amount
of acquisitions, which means that the largest Mexican financial institutions are off-limits to
foreign ownership.363
The purpose of the transition period was to permit the Mexican financial services
industry to adjust to recent changes in domestic law, including the privatization of
Mexican banks that occurred in the early 1980s. This approach was lauded by one of the
U.S. financial services lobbying groups as a good compromise that responded to Mexico's
desire for a phased approach to market penetration while at the same time satisfying the
U.S. business community's need for predictability.364
Another provision of special interest was the possibility for'a U.S. financial institution,
once lawfully established in Mexico, to set up a financial group holding company under
Mexican law, which would be permitted to establish or acquire institutions engaging in a
full range of financial activities, including banking, securities, insurance, factoring, leasing,
bonding, and trust services. 365
359. See id. art. 1120.
360. See id. annex VII, Schedule of Mexico.
361. Id. annex VII(B),Schedule of Mexico.
362. Id. annex VII(B), Schedule of Mexico. Providers of foreign exchange, bonding and general deposit
warehousing services were able to enter immediately.
363. Id.
364. Trade Agreements Resulting from the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 122
(1994) (testimony and statement of Mark E. Lackritz, President, Securities Industry Association, on
behalf of U.S. Coalition of Service Industries, Financial Services Group) [hereinafter 1994 House
Hearing].
365. NAFTA, supra note 12, annex VII(C)(5), Schedule of Mexico.
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e. Prudential Regulation.
U.S. financial regulatory authorities were concerned about the need to continue to
regulate financial institutions based on consumer protection concerns and safety and
soundness concerns with respect to individual financial institutions and the financial sys-
tem generally.366 As a result, there is a carve-out for prudential regulation that limits the
applicability of other provisions of Chapter 14.367 The prudential regulation exception
permits a Party to take reasonable measures consistent with the undertakings of Chapter
14 to protect the integrity of the financial system, the safety and soundness of financial
institutions, and investors, depositors and other financial market participants. 368 While
this provision has not yet been tested, it could justify measures denying the right of estab-
lishment, national treatment or other obligation undertaken by a Party.
E. WTO AGREEMENT ON FINANCIAL SERVICES.
1. The Long Road to a Financial Services Agreement.
Unlike CFTA and NAFTA, which contained separate chapters on financial services
that were accepted by the United States as part of a complete trade agreement package at
the conclusion of negotiations, the GATS Agreement on Financial Services (FSA) was not
completed at the end of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in 1993.369 Rather, it
took four more years of negotiations devoted to financial services to produce an agreement
that the United States was prepared to accept.
366. Financial Services Hearing, supra note 269, at 68-81, 82-94 (statements of John P. LaWare, Federal
Reserve Board and Mary Schapiro, Securities and Exchange Commission).
367. SeeNAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1410(1).
368. Id.
369. Pursuant to the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations dated April 15, 1994, the negotiating parties agreed to submit to their competent
authorities for approval the WTO Agreement to which were annexed the texts of each of the agree-
ments reached at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in December 1993 and to adopt certain
Ministerial declarations and decisions. They also recommended the acceptance by Uruguay Round
participants of the WTO Agreement and its entry into force by January 1, 1995. Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS THE LEGAL TEXTS
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter FINAL ACT]. The Uruguay Round negotiations were com-
menced pursuant to the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration of September 20, 1986, were
reviewed at Ministerial meetings held in Montreal, Canada in December 1988 and Brussels,
Belgium in December 1990, and were substantially concluded in December 1993. It was agreed that
negotiations would be continued in a number of service sectors, including financial services,
telecommunications and movement of natural persons. The Uruguay Round agreements were
negotiated by the United States under negotiating authority granted in the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984. 19 U.S.C. § 1654 (1994). It was implemented into U.S. law pursuant to the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub.L. 103-465. 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (1994). It became effective on January 1, 1995.
The bill that led to passage of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act was H.R. 5110, which passed the
House on November 29, 1994, and the Senate on December 1, 1994. Details of the legislative history
are presented in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773.
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a. Status of FSA at Close of the Uruguay Round Negotiations.
In the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States sought full market access and
national treatment commitments that would benefit U.S. financial service providers. As
will be discussed below, the United States was concerned about the problem of free-riders
- namely those countries that refused to make liberalizing commitments themselves yet
were entitled to the benefits of concessions made by others pursuant to operation of the
MFN clause in GATS. By the end of the Uruguay Round in 1993, commitments made by
key countries in the areas of banking and other financial services (excluding insurance) fell
short of the standard set by the United States.370 Given these shortcomings, the United
States responded by reducing its commitments. As discussed below, market access and
national treatment are binding principles in the FSA only to the extent set forth in national
schedules prepared by each WTO Member. In addition, while MFN treatment is in theory
a general principle in the FSA, WTO Members are in fact allowed to take exceptions for
nonconforming measures. The United States limited its own concessions in two ways. The
United States took a reservation in its national schedule for new access and new powers in
banking and other financial services (excluding insurance). 371 It also took a corresponding
MFN exemption in those segments of the U.S. markets. 372 The purpose of the reservation
370. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STATUS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS
UNDER THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 1 dated Apr. 30, 1995 [hereinafter 1995
TREASURY FSA REPORT], (pursuant to Statement of Administrative Action, p. 309, accompanying the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465)). As of the end of December 1993,60 countries,
including the United States and the European Union on behalf of its 12 member states, submitted
schedules in banking, securities, and other financial services including insurance. Eleven additional
countries scheduled commitments in the insurance sector. The United States evaluated 39 of these
commitments, choosing those that were submitted by commercially important developed and
developing countries, countries with which the United States conducted active negotiations and
countries of special geographic, political or other interest (excluding Canada and Mexico which
were covered under NAFTA). Only five of these country schedules contained what the United States
considered "high quality" commitments and they were submitted by countries characterized as
having relatively open markets to begin with, including the European Union. The largest group of
schedules, including many Eastern European countries, contained "a few major flaws'; namely
omission or unclear coverage of some sectors and retention of one or two important barriers to
market access and national treatment. A final group of countries, including Japan, economically sig-
nificant countries in Latin America, and the newly industrialized countries of Asia, submitted unac-
ceptable schedules with limited sectoral coverage and failure to address significant market access
and national treatment barriers. Some of these countries also took MFN exemptions for all or part
of their financial services sector, meaning that their best available treatment would not be accorded
to other WTO members. See id. at 4-6.
371. U.S. Schedule of Commitments and List of MFN Exemptions, WTO Doc. GATS/SC/90 Suppl. 3
(Feb. 26, 1998).
372. See id. The United States argued that with its relatively open financial services market and the
absence of substantial market access commitments by particular developing countries, application
of the GATS MFN rule in the financial services sector would work to its disadvantage. The United
States maintained the disadvantage would occur because in future negotiations to open other mar-
kets around the world it would have no leverage due to automatic application of the MFN rule
requiring the United States to maintain its high level of market access. Furthermore, the MFN rule
wotuld not prevent those same countries from maintaining their current restriction against foreign
firms, including those against the United States. 1995 TREASURY FSA REPORT, supra note 370, at 4-6.
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and MFN exemption was to allow the United States to differentiate among countries seek-
ing future access to U.S. markets, the expansion of existing U.S. operations, or the benefit
from new U.S. activities legislation. 373 Several other countries also took MFN exemptions
in financial services for the same reason. 374
As part of the Final Act, the parties agreed to an extended negotiation period for
financial services, ending six months after entry into force of the WTO Agreement on
January 1, 1995. 375 After December 1993, the United States continued to negotiate with
commercially important developed and developing countries.376 The United States made
some progress in bilateral negotiations with Japan, which resulted in an October 1994
agreement on insurance377 and a January 1995 agreement on financial services.378
b. 1995 Interim FSA.
By June 30, 1995, the end of the six-month period after entry into force of the WTO
Agreement, the United States was still not satisfied with the level of commitments made by
certain developing countries to open their financial services markets.3 79 The United States
373. 1995 TREASURY FSA REPORT, supra note 370, at 6,7.
374. See id. at 7. In the area of insurance, the overall level of commitments was deemed inadequate,
but the United States did not take a reservation or MFN exemption, although it retained the right
to do so later. Id.
375. FINAL ACT, supra note 369. This extension was granted pursuant to the Second Annex on
Financial Services and Decision on Financial Services. During that period, WTO Members were
free to improve, modify or withdraw all or part of their commitments and to finalize their posi-
tions relating to MFN exemptions. They further agreed not to apply the MFN exemptions they
had taken pursuant to the Annex on Article II Exemptions that were conditioned on the level of
commitments undertaken by other participants.
376. 1995 TREASURY FSA REPORT, supra note 370, at 8-16.
377. See Insurance Measures, supra note 63.
378. See Financial Services Measures, supra note 63. This agreement focused on three areas in which for-
eign financial institutions were most disadvantaged, namely investment management of pension
funds, corporate securities underwriting and cross-border financial services. Id. at 618.
379. The United States was dissatisfied with the offers of a handful of developing countries, including
Brazil and several Asian nations. Frances Williams et al., Global Trade Deal Agreed Over Financial
Services: Japan and South Korea Join to Open Markets, FIN. TIMES, July 27, 1995, at 18, available in
LExiS, NEWS Library, Fintime file [hereinafter Global Trade Deal]. In Congressional hearings on
the FSA in June 1995, Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin stated the U.S. negotiating position as
follows:
A few parties to the negotiations made offers that would have provided what we
were seeking. However, many offers did not provide acceptable market access and
national treatment commitments. Countries sought to maintain a range of restric-
tions - from prohibitions on new licenses for foreign firms to discriminatory regu-
latory and legal requirements - that could not be justified, except as a way of keep-
ing foreign firms out. Some also held back from committing themselves to allowing
U.S. firms now in their markets to continue operations on current terms. In the
end, we could not commit ourselves to granting essentially full market access and
national treatment to firms from other countries that would not open their markets
to our firms and commit to keeping them open.
Senate FSA Hearing, supra note 6, at 45 (statement of Robert E. Rubin, Secretary, U.S. Department
of the Treasury).
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announced its intention to remove most of its offer in financial services and to take an
MFN exemption for the whole of the financial services sector with respect to new entrants,
expansion, and new activities. 380 In essence, this meant that the United States was allowed
to discriminate among foreign financial service providers, offering more access to those
trading partners who opened their markets on a reciprocal basis. 38 1 This was considered a
surprise decision by the United States for "this [was] the first time a global trade agree-
ment ha[d] been reached without the U.S. and the first time the U.S. ha[d] negotiated a
deal and then walked away from it.' 382
The negotiations were extended at the suggestion of the European Union for an addi-
tional one-month period in an attempt to salvage the FSA. The other WTO Members
agreed to an interim FSA that was implemented for an initial period up to November 1,
1997. At that time, WTO Members would have an opportunity during the following sixty
days to modify or improve their offers on financial service schedules and to take MFN
exemptions in financial services. 38 3 This was termed a "second best result" by the WTO
Director-General due to the failure of the United States to enter binding commitments.384
The WTO Director-General expressed the hope that the United States would reenter the
multilateral MFN framework at the expiration of the interim FSA, if not sooner.385
380. U.S. Schedule of Specific Commitments, WTO Doc. GATS/SC/90/Suppl. 1, App. A (July 28, 1995);
see WTO Press Release (Press/18) (July 26, 1995) <http://www.wto.org/wto/archives/addpr3.htm>
[hereinafter WTO Press Release]. Secretary Rubin stated in testimony before Congress on the FSA
in June 1995:
To be sure, the decision to accept or refuse an MFN obligation is a tough one. The
benefits of accepting an MFN obligation could be substantial. Countries which have
made attractive market-opening commitments would bind those commitments
through the GATS. U.S. firms would be assured of important new opportunities to
compete in exciting new markets....But there would be a serious downside to our
irrevocably accepting an MFN obligation, assuming that commercially significant
countries continued to retain restrictions against foreign firms. GATS most favored
nation rules would not allow us to treat countries which do not open their markets
to us any differently from those that do. All WTO member countries' firms would
be entitled to full market access and national treatment in the United States. In
other words, the few closed markets would be able to free-ride on the agreement we
reach with other market-opening WTO members, such as the European Union. We
would lose the leverage we now have to open markets by taking other countries'
practices into account when their firms apply to do business over here.
See id. Senate FSA Hearing, supra note 6, at 46-47.
381. See WTO Press Release, supra note 380. Unlike the European Union, the United States had not writ-
ten the concept of conditional reciprocity (matching terms offered by other countries) into its law.
382. Frances Williams, Financial Services Deal Sidelines the U.S.-European Union Seizes World Trade
Leadership; Washington Downplays Controversy; Japan Treads Carefully FIN. TIMES, July 27, 1995, at 6
(quoting an unnamed senior trade official), available in LEXIS, New Library, Fintime File. [here-
inafter Financial Services Deal].
383. Second Protocol to General Agreement on Trade in Services (July 24, 1995), 35 I.L.M. 199
<http://www.wto.org/wto/services/2-prote.htm>.
384 SeeWTO Press Release, supra note 380 (quoting WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero).
385. See icL
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The interim FSA commitments were described by the WTO Director-General as "sub-
stantial "'386 This statement may be considered accurate if the number of commitments,
rather than the contents of such commitments, is the criterion for evaluation. However,
other assessments were less praiseworthy, with a leading financial newspaper terming it "a
deal which offers some genuine market-opening beyond existing practice ... [but which] is
mostly 'guarantees' of existing market access as a basis for further liberali[z]ation' 387 The
interim FSA was also praised for its symbolic significance, in addition to the economic
benefits it might produce, and was termed a "declaration of support by WTO Members for
the principle of multilateralism;' with the role of the European Union in "wresting...
international trade leadership away from the U.S." duly noted.3 88
c. 1997 FSA.
Upon the expiration of the interim FSA on November 1, 1997, WTO Members were
again free to table new commitments. On December 12, 1997, the day before the negotiating
deadline for new offers, the United States circulated a document entitled "Revised
Conditional Offer on Financial Services' 389 In that document, the United States set forth its
offer to fully liberalize its financial services markets, which consisted of two changes to its
existing FSA schedule: First, the United States offered to remove the limitation on its com-
mitments with respect to new entrants, expansion of existing activities, and the conduct of
new activities. 390 Second, the United States offered to delete language permitting differential
treatment by it of countries based on reciprocity measures or certain international agree-
ments. 391 The United States stated that its offer was conditioned upon other negotiating par-
ties undertaking comprehensive commitments to preserve foreign firms' existing ownership
and activities and to provide substantially full market access and national treatment on an
MFN basis in their financial services sectors. A phase-in of national treatment and market
access commitments over time was considered acceptable. 392 The U.S. strategy of forcing the
386. See id. According to the WTO, 76 WTO Members made commitments in financial services, with
approximately 30 (counting the EU as one) offering improvements. WTO Press Release, supra note
380. The advantages of the interim FSA were described as (1) bringing new opportunities and
greater security and predictability for investors in banking, insurance and other financial services
activities; (2) promoting merchandise and services trade where access to financial services is need-
ed; (3) facilitating new financial flows to developing and transition economies. Id.
387. See Financial Services Deal, supra note 382. Among the achievements cited were promises of
increased liberalization in the Asian and Latin American markets, including Thailand and Brazil,
and concessions by Japan and South Korea in the insurance and securities sector. See Global Trade
Deal, supra note 379.
388. See Financial Services Deal, supra note 382.
389. WTO, COMMITTEE ON TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES, COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, REVISED CONDITIONAL OFFER ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, S/FIN/W/12/Add.5/Rev.2 (Dec. 12,
1997) <http://www.ustr.gov/agreements/index.html> [hereinafter Revised Conditional Offer].
390. This restriction was contained in headnote 2 to its 1995 Schedule. In addition, the Revised
Conditional Offer dropped a number of state restrictions with respect to issuances of licenses to
non-residents and residency or citizenship requirements and provided national treatment with
respect to the costs of Federal Reserve examinations. The revised offer also extended to foreign




hands of recalcitrant countries apparently worked, for the United States announced its inten-
tion of tabling its improved commitments the next day.
Seventy countries made either new or improved offers to allow foreign financial firms to
expand or maintain access to their national markets.393 In response, the United States
announced its intention to enter into the agreement, noting that the United States had led
the successful effort to conclude the multilateral FSA and secured an agreement that was
"dramatically improved" from the 1995 interim FSA. 394 The new and improved offers were
annexed to the Fifth Protocol to the GATS,395 which will remain open for governments to
accept until January 29, 1999, and will enter into force no later than March 1, 1999.396 On
that date, commitments of 102 WTO Members will become effective covering (in U.S. dol-
lars) $17.8 trillion in global securities assets, $38 trillion in global bank lending and $2.2 tril-
lion in worldwide insurance premiums. 397 The WTO estimated that the FSA would cover
ninety-five percent of world trade in banking, insurance, and securities.398
2. Negotiating Objectives.
Achieving an agreement in trade in services was a top priority for the United States in
the Uruguay Round 399 and putting in place rules in banking and insurance was considered
of paramount interest to the United States.400 Financial services was one of the most diffi-
cult service sectors for liberalization efforts due to the wide range of industries covered,
including banking, securities, insurance, and other financial services. 40 1
393. There were fifty-six offers tabled, with the proposals of the fifteen nations comprising the European
Union being counted as one offer. WTO Press/86, supra note 9.
394. See Rubin and Barshefsky, supra note 11.
395. The Schedules of Specific Commitments and Lists of Article II Exemptions of individual countries
can be found at the WTO Web Site <http://www.wto.org/wto/services/finsched.htm> (viewed
10/8/98).
396. Some countries will be able to phase in their commitments over time. The United States stated that
it will continue to negotiate with countries like South Korea and Malaysia to improve their offers.
Transcript: U.S. Briefing on Financial Services Accord (statement of United States Trade
Representative Charlene Barshefsky) (Dec. 14, 1997) <http://www.usia.gov/topical/
econ/wto/wtct125c.htm> (viewed 10/8/98) [hereinafter Transcript].
397. See Rubin and Barshefsky, supra note 11.
398. SeeWTO Press/86, supra note 9.
399. The U.S. negotiating objectives for the GATT Uruguay Round were set forth in a communication
prepared by the Office of the United States Trade Representative dated November 30, 1988 in con-
nection with the Montreal Mid-Term Review. The purpose of the Mid-Term Review was to assess
progress made in the first two years of the Uruguay Round negotiations and to outline the objec-
tives for the remaining two years. The U.S. negotiating objectives were listed, in order of impor-
tance, as better rules for trade in agriculture, the first ever GATT rules for trade in services, adequate
protection in the GATT for intellectual property rights, elimination of trade-related investment
restrictions, better market access for U.S. exporters and stronger provisions for resolving trade dis-
putes. OFFICE OF THE UNIfED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, GATT, URUGUAY ROUND PROGRESS
REPORT, at 23 (Nov. 30, 1988) [hereinafter U.S. MID-TERM REviEW LETTER]. At the same time, it was
recognized that services trade liberalization presented some of the most difficult issues. See id. at 2.
400. See id. at 6.
401. REPORT OF THE SERVICES POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (SPAC) ON THE RESULTS OF THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATION, at 8 (Jan. 12, 1994) [hereinafter SPAC].
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The United States had two major motivations for pursuing a financial services agreement
through the WTO. Testifying in Congressional hearings held in 1995 on the FSA, Treasury
Secretary Robert E. Rubin stated that the United States was placing emphasis on the financial
services negotiations (1) to help the U.S. economy and advance the interests of the U.S. finan-
cial services industry, and (2) to advance the development of international capital markets. 402
a. Market Access.
Congressional hearings on the FSA reflected the views of private industry and U.S
Government officials that U.S. financial service providers were disadvantaged in operating in
foreign markets that offered the greatest opportunities for growth. Except in the OECD coun-
tries, these markets were plagued by a lack of trade disciplines on government action. It was
believed that broadly applicable international rules would enable U.S. firms operating abroad
to compete more effectively with foreign financial institutions. 403 The openness of the U.S.
market to foreign financial service providers was often contrasted with the treatment received
by U.S. financial firms that sought to do business in other countries. A frequently repeated
theme was the need for greater fairness and reciprocal opening of markets by other countries,
sometimes expressed as the need for a "level playing field' 404
U.S. market access efforts focused on key countries where significant markets existed, but
U.S. suppliers faced discriminatory barriers, primarily the newly-industrialized countries of
Asia, as well as Japan and Latin American countries. 40 5 The United States also sought assur-
ances that U.S. firms would not be dosed out of the EU market and requested bindings under
EC financial services directives issued as part of the 1992 EC Single Market initiative.406
402. See Senate FSA Hearing, supra note 6, at 10-12, 44-47 (statement and testimony of Treasury
Secretary, Robert E. Rubin).
403. Uruguay Round Negotiations on Financial Services: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Task Force on International Competitiveness of
US. Financial Institutions of the House Comm. on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong.
47 (1990) (testimony and statement of William E. Barreda, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury
for Trade and Investment) [hereinafter Hearing on Uruguay Round Negotiations].
404. In connection with the U.S. unwillingness to accept the results of the 1995 FSA negotiations, United
States Trade Representative Michael Kantor noted that the United States would continue to insist
that other countries begin to "level the playing field" for U.S. companies, "not only in financial ser-
vices but in trade generally.' Gary C. Yerkey and Melissa Pozsgay, Services: U.S. Still Disappointed
With Offers in Financial Services Talks at WTO, 12 INT'L TRADE REP. 1231, July 19,1995.
405. SPAC, supra note 401, at 8. At the start of the 1997 FSA negotiations, U.S. Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky stated: "For the financial service negotiations to be successful, it is absolutely
critical that we see significantly improved offers from a critical mass of countries, particularly in
Asia and Latin America." Gary G. Yerkey, Services: U.S. Major Trading Partners Urge Others to
Improve Offers in Financial Services Talks, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 1811, May 7, 1997.
406. Id. at 8-9. In insurance, the priority countries where the United States believed that liberalizing
commitments were feasible consisted of two groups: (1) OECD countries (comprising 90% of the
global market) and (2) emerging industrial countries, including those in Latin America and Asia
(comprising 7% of the global market). The important countries in this latter group were the fol-
lowing: Asia and the Middle East: Korea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, Pakistan, and Egypt; Eastern Europe: Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary; Latin
America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY
SECTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SERVICES FOR TRADE POLICY MATTERS (ISAC 13) ON THE URUGUAY
ROUND MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, at 16-17 (Jan. 15, 1994) [hereinafter ISAC].
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As in the case of the NAFTA negotiations, individual financial services firms, lobbying
groups for the financial services industry, and industry advisory groups were actively
involved in the negotiation process. This involvement consisted of periodic briefings by the
U.S. Government and solicitation of views on important issues that arose during the negoti-
ations. U.S. lobbying groups provided information to U.S. Government negotiators about
market access barriers faced by U.S. firms operating abroad and this information was used
in the negotiating process. 407 Industry advisory groups conditioned their support of the
FSA on achievement of an acceptable level of market access commitments. 40 8 They made it
clear that private industry was looking for significant market-opening concessions and that
standstill commitments, which merely locked in existing levels of liberalization, but did not
contain commitments to liberalize further, were not sufficient. 40 9 Another concern was the
problem of free-riders. It became apparent during the negotiations that many emerging
market governments were extremely reluctant to open their financial services markets by
making commitments expanding national treatment or market access. 410 At the same time,
these countries were entitled to the benefits of market-opening concessions made by other
WTO Members, including the United States, through operation of the MFN clause in
GATS.4 11 The perception that certain other countries were free-riding on the largesse of the
United States and should be required to make liberalizing commitments of their own
became a type of rallying cry in the later stages of the FSA negotiations. 4 12
The United States considered a number of responses to the perceived problem
of free-riders. 4 13 Most of these proposals received no support from other
407. Telephone Interview with Peter Russell, Senior Vice President, Government Relations, Chase
Manhattan Bank (September 15,1998) [hereinafter Russell Interview].
408. ISAC, supra note 406, at 21.
409. Id.
410. This was attributed to the conservative views of finance ministries and central banks. SPAC, supra
note 401, at 9. Another explanation was that there was little interest on the part of these countries in
entering the U.S. market and to the extent there was interest, the U.S. market was already open.
Telephone Interview with Thomas Farmer, General Counsel, Bankers Association for Foreign Trade
(August 20, 1998) [hereinafter Farmer Interview].
411. SPAC, supra note 401, at 9.
412. ISAC, supra note 406, at 3.
413. In Congressional hearings in 1993, the Financial Services Group (FSG) of the U.S. Coalition of
Service Industries reported that the following options were proposed: (1) sectoral non-applica-
tion of GATS (United States was isolated in this position and FSG abandoned it), (2) refusal to
sign final services agreement (unlikely to be exercised if agreement was deemed to provide signif-
icant benefits to other service sectors), (3) invoking global non-application by not applying entire
services agreement to a particular country (may prove unworkable for same reason), and (4)
invoking an MFN exemption for one or more financial service sectors in the event of insufficient
liberalization commitments (enormous uncertainty about how this mechanism would work -
U.S. and GATT officials gave conflicting views). Hearing on Draft Final Text of the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Dunkel Draft), Serial 102-81 (Jan. 23, 1992)
(testimony and written statement of Oakley Johnson, Financial Services Group, U.S. Coalition of
Service Industries, Inc. and Vice President, Corporate and International Affairs, American
International Group). The United States also proposed a "two-tier" MFN approach for banking
and securities. SPAC, supra note 401, at 9. Under this approach, the United States would have
made a limited lower tier commitment to all WTO Members and enhanced commitments to an
upper tier of countries who had themselves agreed to extend substantially full market access and
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countries. 4 14 The free-rider problem was discussed with the industry and an MFN
exemption was agreed upon as the most viable option. 415 It was felt that any other
course of action would lead to U.S. markets being "frozen open" by MFN obliga-
tions indefinitely, with Asian and Latin American countries having won all the mar-
ket access they needed. There would be no incentive for the hold-out countries to
make market access commitments in the future. The purpose of the MFN exemp-
tion was not to shrink foreign competitors' presence in the U.S. market, but to pre-
serve leverage for lowering foreign barriers to U.S. financial service providers. 416
b. Development of International Capital Markets.
The process of globalization has heightened awareness of the interrelationship among
national economies. The benefits of financial reform and development of capital markets
worldwide, and the necessity for such steps to accompany trade liberalization, are now
acknowledged not only by economists,4 17 but also by the U.S. Government and the U.S.
financial services industry.
The U.S. Government has consistently supported global financial reform and capital
market development in the context of promoting free trade in financial services. In the
1994 National Treatment Study prepared by the Department of the Treasury, one compo-
nent of the U.S. strategy for further liberalization was supporting other initiatives to pro-
mote capital market development and integration in emerging financial markets and to
build the regulatory infrastructure in such markets as a complement to the liberalization
process.4 18 Public statements by high-ranking U.S. Government officials also endorsed this
policy. Secretary Rubin had stated publicly at the time of the 1995 interim FSA that"[t]he
development of global financial markets has a significance which goes beyond their
importance to specific firms. More than ever before, well-functioning capital markets are
essential to the health of the world economy. Capital needs in emerging markets are out-
stripping the capacity of traditional financial systems." 4 19 When the 1997 FSA was
announced, Assistant Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers praised the agreement, stat-
ing that it represented a recognition of the important benefits of global financial markets
to economic growth and stability in a time of financial uncertainty.420 He stated that the
participation of foreign financial institutions was critical to growth in emerging markets,
providing the benefits of know-how, a capital base, and important services to local busi-
nesses and entrepreneurs. 42 1
national treatment. This approach was rejected by most other countries as a violation of the
MFN principle and the United States abandoned it. Sydney J. Key, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE
URUGUAY ROUND AND THE WTO 52 (Group of Thirty Occasional Papers No. 54, 1997).
414. See id.
415. See ISAC, supra note 406, at 15.
416. See id.at9.
417. WENDY DOBSON & PIERRE JACQUET, FINANCIAL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION IN THE Wro 15-30 (1998).
See WTO, OPENING MARKETS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE ROLE OF THE GATS 23-35 (1997).
418. The United States planned to support efforts by the World Bank and other regional developments
banks, the IMF and the OECD, as well as cooperative efforts among regulatory agencies involving
countries in Latin America and Asia. 1994 Study, supra note 123, at 11-12.
419. See Nancy Dunne, White House Says Bargaining Power Boosted, FIN. TIMES, July 27, 1995, at 6.
420. Transcript, supra note 396.
421. See id.
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U.S. private industry also understood the importance of strengthening financial markets
and institutions in other countries. U.S. financial institutions viewed such developments as
complementing their plans for international expansion,422 perhaps because well-functioning
financial markets would increase the chances for success of their own international businesses.
c. The Negotiating Agenda.
The U.S. negotiating agenda shifted over the course of the FSA negotiations. Initially,
the United States sought to achieve a strong framework of principles based on the GATT
model, with certain embellishments to take account of the special nature of services trade.
Over time, it became apparent that developing countries were not in agreement with the
U.S. program and would be willing to offer only a low level of commitments. The U.S.
focus then shifted to locking in those commitments, while at the same time preserving
leverage for future negotiations at which additional concessions would be sought.
From the beginning of the Uruguay Round, the United States sought a principled
agreement on financial services trade that would subject all GATT contracting parties to
the same rules. At the time of the Montreal Mid-Term Review, the United States stated that
it hoped to achieve agreement on four basic principles for services trade: national treat-
ment, right of establishment, transparency, and nondiscrimination. 423 The United States
also sought provisions on consultation and dispute settlement, a negotiating timetable,
procedures for sectoral coverage, and flexibility in allowing reservations by individual
countries.4 24 The United States observed that while most other developed and some devel-
oping countries agreed with the U.S. approach of negotiating a broadly-based services
agreement, a group of developing countries questioned the value of liberalizing trade in
services. These countries sought to narrow the scope of the negotiations and to push their
own agendas regarding preferential market access, restrictive business practices, transfer of
technology rules, and priority sectors. 425 The U.S. position was to recognize the needs of
these countries by allowing reservations and phase-in periods, but it was not prepared to
accept special and differential treatment that would perpetuate trade distorting practices
or create a two-tiered trading system in services. 42 6
By the end of the Uruguay Round, when it became clear that the FSA would not be
completed at that time and additional talks on financial services were agreed to, the United
States stated its negotiating position to be that mandated in the Uruguay Round implement-
ing legislation for the extended negotiations, namely to secure commitments to reduce or
eliminate barriers to the supply of financial services, including those that denied national
treatment or market access, as a condition for the United States offering national treatment
and market access in each of the financial services sub-sectors on an MFN basis.427
One of the services industry advisory groups, ISAC 13, initially took the position that
GATS should contain a universal set of rules that would be applicable to all signatories,
with only limited derogations by individual countries allowed. 428 It recommended includ-
422. Russell Interview, supra note 407.
423. See U.S. MID-TERM REviEW LEMrER, supra note 399, at 6.
424. See id
425. See id
426. See id at 6, 7.
427. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 135, 19 U.S.C. § 3555 (1994),
428. See ISAC, supra note 406, at 2.
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ing the principles of market access (covering cross-border sales, contractual arrangements,
and commercial establishment, as determined by the service provider), national treatment,
transparency, licensing and certification decisions based on competence and ability to pro-
vide services, and efficient and effective dispute resolution procedures for violations of
GATS.429 The Uruguay Round negotiations ultimately adopted a different approach, in
which some of the above-mentioned disciplines would apply to all countries, but other
crucial commitments, most notably market access and national treatment, would only
apply to countries to the extent they were incorporated for a specific sector in national
schedules. At that point, ISAC 13 shifted its focus to monitoring the extent of liberalization
of commitments made in these schedules. 430
3. The Structure of the FSA.
a. The Fragmented Structure of the FSA.
Unlike the earlier trade agreements discussed in this article, the FSA is not a single
agreement. In fact, the FSA is composed of several different parts, namely (i) General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); 43 1 (ii) Annex on Article II Exemptions (Article II
Annex); (iii) First Annex on Financial Services (Financial Services Annex); (iv) certain
GATS Ministerial Decisions relating to financial services (Ministerial Decisions); 432 (v)
National Schedules of Commitments on Financial Services (Schedules); and (vi)
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services (Understanding). These various
components must be read together as a whole, admittedly a difficult task. The FSA is the
product of two separate negotiations - the GATS negotiations, which were handled by the
Office of the United States Trade Representative, and the financial services negotiations, in
which the U.S. Treasury Department was responsible for banking and securities issues and
the U.S. Commerce Department covered insurance issues.
GATS is a framework agreement that sets forth general principles for trade in services
for covered sectors, including financial services. GATS incorporates by reference 433 the
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), 434 thereby making the DSU procedures
applicable to financial services disputes. The Article II Annex, the Financial Services Annex
and the Ministerial Decisions modify both GATS and the DSU with respect to financial
services matters. Finally, the Schedules set forth the commitments of WTO Members in
the areas of national treatment and market access under Part III of GATS. 435 These are not
general principles in the FSA, meaning that a WTO Member is not bound to accord such
treatment to foreign financial service providers unless such Member has given an under-
429. Id.
430. Id. at 3.
431. GATS is Annex IB to the WTO Agreement, supra note 8, and is binding on all WTO members.
432. The Decision on Institutional Arrangements for GATS established the Committee on Trade in
Financial Services, which, among other things, is important for the institutional role it played in
furthering the financial services negotiations. The Decision on Certain Dispute Settlement
Procedures for GATS required financial services expertise in dispute settlement matters involving
that sector.
433. GATS, supra note 10, art. XXIII.
434. The DSU is Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement, supra note 8.
435. Id. arts. XVI, XVII, XX.
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taking to do so in its Schedule. Certain WTO Members have adopted an alternative
approach to scheduling their commitments under Part III of GATS in the Understanding.
By its terms, GATS contemplates progressive liberalization of the services sector
through successive rounds of multilateral negotiations beginning no later than January 1,
2000, in which Members will seek to remove measures that hinder effective market
access. 436 The goal of such liberalization is economic growth of all Members and develop-
ment of developing country Members. The national policy objectives of Members in regu-
lating their service sectors are to be given due respect. Developing countries are to be
accorded special status, allowing them to maintain discriminatory legislation in place as
protectionist measures for a longer period than developed countries.437
b. Sector Coverage.
The coverage of the FSA is potentially very broad. The term "financial services" is
defined to mean any service of a financial nature offered by a financial service supplier of a
Member.438 Financial services are divided into two categories: insurance and insurance-relat-
ed services and banking and other financial services, and covered activities for each sector are
listed.439 The second category covers activities that in the United States are conducted by the
banking and securities businesses. Core banking activities such as deposit-taking and lending
are covered, as well as classic securities industry activities such as underwriting, dealing, bro-
kerage services, and investment advisory functions.440 Activities of leasing companies, factor-
ing companies, and consumer finance companies are also covered.44 1
The term "financial service supplier" covers both natural and juridical persons, but
does not cover public entities. 442 Public entities include a government, central bank or
monetary authority or other entity owned or controlled by the government that is princi-
pally engaged in carrying out government functions. Private entities performing functions
normally provided by a central bank or monetary authority may also be excluded. 443
The FSA covers all four modes of delivery of trade in financial services, namely cross-
border trade, movement of consumers, commercial establishment, and movement of natural
persons employed by the service supplier.444 As will be noted below, in spite of the language
436. GATS, supra note 10, at pmbl., art. XIX.
437. Id.
438. GATS, Financial Services Annex, supra note 10, cl. 5(a).
439. Id.
440. Id. cls. 5(a)(v)-(xvi).
441. Id. cis. 5(a)(vi), (vii).
442. Id. clis. 5(b), (c).
443. In addition to these provisions, the Financial Services Annex refers back to the exception from cov-
erage in Article I of GATS for government activities and clarifies that the following types of govern-
mental entities are not subject to the FSA: central bank, monetary authority or other public entit)
conducting monetary or exchange rate policy; social security or public retirement plans; and othei
public entities where the government is financially responsible for its activities. Id. cl. 1(b). The
exception referred to in the preceding sentence is not available for the latter two categories of ser-
vices if private sector providers are permitted to compete with the government in supplying sucl
services. Id. cl. 1(c).
444. Id. cl. 1(a); GATS, supra note 10, art. 1(2).
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regarding coverage contained in the Financial Services Annex, the FSA does not automatical-
ly cover all modes of supply or all financial service sectors of all Members. Rather, only those
modes of supply and sectors set forth in each Member's Schedule are covered.445
The FSA binds WTO Members directly, but not their regional and local units of govern-
ment or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within their borders. The Members agree
to use best efforts ("reasonable measures") to ensure observance by such sub-units and
NGOs.446 However, it is conceivable that such entities may not be in compliance with the
terms of the FSA. This is a concern for countries with a federal system of government in
which state or provincial governments play a significant regulatory role for financial services.
c. Framework of Principles.
The framework of principles for the FSA is set forth in GATS. There are two types of
principles - those that are generally binding on all WTO Members and those that become
binding only if, and to the extent that, a Member has made a commitment in its Schedule.
(i) General Principles.
Both substantive and procedural principles are included. The most significant general
principles are MFN treatment, transparency and impartial administration of national laws,
and dispute settlement. The operation of the principles may be limited by the operation of
exceptions for prudential regulation 447 and for restrictions imposed to redress balance of
payments difficulties. 448
(a) Most-Favored-Nation Treatment.
The most-favored-nation clause is patterned after Article I of GATT and requires
Members to accord on an unconditional basis the same concessions to all Members that it
extends to any other country.449 The undertaking is weaker than the comparable GATT clause,
however, due to the possibility of taking exemptions for non-conforming measures, provided
they comply with the conditions of, and are entered on lists attached to, the Article II Annex. 450
The exemptions fall into two categories - those agreed as part of the Uruguay Round
negotiations 45 1 and new exemptions added after the date of entry into force of the WTO
445. GATS, supra note 10, arts. XVI, XVII.
446. Id. art. I(3)(a).
447. GATS, Financial Services Annex, supra note 10, cl. 2.
448. GATS, supra note 10, art. XII. In general, restrictions on international payments and transfers for
current transactions are not allowed, except for exchange actions permitted by the IMF Articles of
Agreement. Id. art. XI.
449. Id. art. 11(1).
450. Id. art. 11(2).
451. Such exemptions are contained in lists attached to the Annex for each country that negotiated
exemptions. Sixty-one countries listed Article 11 exemptions, counting the European Union as one
country. The United States exemptions for banking relate primarily to state law requirements of
reciprocity for establishment of branches, agencies, representative offices or commercial banking
subsidiaries. United States, List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, WTO Doc. GATS/EI/90/Suppl.3,
(February 26, 1998). This list replaced the financial services section contained in WTO document
GATS/EL/9O/Suppl. 1.
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Agreement. 452 Exemptions are granted for limited time periods and in no case for more
than ten years. 453 Members shall notify the Council for Trade in Services at the end of such
term that non-conforming measures have been brought into conformity.454
(b) Transparency and Impartial Administration of Laws.
The transparency provision requires publication of all relevant generally applicable
measures, as well as international agreements, relating to trade in financial services. 455 No
requirements as to the type of publication are imposed, suggesting that publication in a local
newspaper of limited circulation could satisfy the publication requirement, even though it
would be of no assistance to a foreign service provider. Members must respond to requests
from other Members for information about such measures and international agreements. 456
Members must inform the Council on Trade in Services of the introduction or amendment
of any laws, regulations or administrative guidelines affecting its specific commitments on
market access and national treatment.457
Recognizing that discrimination may be the product not just of national laws, but of
their administration in a discriminatory fashion, domestic regulations that affect trade in
services are required to be applied in an impartial manner.458 Members shall ensure they
have institutional mechanisms in place for the review of administrative decisions on trade
in financial services that affect foreign service suppliers.459
(c) Dispute Settlement.
Financial services disputes are subject to the DSU procedures, 460 which require
Members to utilize informal consultations or mediation to attempt to resolve disputes. 461 If
such efforts prove fruitless, formal arbitration 462 in front of a panel of financial services
experts463 is mandated. Members must comply with the recommendations set forth in the
panel's report or become subject to additional sanctions, including the payment of com-
pensation or the suspension of concessions. 464
452. Such additions require the consent of the WTO Ministerial Council, which receives a recommenda-
tion from the Council on Trade in Services. GATS, Article II Annex, supra note 10, cl. 2; WTO
Agreement, supra note 8, arts. IX(3), (4).
453. GATS, Article II Annex, supra note 10, cis. 5, 6. All exemptions put in place for more than five years
are to be reviewed by the Council for Trade in Services and a determination made as to whether such
exemptions shall be continued and subject to further review. Id. cls. 3, 4.
454. Id. c. 7.
455. GATS, supra note 10, art. 111(1).
456. Id. art. 111(4).
457. Id. art. 111(3).
458. Id. art. VI(l).
459. Id. art. VI(2).
460. Id. art. XXIII(I).
461. DSU, supra note 434, arts. 4, 5.
462. Id. art. 6.
463. GATS, Financial Services Annex, supra note 10, cl. 4.
464. GATS, supra note 10, arts. XXIII(2), (3); DSU, supra note 434, art. 22.
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(d) Other General Principles.
Members are also generally bound by the following principles: prohibition on certain
payment and capital transfer restrictions, 465 recognition of licensing of foreign service
providers, 46 6 non-disclosure of confidential information4 67 and special treatment of
developing countries. 468 Other generally applicable provisions deal with the problems of
monopoly service providers 469 and restrictive business practices. 470
(ii) Principles Subject to Specific Commitments.
Although the United States sought to include market access and national treatment as
general obligations, opposition from developing countries led to their inclusion in a very
limited form, i.e., only to the extent commitments are set forth in a Member's Schedule.471
(a) Market Access.
Members are prohibited from imposing certain types of measures that restrict entry
of foreign suppliers: limits on the number of service suppliers, limits on the total value of
transactions or assets, limits on the total number of operations or quantity of output, lim-
its on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a particular service
sector, limits on the legal form for supply of services, and limits on participation of foreign
capital expressed as a percentage of total shareholding or investment. 472 Market access
465. GATS, supra note 10, art. XI(1). Members are prohibited from imposing restrictions on interna-
tional transfers and payments for current transactions in areas where they have made specific com-
mitments regarding market access and national treatment. Exchange controls allowed by the IMF
Articles of Agreement are permitted as long as they do not violate specific commitments, unless
they fall under the GATS Article XII exception for safeguarding the balance of payments or the IMF
requests that they be imposed. Id. art. X1.
466. Id. art. VII(1). This may take the form of harmonization by agreement with another Member or
may be undertaken unilaterally by a Member.
467. Id. art. III bis.
468. Id. art. IV.
469. Id. art. VIII.
470. Id. art. IX.
471. Id. arts. XVI(1), XVII(I), XX. Members are also permitted to set forth additional commitments on
other matters, such as qualifications and licensing, in their Schedules. A comparison of the pro-
posed drafts of the GATS submitted at the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 by the United
States, the European Union and a group of developing countries led by Brazil, reveal the differences
in the negotiating stances that led to the compromise treatment of market access and national treat-
ment. The United States sought a "comprehensive, ambitious and enforceable set of international
rules" applicable to all governments, including rules on market access and national treatment. The
European Union took a more limited approach, with market access and national treatment princi-
ples automatically binding, except to the extent not inconsistent with existing laws, regulations and
international agreements. Other concessions could be negotiated through the request/offer process.
The developing country position was that neither market access nor national treatment should be
automatic obligations and that any market access concessions should be made through a positive
list approach. STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE STRUCTURE OF A GENERAL SERVICES AGREEMENT
(Presentation to the Services Policy Advisory Committee, Mar. 1, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 SPAC
Briefing], reprinted in Hearing on Uruguay Round Negotiations, supra note 403, at 197-204.
472. GATS, supra note 10, art. XVI.
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means the absence of any of these restrictions in the four supply modes covered by the
FSA. Measures that do not conform to the market access standard for a particular mode of
supply within a covered sector are required to be listed. The Schedules therefore embody
both a positive list approach (whether a sector is covered) and a negative list approach
(measures that do not conform to the standard within a particular supply mode must be
scheduled). This so-called hybrid approach 473 was the product of a negotiating compro-
mise and differs from the negative list approach sought by the United States. 474
(b) National Treatment.
The national treatment commitment requires each Member to treat services and ser-
vice suppliers of other Members no less favorably than such Member's own like services
and service suppliers.475 The "no less favorable" language means that such treatment must
not make competitive conditions more favorable for domestic versus foreign suppliers. 476
Such treatment may be achieved by treating foreign services and service suppliers either
formally identically or formally differently.477 This provision recognizes that the goal is
equal results and that equivalent treatment does not automatically provide a nondiscrimi-
natory result.
d. Market Access Achieved in Key Countries.
The extent of market access achieved under the FSA can be ascertained only through a
careful study of the Member's Schedules. One such study was conducted by the Financial
Leader's Group (FLG), which is composed of representatives of U.S. and European financial
services firms. Evaluations conducted for 20 key countries suggest that significant progress
was achieved in major areas of the negotiations. Those key countries are Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, South Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand,
Turkey, and Venezuela. However, many offers were judged to be disappointing, including
those of Chile (banking, asset management, and securities), Colombia (insurance), Egypt
(insurance), India (all services), South Korea (all services), the Philippines (asset management
and securities), Singapore (banking), Thailand (all services), and Venezuela (insurance).478
The Understanding was an attempt to develop a standardized approach to scheduling
of commitments, which met with limited success. 479 The Understanding sets forth uni-
473. Key, supra note 413, 14-16.
474. Id. at 197.
475. GATS, supra note 10, art. XVII(1).
476. Id. art. XVII(3).
477. Id. art. XVII(2).
478. FLG Study cited in DoBSON & JACQuET, supra note 417, at 89. Another study of commitments by
twenty-six WTO Members at varying levels of economic development was conducted by another
private industry group. See Association of British Insurers, Opening Markets for Financial Services:
Guide to the Financial Services Agreement in the World Trade Organization (1998).
479. The Understanding, as well as the Financial Services Annex, stem from a text originally developed
by an informal group of finance officials from Canada, the European Community, Japan, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United States. The group later was expanded to include selected Asian, Eastern
European and Latin American countries. The provisions on which only the industrialized countries
could agree became the Understanding. Key, supra note 413, at 18-19.
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form principles of liberalization in financial services that Members may incorporate in
their national schedules.480
The Understanding adopts a standstill on market access and national treatment issues
such that new non-conforming measures will not be put into place. 481 With respect to lib-
eralizing commitments on market access, the Understanding recognizes the right of estab-
lishment,482 the right to provide new financial services,48 3 the right to transfer informa-
tion across borders,484 the right to temporary entry of business personnel,485 and the right
to purchase financial services while travelling abroad.48 6 The right to provide cross-border
services is recognized with respect to a limited category of financial services, including
provision and transfer of financial information and financial data processing and advisory
and other auxiliary services (excluding intermediation) relating to banking and other
financial services (credit reference and analysis, investment and portfolio research and
advice, advice on acquisitions and on corporate restructuring and strategy). 487
Finally, Members agree to seek to eliminate or reform monopoly rights,488 government
procurement practices489 and nondiscriminatory measures that have the effect of restricting
market access.490 With respect to national treatment, the Understanding grants access to pay-
ment and clearing systems operated by public entities and to official funding and refinancing
facilities available in the normal course of ordinary business and will ensure that self-regulato-
ry bodies, securities or futures exchanges or markets, clearing agencies or other organizations
will extend national treatment to such suppliers if necessary to ensure equal access.491
e. Prudential Regulation.
The right of governments to regulate financial services for prudential policy reasons,
including protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or those to whom a fidudiary
duty is owed and ensuring the stability of the financial system, is preserved. 492 In addition, a
Member may recognize prudential regulation of any other country in determining how to
apply its own measures on financial services.493 This may include harmonization of laws by
agreement or it may be extended unilaterally by a Member. Other Members shall be permit-
ted the opportunity to negotiate similar harmonization arrangements if they so desire.
480. There are several caveats to application of this approach, namely, that nothing therein shall conflict
with the provisions of GATS, Members will be free to schedule their specific commitments in accor-
dance with the provisions of Part III of GATS, specific commitments will be applied on an MFN
basis and there is no presumption created about the degree of liberalization to which a Member has
committed. GATS, Understanding, supra note 10, at pmbl.
481. Id. at para.A.
482. Id. at para. B5, 6.
483. Id. at para. B7.
484. Id. at para. B8.
485. Id. at para. B9.
486. Id. at para. B4.
487. Id. at para. B3.
488. Id. at para. B1.
489. Id. at para. B2.
490. Id. at para. B10.
491. Id. at para. C.
492. GATS, Financial Services Annex, supra note 10, cl. 2.
493. Id. cl. 3.
Winter 1999 75
IV. Assessing the Results of U.S. Efforts to Liberalize Trade in
Financial Services.
A. THE GAPS IN THE REGIME FOR FREE TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES UNDER NAFTA
CHAPTER 14 AND FSA.
Reading the press releases issued by the U.S. Government at the conclusion of the
NAFTA and FSA 494 negotiations, it would appear that the financial services liberalization
efforts of the United States were a resounding success. It cannot be denied that both trade
agreements improve the outlook for global trade and investment by U.S. financial service
providers and in that sense represent a clear win. Given the gloomy prognosis for such
talks at their inception, 495 achieving an agreement at all was a triumph. However, both
NAFTA and FSA fall short of the ambitious U.S. goals set for such negotiations.
1. NAFTA Chapter 14.
a. Strengths.
Chapter 14 was a noteworthy achievement in several respects. First, the scope of
'Chapter 14 is very broad, covering banking, securities, insurance and other financial ser-
vices.496 New financial services are also covered, 497 avoiding the need for renegotiation of
NAFTA as innovations lead to the introduction of new products. State and provincial gov-
ernment measures are covered in addition to federal measures,498 a significant provision
because certain forms of financial services are regulated at the state and provincial level in
all three NAFTA Parties.499 These measures ensure that wide-ranging liberalization will be
achieved in the long run in the sector, even though barriers may remain in the short run.
Second, the framework of principles is a significant step forward in putting financial
services trade on a firmer footing and should serve well as a guide both to future liberaliza-
tion efforts by the three current NAFTA Parties as well as to accessions by additional
NAFTA Parties. In general, the principles are clear and well-drafted and they cover the
major areas ofinterest to the United States. The substantive principles include those consid-
ered most significant to U.S. negotiators, namely the right of establishment 500 and the right
to national treatment,50 1 defined to include the right to equal competitive opportunity.
Indeed, the NAFTA parties are entitled to better than national treatment under operation of
494. Rubin and Barshefsky, supra note 11.
495. There had been a notable lack of enthusiasm by the developing countries for the liberalization ini-
tiative in the services trade area. The developing countries felt that the comparative advantage in
services belonged to the developed countries and that focusing on services would turn attention
away from making progress on liberalizing trade in goods. Bhagwati, supra note 28, at 26-27.
496. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1416, definition of "financial service"
497. Id. art. 1407(1).
498. Id. art. 105.
499. In the United States, insurance regulation is almost exclusively a matter for state regulation. In addi-
tion, the dual banking system, allowing for both state and federal chartering and supervision of
banks, persists. In Canada, certain forms of securities trading are regulated at the provincial level.
500. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1403.
501. Id. art. 1405.
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the MFN clause in Chapter 14.502 The procedural principles are more than mere window
dressing. The transparency principle50 3 provides assurances that foreign financial service
providers from NAFTA countries will have meaningful access to the rule-making process in
other NAFTA countries and will be freed from the problem of abuse of discretion by
administrative agencies in the form of vague requirements and time delays. Moreover, the
dispute settlement provisions504 give real bite to the commitments of the parties. Binding
arbitration in front of financial services experts, 5° 5 backed by remedies to ensure enforce-
ment of arbitral awards, 506 is mandated if more informal methods of consultation and
mediation do not resolve government-to-government disputes. 507 In addition, the FSA pro-
vides for a private right of action for investment disputes508 - a unique feature in a govern-
ment-to-government trade agreement like NAFTA. Such trade agreements usually provide
only government-to-government dispute settlement, as in the case of the WTO Agreement.
Indeed, the investment dispute provisions that are incorporated into the FSA by reference to
Chapter 11 of NAFTA bear the imprimatur of U.S. concerns about foreign investment,
which it has frequently lobbied for in international fora.509 Neither set of dispute settlement
provisions has been tested yet in a financial services dispute.
Another significant feature of the institutional provisions of Chapter 14 is the establish-
ment of a Financial Services Committee (FSC). 510 One of the functions of the FSC is to meet
annually to assess the effectiveness of Chapter 14.511 Other functions are to supervise imple-
mentation of Chapter 14, consider issues regarding financial services referred to it by a Party
and to participate in dispute settlement with respect to investment disputes. 512 The FSC is
composed of federal regulators in each country.513 By providing a permanent forum com-
posed of government officials with an expertise in financial services, the Parties have ensured
that there is a mechanism for continued discussions and exchange of information.
Combined with the provisions of Chapter 14 that contemplate further liberalization of trade
and investment, the institutional provisions create a pathway for continued consideration of
free trade in financial services.
502. Id. art. 1406.
503. Id.art. 1411.
504. Id arts. 1412-14.
505. Id. art. 1414.
506. Id.
507. This form of dispute settlement was an improvement over the old style of non-binding GATT
dispute settlement that was in effect prior to adoption of the WTO Agreement. For a critique of
the GATT dispute settlement provisions, see JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURiNG THE GATT SYSTEM
64-65 (1990).
508. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1415.
509. An example is the OECD negotiations on the MAI.
510. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1412(3).
511 Id.
512. Id art. 1412(2).
513. Id. art. 1412(1). Annex 1412.1 sets forth the authorities responsible for financial services in each
country. They are for Canada, the Department of Finance of Canada, for Mexico, the Secretaria de
Hacienda y Crdito Publico and for the United States, the Department of the Treasury for banking
and other financial services and the Department of Commerce for insurance services.
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Third, Chapter 14 succeeded in achieving substantial new business opportunities in
Mexico for U.S. and Canadian firms, an important achievement considering that foreign
financial institutions had been closed out of the market for nearly fifty years.514
Fourth, the prudential regulation exception 515 ensures, at least in theory, that regulators
will continue to have the right to regulate for purposes of protecting investors and depositors,
the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions and the integrity and stability of
the financial system as a whole. The limits of this principle have yet to be tested, however.
b. Weaknesses.
Chapter 14 does not achieve full liberalization of the financial services sector. There
are several significant gaps in the structure. The language of Chapter 14 provides that
some of these open issues will be discussed in negotiations to be held in the near future.
First, although all four modes of delivery of financial services are nominally covered,
only partial liberalization is achieved in any of the modes. The absence of provisions liber-
alizing cross-border trade or permitting cross-border branching is one of the biggest flaws
in Chapter 14.516 Cross-border trade is subject to a standstill agreement only, meaning that
existing rights of access are preserved but that no further liberalization was undertaken in
NAFTA. 5 17 However, the Parties agreed to discuss this matter further no later than January
1, 2000. 5 18 While the right of establishment through any juridical form chosen by an
investor is guaranteed in principle,5 1 9 the Parties actually require a subsidiary form of
presence.5 20 Although the right of a consumer of one Party to purchase services from
financial service providers of another Party, whether in the consumer's home country or
abroad, is guaranteed, a NAFTA Party is not required to allow foreign service providers to
do business or to solicit customers within its territory.521 This is consistent with the stand-
still provision on cross-border trade but cuts back on the right of consumers to purchase
services from foreign providers. Finally, although the provisions of Chapter 16 on tempo-
rary entry for business persons apply to financial services, the movement of persons under
this section is severely restricted. 522 Many categories of persons who would need to move
cross-border are allowed temporary entry.523 However, under some circumstances, visas
may still be required. 524 With respect to professionals, the persons who can enter on a
514. For a brief history of Mexican banking laws, see RALPH H. FOLSOM AND W. DAVIS FOLSOM,
UNDERSTANDING NAFTA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS 20-28 (1996).
515. NAFTA, supra note 12,art. 1410(1).
516. Newman Interview, supra note 265.
517. NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1404(1).
518. Id. art. 1404(4), annex 1404.4.
519. Id. art. 1403(1).
520. Id. art. 1403(3).
521. Id. art. 1404(2).
522. Clearly, the reason for this is the concern of U.S. labor organizations about the effect on American
workers of unfettered access to the U.S. labor market. Id. art. 1601 (referring to the need to enforce
border security and to protect the domestic labor force and permanent employment).
523. Chapter 16 applies to, among other categories, business visitors, defined to include financial services
personnel (insurers, bankers or investment brokers) and management and supervisory personnel
engaging in commercial transactions for an enterprise located in the territory of another Party, as
well as professionals, such as lawyers and accountants. Id annex 1603(A), (D), app. 1603.A.1.
524. Id. annex 1603(A)(5), 1603(D)(3).
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temporary basis are restricted to those holding certain educational credentials or meeting
certain government licensing criteria.525 This may have an adverse impact on a financial
service provider if the delivery of the service is structured in a manner that requires move-
ment of personnel on a temporary basis.
Second, the framework of principles in Chapter 14 is riddled with exceptions. These
are set forth in the Schedules of each of the NAFTA Parties, which form part of Annex VII.
The exceptions are of two types: those that grandfather existing restrictions are set forth in
Section A of each Annex VII and those that grant the right to impose restrictions in the
future are contained in Section B of each Annex VII. 5 26 The effect of these exceptions is to
render the substantive principles inapplicable, 527 not only to existing non-conforming
measures that were properly scheduled or otherwise exempt,528 but also to other non-con-
forming measures to be adopted in the future, provided they were properly scheduled.
Third, the market access concessions of Mexico were limited by the transition periods
described earlier. It should be noted that the U.S. financial services industry felt the phase-
in periods were reasonable and completely justified in view of the state of development of
the Mexican financial services industry.52 9 The market access concessions were also limited
from the U.S. perspective because they did not extend further the ability of U.S. financial
institutions to do business in Canada.530
2. FSA.
a. Strengths.
One of the most favorable things that can be said about the FSA is that such an agree-
ment exists at all. Given the split between the developed and developing world on the issue
of whether financial services trade should be covered by multilateral rules, 531 the develop-
ment of a framework of principles covering a wide range of financial services532 and the
binding of the existing degree of market access and the making of liberalizing concessions
by a significant number of WTO Members was a substantial achievement. The right to reg-
ulate for legitimate purposes is also guaranteed, thereby satisfying the concern of govern-
ments that liberalization would not interfere with national regulatory goals in financial
services. 533 Finally, the new, enhanced WTO dispute settlement procedures contained in
525. Id. app. 1603.D.1.
526. See id., annex vii, Schedules of Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
527. The substantive principles are set forth in NAFTA arts. 1403-08.
528. Measures of local governments were not bound. Id. art. 1409(1)(a). This was not expected to have
an adverse effect on liberalization because few, if any, local governments regulate financial services
in any manner.
529. ISAC REPORT, supra note 266, at 18. "It addresses the desires of U.S. banks to aggressively enter the
Mexican market, and it addresses the legitimate concerns of Mexican officials that their recently pri-
vatized banking industry not be suddenly crippled by an influx of foreign competition." Id.
530. Kenneth L. Bachman et al., Financial Services Under the North American Free Trade Agreement: An
Overview, 28 INT'L LAW. 291,310 (1994).
531. Bhagwati, supra note 28, at 32-33.
532. GATS, Financial Services Annex, supra note 10, cl. 1 (a).
533. Id. cl. 2.
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the DSU are applicable to financial services,534 ensuring that legally binding arbitration 535
in front of financial services experts 536 backed by remedies for enforcement 537 will be
available for disputes in the sector.
Just as the GATT process of tariff cutting for trade in goods took several decades and
numerous negotiating rounds to achieve, so too the process of services liberalization, in
general, and financial services liberalization, more specifically, is likely to take at least as
long, if not longer, due to the complexity of the issues and the political sensitivities
involved. 538 Fortunately, the FSA contains a commitment to progressive liberalization and
new talks are planned for further financial services liberalization for the year 2000. 539
b. Weaknesses.
The FSA suffers from several serious weaknesses which will have to be remedied if fur-
ther liberalization is to occur. At the present time, the manner in which such weaknesses
will be remedied, or indeed whether they will be addressed at all in the year 2000 negotia-
tions, is not set forth in the FSA.
First, most of the general framework principles are procedural, not substantive.
Admittedly, the provisions on transparency, impartial administration of law and dispute
settlement are extremely important. However, these principles are not as strong as they
could be. The transparency principle suffers from two defects - publication is only
required locally and no notice must be given to any WTO institution, where such informa-
tion would be readily accessible to Members. 540 The provision on administration of laws
provides for judicial review of administrative decision-making. 54 1 It also requires that
administrative agencies processing applications act within a reasonable time period,542 but
it does not impose firm deadlines on administrative decision-making, as NAFTA Chapter
14 does. While the dispute settlement provisions incorporated from the DSU are an
534. GATS, supra note 10, art. XXIII(1).
535. DSU, supra note 434, art. 6.
536. GATS, Financial Services Annex, supra note 10, cf. 4.
537. GATS, supra note 10, art. XXIII(2), (3); DSU, supra note 434, art. 22.
538. John H. Jackson, a leading U.S. expert on trade law, has written:
One need only look at the multiple rounds of GATT negotiations on trade in
goods that took place over nearly fifty years to realize that the complexity of the
issues involved in services trade may necessitate an even longer process to achieve
equivalent results. The complexity, defects, and problems of the GATT system for
trade in goods, when added to the much greater variety and complexity of trade
in services, result in a web of cross-currents that is so difficult to organize by
international rules that any person, no matter how expert, must approach the
subject with great caution. Indeed in my view, it will not be possible within a few
years or the time span of one GATT negotiating round to build a complete struc-
ture of such rules. It seems better to recognize this and to focus on the institution-
al structures that could be established.
JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION, supra note 172, at 10.
539. GATS, supra note 10, art. XIX.
540. Id. art. III(1). Paragraph (3) does, however, require notice to the Council on Trade in Services if the
specific commitments of Part III of GATS would be impacted.
541. Id. art. VI(2).
542. IM art. VI(3).
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improvement over those contained in the old GATT, they fall short of providing a private
right of action for financial services investment disputes, as in Chapter 14 of NAFTA. The
only significant substantive principle that appears in the framework is the MFN clause.543
The other important principles of national treatment and market access are not part of the
framework itself, but rather are obligations in the FSA only to the extent that WTO
Members have made binding commitments in their Schedules. 544
Second, even though the core substantive principles of MFN treatment and national
treatment are contained in the FSA, they are contained in a very weakened form, com-
pared to GATT. These two principles of nondiscrimination are contained in a strong form
in Articles I and III, respectively, of GATT 545 and are considered the cornerstone of the
GATT system of multilateral trade concessions. 546 The MFN clause in Article I of GATT is
unconditional in nature.547 In contrast, the MFN principle in the FSA548 is undermined
by the fact that the parties were allowed to take exemptions for non-conforming measures
at the time of entering into GATS549 and therefore, it is a conditional undertaking. In addi-
tion, the United States was able to negotiate an MFN exemption for new entrants, expan-
sion and new activities in connection with the negotiation of the FSA. The national treat-
ment principle contained in Article III of GATT is binding on all WTO Members and is
not subject to variation. In contrast, the national treatment principle in the FSA is option-
al. By making such core principles conditional or optional in nature, the FSA has substan-
tially weakened them. In fact, one can question whether the FSA embodies the principle of
non-discrimination at all. In any case, it is significantly less strong than under GATT.
Third, in spite of general language in the FSA suggesting that all financial services and
all four modes of supply are covered, WTO Members are bound to extend market access
and national treatment with respect to a particular financial service in any of the four sup-
ply modes only to the extent that they have made commitments in their Schedules. The
extent to which WTO Members have made such commitments varies widely. If one
believes the predictions of economists that the widest possible liberalization across sectors
and modes of supply will lead to the greatest possible economic gains, the gains from the
FSA can be expected to be quite limited.
The method used in the Schedules for setting forth negotiating concessions is open
to criticism on a number of grounds. The hybrid approach used in the Schedules differs
in significant respects from the negative list approach for scheduling commitments that
543. Id. art. 11(1).
544. Id. arts. XVI, XVII, XX. The Understanding contains fairly strong commitments in these areas.
545. GATT, arts. 1, 3.
546. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 157.
547. MFN can be unconditional or conditional. The difference can be illustrated by the following exam-
ple. Conditional MFN treatment means that when country #1 grants a privilege to country #3, it
must grant equivalent treatment to country #2, to whom it owes MFN treatment, but only after #2
has given #1 some privilege to pay for it. Under unconditional MFN, #1 must grant equivalent priv-
ileges to #2 without receiving anything in return. It has been U.S. policy to pursue unconditional
MFN treatment. Under code conditional MFN, a new form that developed under various codes
and side agreements negotiated during the GATT Tokyo Round, the benefits of code treatment
would only be extended to code signatories. However, no additional reciprocal benefit would be
required. Id. at 161-162.
548. GATS, supra note 10, art. II.
549. Id. art. 11(2); Annex on Article II Exemptions.
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was sought by the United States during the negotiations.5 5 0 In a negative list approach,
the implied starting point is adherence to a general principle like national treatment and
the negative list contains all non-conforming measures. This approach has two virtues.
The list, in effect, becomes an inventory of remaining trade barriers, and this information
can be usefully employed in later trade negotiations. A negative list approach is therefore
more transparent than the hybrid approach.55 1 The negative list is also desirable because
the baseline is liberalization and maintenance of trade barriers is the exception. In the
FSA, it is possible for a country to make no commitments with respect to a particular sec-
tor or mode of supply. The approach taken is that the baseline is the status quo and liber-
alization is the exception.
Another criticism is that the principle of market access in the GATS, and hence in the
FSA, is ill-defined and seems to overlap with the principle of national treatment.55 2 The
result is that the Schedules are difficult to interpret and the level of commitments made by
WTO Members hard to assess. This may undermine the goal of creating a secure, stable
trading environment and lead to disputes among WTO Members.55 3
Fourth, the FSA does not require WTO Members to commit to a standstill in their
Schedules. Even the status quo is not bound and WTO Members may withdraw measures
currently in place allowing market access and national treatment and replace them with
discriminatory measures.554
Fifth, the results of the FSA, judged from the perspective of the U.S. objective of
achieving market-opening concessions, are disappointing. A recent analysis of the nature
and extent of the concessions made reveals that most commitments only succeeded in
binding the status quo and very few countries moved beyond the status quo to make liber-
alizing commitments, at least in the banking sector.5 55
Sixth, the broad scope of coverage of services industries is limited by the fact that
measures of political subunits are not covered. This is in contrast with Chapter 14 of
NAFTA, which is binding on state and provincial governments. This limitation is signifi-
550. For an examination of the negotiating dynamics on this issue, see Anders Ahnlid, Comparing GATT
and GATS: Regime Creation Under and After Hegemony, 3 Review of International Political Economy
80-81 (1996).
551. SeeKey, supra note 413, at 16.
552. Richard H. Snape & Malcolm Bosworth, Advancing Services Negotiations in THE WORLD TRADE
SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AHEAD 201 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1996) (suggesting elimination of the principle
of market access as duplicative of the national treatment obligation).
553. Aaditya Mattoo, National Treatment in the GATS: Corner Stone or Pandora's Box?, 31 JOURNAL OF
WORLD TRADE 107 (February 1997).
554. Compare the approach taken in the Understanding, which introduces a limited standstill provision.
During the FSA negotiations, some countries sought to bind a lower level of liberalization than
existed under their national laws. An example was Malaysia, which refused to grandfather certain
existing foreign investments in the insurance sector. Malaysia, Schedule of Specific Commitments,
Supplement 3, GATS/SC/52/Suppl. 3., Feb. 26, 1998.
555. DOBSON & JACQUET, supra note 417, at 90. More liberalization was seen in the insurance sector. Id.
One possible explanation for this is that insurance and securities are underdeveloped services sec-
tors in many markets around the world and making liberalizing commitments in those areas is
therefore less risky than in the banking sector, which is considered far more significant in most
countries. See Piritta Sorsa, THE GATS AGREEMENT ON FINANCIAL SERVICES-A MODEST START TO
MULTILATERAL LIBERALIZATION, IMF WP/97/55 (May 1997).
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cant in countries that have a federal system of government, because financial services regu-
lation may occur at the subnational level.
3. NAFTA Chapter 14 and FSA Compared.
It is clear that the United States was more successful in achieving its negotiating objec-
tives in NAFTA Chapter 14 than in the FSA. The primary negotiating objectives of the
United States for financial services have remained consistent, namely (1) development of a
framework of principles, including national treatment and the right of establishment, (2)
achieving greater market access with respect to key trading partners, and (3) preserving the
right of regulation for prudential purposes. NAFTA Chapter 14 achieved a more intact
framework of principles than did the FSA. In addition, the NAFTA negotiators achieved
liberalizing market access concessions relating to the right of establishment in Mexico and
also achieved a standstill in the area of cross-border trade. In the FSA, most national com-
mitments did not lead to greater liberalization with respect to the right of establishment,
but merely bound the status quo in many cases. Moreover, no general standstill was
achieved in the FSA, meaning that even the status quo was not bound in some cases.
There are numerous explanations for the different results under NAFTA Chapter 14
and FSA. First, the differences in levels of economic development among the NAFTA
Parties was far less vast than among the WTO Members. If the notion that those countries
that have a presumed comparative disadvantage in financial services trade would oppose
liberalizing commitments is true, then it may explain why so few concessions were extend-
ed in the FSA. Indeed, in the FSA negotiations, even binding the status quo was deemed a
concession by some WTO Members.
Second, a free trade agreement like NAFTA implies a greater depth of economic inte-
gration than the WTO Agreement. NAFTA has been viewed by some as the first step
towards establishing very close economic ties among Western Hemisphere countries, pos-
sibly developing into a customs union or something more, as in the case of the European
Union. NAFTA's strong provisions on new trade topics like investment and intellectual
property protection certainly indicate a deeper level of commitment by Members than the
WTO Agreement. 556 At this point, WTO is still a forum for reducing tariff and non-tariff
barriers to trade, but does not contemplate any deeper level of integration.
Another reason for the differences is simply based on the numbers of the negotiating
parties. As any lawyer who has negotiated a multiparty agreement will tell you, it is far easi-
er to reach agreement among a handful than among a vast number of negotiators.
B. ASSESSMENTS BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE U.S. FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY.
There are several different approaches that could be adopted in assessing the success
of NAFTA Chapter 14 and the FSA. This author has chosen the approach of comparing
negotiating objectives against actual outcomes and then analyzing the gaps in the resulting
structures. On such an analysis, the outcomes can only be termed not wholly successful.
556. See NAFTA, supra note 12, at chs. 11, 17. The WTO Agreement also included provisions on
investment and intellectual property. TRIMS is very weak compared to NAFTA Chapter 11 on
investment. TRIPS is more successful, from the perspective of investors from developed coun-
tries, providing substantial new international protection for intellectual property.
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The approach taken by the U.S. Government and private industry is somewhat different.
The assessments of these groups are very similar and have focused on a comparison of the
trade and investment landscape for financial services providers before and after the trade
agreement negotiations. It is generally agreed that the results of NAFTA Chapter 14 were a
vast improvement over the pre-NAFTA situation. 55 7 The major weaknesses cited were the
absence of progress on cross-border trade and the failure to permit firms the right of
establishment through a branch operation. 558
Under the FSA, the binding of the status quo by many countries was considered an
important achievement because it meant that existing operations of U.S. firms would be
grandfathered. 559 The U.S. Government assessments have tended to emphasize the large
numbers of WTO Members that made offers under the FSA.560 Weaknesses often cited in the
interviews conducted by the author were the disappointing commitments made by certain
countries, and the failure of the FSAs structure to facilitate cross-sector liberalization. 561
Another approach to assessment would be to examine trade statistics to determine if
gains resulted for U.S. financial services firms from NAFTA Chapter 14 and the FSA. It will
take some time before trade figures will reflect the effects of these trade agreement provi-
sions, however.
V. U.S. Policy on the Future Development of Free Trade in
Financial Services.
As for the future, U.S. policy seems to be to continue pursuing financial services liber-
alization on all levels - multilateral, regional and bilateral. 562 The most likely routes for
financial service liberalization are discussed below.
A. NAFTA.
By its terms, NAFTA contemplates further liberalization of financial services trade and
investment 563 and accession of additional parties. 564 The following steps are already on
the agenda for future financial services talks: (1) develop a process for keeping Annex VII
Schedules up to date; (2) review the issue of limited scope securities firms as stipulated in
Mexico's Schedule to Annex VII; and (3) review the status of the Riegle-Neal Act in the
557. Farmer Interview, supra note 410. Telephone Interview with Robert Vastine, President, U.S.
Coalition of Service Industries (August 28, 1998) [hereinafter Vastine Interview].
558. Newman Interview, supra note 265.
559. Russell Interview, supra note 407.
560. Rubin and Barshefsky, supra note 11.
561. Russell Interview, supra note 407.
562. This approach was outlined in the 1994 National Treatment Study, supra note 123, at 10-12. More
recent statements by U.S. Government officials continue to support this position. See Testimony
Before the House Ways and Means Comm. by U.S Trade Representative Michael Kantor (Mar. 13,
1996) <http://www.ustr.gov/testimony/Kantor_4.html>.
563. NAFTA, supra note 12, arts. 1403(3), 1404(4), annex 1404.4.
564. Id. art. 2204.
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United States in the context of Article 1403 restrictions on direct branching. 565 No other
information about future negotiations is currently publicly available.5 66
There are currently no talks being held regarding accession of additional NAFTA
Parties, based on publicly available information. Talks undertaken in 1994 with Chile were
broken off when the U.S. Congress refused to give the executive branch the fast track nego-
tiating authority it had requested. 567 The United States and Chile formed the Chile-U.S.
Commission on Trade and Investment in 1998 to serve as a forum for discussion and
exchange of information on bilateral issues of interest.5 68 In spite of this development, the
Chilean Government continues to maintain that it will not proceed with NAFTA accession
negotiations until fast-track authority is granted.569
B. WTO.
New financial services talks are scheduled to begin in the year 2000. United States
Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky recently reiterated the importance to the United
States of these talks beginning on schedule.570 There is no publicly available work plan for
the talks. However, the author assumes that further concessions on market access and
national treatment will be sought, because this has been the focus of U.S. efforts since
agreement on the FSA was reached. Hopefully, other weaknesses of the FSA, such as the
absence of a standstill on cross-border trade, will also be addressed.
Services industry lobbying groups are already preparing their own agenda for future
WTO negotiations. The FLG has established a three point plan, namely (1) to ensure full
implementation of the WTO Agreement, (2) to seek good financial service commitments
from new WTO Members and (3) to prepare for the year 2000 negotiations by encourag-
ing governments to seek new commitments that liberalize existing restrictions and move
beyond the status quo, that cover cross-border trade and consumption abroad modes of
supply and that remove the extensive regulatory barriers still remaining. A new coalition
565. NAFTA Financial Services Committee, Report for the NAFTA Commission Meeting,
<http://www.infoexport.gc.ca/nafta/menu-e.asp> (viewed 8/5/98). This was the work plan adopted
by the NAFTA Financial Services Committee in 1995.
566. The Financial Services Committee meets annually, but it does not publish the results of its meet-
ings. The author understands from conversations with U.S. Government officials that the points in
the work plan are under discussion, although no decisions have been reached.
567. NAFTA: Chile Not in Rush to Join NAFTA, Foreign Minister Says, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 107, January
22, 1997 (statement made on January 14, 1997 of Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister Jose Miguel
Insulza). Fast-track negotiating authority prevents changes to U.S. implementing legislation for a
trade agreement after it is submitted to Congress for approval, although Congress is permitted
extensive consultation rights during the negotiating process. For a history of fast-track negotiating
authority, see Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 143,143-159 (1992).
568. James Langman, Trade Policy: U.S.-Chile Commission Has Open Agenda, But Fast-Track a Must,
Chilean Official Says, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. 1018, June 10, 1998.
569. Id. (statement made on June 1, 1998 of Alejandro Jaro, Chilean Director of Multilateral and
Bilateral Trade Negotiations).
570. Gary G. Yerkey, WTO: WTO Ministerial Meeting Backs Open-Ended Trade Liberalization, 15 INT'L
TRADE REP. 888, May 20, 1998.
571. Financial Leaders Group, Future Work Plan for the Financial Leaders Working Group (February 27,
1998) (on file with the author).
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called the Global Services Network has been formed to press for greater liberalization in
the year 2000 services negotiations and is seeking close monitoring of ratification and
implementation of the FSA. 572
C. FTAA.
The United States is currently supporting the creation of a free trade area in the
Western Hemisphere under the rubric of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 573
In recent years, the Western Hemisphere has had the most active agenda of free trade
agreement negotiations of any region in the world. 574 Apart from NAFTA, these negotia-
tions have not included the United States. The United States interest in the FTAA stems, at
least in part, from a concern that the proliferation of sub-regional preferential trade
arrangements could place American suppliers at a disadvantage. 575 The United States
believes that the FTAA should go further than the WTO Agreement in liberalizing trade
and investment and become the "state of the art" in regional trade agreements. 576
Formation of the FTAA was proposed by the heads of state of thirty-four countries 577
at the Summit of the Americas held in Miami in December 1994.578 The goal of the nego-
tiating parties is to achieve significant progress in negotiations by 2000 and to complete
negotiations by 2005.5 79 FTAA negotiations were initiated at the Second Summit of the
572. The group was formed by the U.S. Coalition of Service Industries. Services: Companies in Several
Countries Agree to Urge Further Freeing of Services Trade, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. 728, April 29, 1998.
573. The United States is also willing to engage in bilateral negotiations, although it is not currently
engaged in talks with any country in the region apart from Chile. America's Free Trade Pact: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Internat'l Econ. Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Internat'l Relations,
June 11, 1997 (statement of Jeffrey M. Lang, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative).
574. Recent developments include the following: the conclusion of the Chile-Canada FTA, the MERCO-
SUR-Chile FTA, the MERCOSUR-Bolivia FTA, and the initiation of negotiations between Mexico
and MERCOSUR, Mexico and Peru, Mexico and Ecuador, MERCOSUR and most of the Andean
Community, Panama and Chile, Mexico and the Northern Triangle of Central America(Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras), and between Central America and the islands of the
Caribbean. This is in addition to other regional and bilateral trade arrangements that have been in
place for some time. See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES TRADE UNIT, REPORT ON PROVISIONS ON
TRADE IN SERVICES IN TRADE AND INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, submitted
to the FTAA Working Group on Services, Apr. 21, 1997. Only a few of the Western Hemisphere
trade arrangements contain provisions on services generally or financial services.
575. PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, RECOMMENDATION ON FUTURE FREE TRADE AREA
NEGOTIATIONS, Sept. 25, 1997, at 2 [hereinafter FTA REPORT].
576. Id. at 4.
577. Thirty-four countries are involved in the attempt to integrate the economies of the Western
Hemisphere. The FTAA countries are: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, The Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, The United States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
578. Organization of American States, Miami Summit of the Americas: Plan of Action
<http://www.sice.oas.org/ftaa-e.stm> (viewed 7/13/98).
579. Id.
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Americas held in Santiago, Chile in April 1998580 pursuant to the San Jose Ministerial
Declaration of March 19, 1998.581 The FTAA objectives for services are: (1) to establish
disciplines to progressively liberalize trade in services, so as to permit the achievement of a
hemispheric free trade area under conditions of certainty and transparency; and (2) to
ensure the integration of similar economies into the FTAA process. 582
A Working Group on Services (Services Group) has been established to address these
issues. 58 3 The Services Group has met a total of five times, most recently in October
1997.584 The Services Group has the following mandate, which was set out as part of the
Belo Horizonte Ministerial Decision of May 16, 1997: (1) to undertake background work
on the nature of trade in services, (2) to compile an inventory of agreements in the
Western Hemisphere which affect trade in services, (3) to compile an inventory of mea-
sures affecting trade in services, (4) to create a statistical database of trade flows in services,
(5) to recommend methods to promote implementation of the WTO GATS, and (6) to
recommend methods for constructing the FTAA in services. 585
The U.S. Government has not yet issued its negotiating objectives except in very gen-
eral terms, namely, reducing barriers to trade and opening markets to U.S. exports. 586 The
U.S. private sector has been active in supporting the FTAA. Representatives of services
industries met with government negotiators at Santiago, Chile in October 1997 for the
First Services Business Forum of the Americas (Forum). 587 The Forum formulated recom-
mendations on services liberalization that it submitted to the Services Group. In the area
of financial services, the Forum sought greater liberalization, easy access to capital markets,
and freedom of operations. 588
580. San Jose Ministerial Declaration, Summit of the Americas, Fourth Trade Ministerial at para. 11,
Mar. 19, 1998 [hereinafter San Jose Dedaration] <http://www.alca-ftaa.org/English Version/costa-
e.htm> (viewed 7/15/98). The San Jose Declaration has been compared to the 1986 Punta del Este
Declaration that launched the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations in terms of breadth of the pro-
gram proposed.
581. Chronology of the FTAA Process <http://alca-ftaa.org/ENGLISH VERSION/view-e.htm> (viewed
7/13/98).
582. San Jose Declaration, supra note 580, annex II.
583. Id. at para. 11.
584. FTAA Negotiating Groups <http://www.alca-ftaa.org/ENGLISH VERSION/ngserv-e.htm> (viewed
7/13/98).
585. FTAA: Working Groups <http://www.alca-ftaa.oas.org/ENGLISH VERSION/service.htm> (viewed
7/13/98).
586. FTA REPORT, supra note 575, at 6-7.
587. Free Trade in the Western Hemisphere: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, Mar. 31, 1998,3/31/98 CONGTMY (statement of Robert Vastine, President of the
Coalition of Service Industries (CSI) [hereinafter CSI Testimony]. The Forum was organized by the
U.S. Coalition of Service Industries, the main lobbying group in the United States for service indus-
tries on trade issues, as a means for including private sector views in the negotiating process. In
addition, CSI assisted in the formation of the Services Business Network of the Americas to provide
private sector support for services liberalization.
588. Services Forum Makes Recommendations on FTAA, 14 INT'L TRADE REP., Oct. 22, 1997. In more spe-
cific terms, the Forum made the following recommendations regarding financial services: govern-
ments should liberalize capital accounts immediately and completely, eliminate currency exchange
controls, eliminate restrictions on foreign investment, promote the delivery of ample financial
information, facilitate registration processes for foreign mutual funds; and with respect to the
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D. APEC.
The United States is also pursuing economic cooperation and trade and investment
liberalization through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), 589 com-
prised of eighteen economies, which include many important Asian countries, as well as
Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the United States. 590 The APEC leaders agreed at the 1994
Ministerial Summit in Bogor, Indonesia to open free trade and investment by 2010 for
developed countries and by 2020 for developing countries. 59 1 The APEC Trade Ministers
have met every year since 1989 to assess the progress being made in the region for achiev-
ing free and open trade and investment. 592 APEC is now working toward trade liberaliza-
tion on a sector-by-sector basis.5
93
In January 1997, the APEC Group on Services (GOS), an informal group formed by
the APEC Committee on Trade and Investment, met for the first time.594 The focus of
GOS is on (1) information gathering and analysis, (2) sharing of experiences, and (3)
enhanced transparency. In addition, it supports individual Actions Plans, which are to be
drafted by each country for liberalization of its service sectors. 595 As mandated by the
Osaka Action Agenda (OAA), a Services Collective Action Plan was adopted by the GOS
which states the collective action the APEC economies will take, the steps for implemen-
insurance sector, provide national treatment and freedom of establishment, and promote a greater
degree of liberalization in rendering cross-border insurance services, while protecting consumer
rights. CSI Testimony, supra note 587. The Forum also recommended adoption of the following
principles, among others: national treatment, nondiscrimination, reciprocity, transparency, elimi-
nation of double taxation and of double benefits (social security, health care, etc.), freedom of
mobility of personnel, and freedom of establishment or non-establishment. The elimination of
unnecessary customs procedures, nuisance tariffs, or tariff barriers and taxes was also requested.
Requests were made for the harmonization of professional certification requirements and facilita-
tion of work visas. Id. See also First Services Business Forum of the Americas, Santiago, Chile,
October 1997, Sectoral Commission Recommendations to the FTAA Services Working Group,
Financial Services <http://www.sice.oas.org/ftaa/costa/background/finrecl_e.stm> (viewed
7/15/98).
589. In addition to APEC, the United States is considering bilateral FTAs between the United States and
the other APEC countries to work as a catalyst for increased market liberalization. However, no spe-
cific recommendations for FTA negotiations have been made. Services: President Urged to Press
APEC Leaders to Open Financial Services Markets to U.S., 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 932, May 28, 1997.
590. The APEC economies are: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand and the United States of America.
591. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Sixth Ministerial Meeting Joint Statement, Jakarta,
Indonesia, Nov. 11-12, 1994, http://www.apecsec.org.sg/minismtg/mtgmin94.html (viewed
10/8/98).
592. International Agreements: US. Convinces APEC to Support Sectoral Reforms, Trade Official Says 14
INT'L TRADE REP. 846, May 14, 1997 (statement of United States Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky).
593. Id.
594. APEC: Convenor Summary Report on Services <http://www.apecsec.org.sg/cti/iva2-2.html> (viewed
7/13/98).
595. John E. Siegmund, Services in the WTO: Recent Developments and Overview, 119 Bus. AM. 12, Apr. 1,
1998. The United States has already drafted Individual Action Plans, but other countries are not
releasing their plans for review yet.
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tation and a time frame for the action.596 The two primary objectives for the OAA
Collective Action Plan in services are (a) progressively reducing restrictions on market
access for trade in services and (b) progressively providing for MFN treatment and
national treatment for trade in services, among other things.597 In the future, the GOS
plans to compile a list of national regulatory measures which affect, either positively or
negatively, trade and investment in all service sectors.598
In financial services, APEC supported the successful conclusion of the WTO financial
services negotiations. 599 APEC Finance Ministers also advocated sweeping reforms in the
financial sector as a response to the Asian financial crisis. 600 Such crisis may have damp-
ened liberalization efforts in the region.
VI. Conclusion: Has the United States Retreated from WTO
Multilateralism and the MFN Principle?
As discussed in Part II, the U.S. efforts to liberalize financial services trade have high-
lighted certain new trends in U.S. trade policy, namely the role of interest groups and the
rise of reciprocity and regionalism. Interest groups played a significant role during the
NAFTA Chapter 14 and FSA negotiations. Their function of providing information about,
and focusing attention on trade barriers was considered helpful by the U.S. Government. It
may provide a good model for cooperation between private industry and government on
trade issues. The importance of concrete market opening results to lobbying groups prob-
ably reinforced the U.S. tendency to focus on economic results and to seek reciprocal con-
cessions in the negotiations.
The importance of the reciprocity issue was seen most vividly during the FSA negotia-
tions when the United States conditioned its acceptance of the agreement on achieving a
substantial level of commitments from key trading partners. The long negotiating history of
the FSA outlined in Part III is testimony to the importance of this issue to the U.S. Regional
trade agreements will continue to be pursued by the United States, as outlined in Part V.
Does the U.S. position evidenced during the FSA negotiations represent a turning
away by the United States from its commitment to nondiscriminatory multilateral trade
liberalization? The use by the United States of an exemption to MFN treatment to deal
with the potential problem of free-riders certainly represents a retreat from a strong com-
mitment to the traditional principles of the multilateral trading system. Some commenta-
tors would also see the U.S. pursuit of free trade on a regional level as a threat to the mul-
tilateral system. 601 Several comments are in order.
596. SERVICES 1997 COLLECTIVE ACTION PLAN, <http://www.apec.sec.org.sg/cti/iva2 2.html> (viewed
7/13/98).
597. Id.
598. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), APEC Committees: Services
<http://www.apecsec.org.sg/committee/services.html> (viewed 7/13/98).
599. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Ninth Ministerial Meeting Joint Statement, Vancouver, Canada,
Nov. 21-22, 1997 <http://www.apecsec.org.sg/minismtg/mtgmin97.html> (viewed 10/8/98).
600. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Draft Joint Ministerial Statement, Fifth APEC Finance Ministers
Meeting, Konanaskis, Alberto, Canada, May 23-24, 1998.
601. See Bhagwati, supra note 28.
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First, the global distribution of political and economic power that existed under the
old GATT regime is no longer the same today in the world of the WTO. In fact, U.S. eco-
nomic welfare is tied today as it never was before to generating continued trade surpluses
in the financial services and other services sectors, which partially offset the large trade
deficits in the goods sectors. The U.S. position reflects modern economic reality and is
more pragmatic than idealistic.
Second, perhaps the assumption that services trade can be liberalized in the same way
and on the same model as goods trade is faulty. It fails to take account of the differences
between the two sectors. Liberalization of financial services trade requires changes to nation-
al, legal, and regulatory structures and those changes are often very difficult for national gov-
ernments to commit to make during trade negotiations. Therefore, the analogy to liberaliza-
tion under GATT for trade in goods is flawed. Importing the structure of GATT and the
negotiating request-offer mechanism wholesale into the realm of services may have been a
mistake, but it was the only model available at the time. Indeed, the WTO may not even be
the most appropriate forum for financial services talks due to the lack of expertise by experi-
enced trade negotiators on financial services issues. However, it was (and remains) the only
available forum that included all of the countries whose market access commitments the
United States sought and whose Members would be legally bound by their commitments.
Certainly GATS is weaker than GATT in its commitment to nondiscriminatory princi-
ples but that is due to negotiating difficulties in the GATS that were not encountered when
the GATT framework was developed. Indeed, the United States attempted to negotiate a
framework of principles that included both most-favored-nation treatment and national
treatment.602 This approach would have made liberalization the baseline assumption and
the maintenance of the status quo or back-pedaling the exception. Instead, through a
negotiating compromise, national treatment, along with market access, were relegated to
optional principles.
Third, economic theory and empirical studies are ambiguous on the conclusions to
be drawn from the debate over whether regional or multilateral liberalization will result
in greater gains. Even if regional efforts will not lead to the same broad gains as wholly
successful multilateral liberalization would have, one could reasonably take the position,
as the United States has done, that regional liberalization will surely lead to some gains. In
any case, it has always been, and remains, the United States position that concessions
negotiated on a bilateral and regional basis should ultimately be extended multilaterally
to all WTO Members. 603
The clear trend in U.S. policy is to favor a multilateral approach to further financial
services liberalization. The U.S. financial services industry supports this view.604 While
602. U.S. Proposal for GATS dated October 1989, reprinted in Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst.
Supervision, Regulation and Ins., Task Force on Internat'l Competitiveness of U.S. Fin. Inst. of the
Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, H.R., 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., July 17, 1990, Serial No.
101-152.
603. An example is the U.S. request that the concessions by Japan in its bilateral agreements with the
United States regarding insurance and other financial services be extended on a multilateral basis
under the FSA.
604. Vastine Interview, supra note 557; Farmer Interview, supra note 410; Russell Interview, supra
note 407.
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liberalization on a bilateral and regional level will continue to be pursued by the United
States, such initiatives will be viewed as complementary to the goal of broad-based liber-
alization through the WTO. There are a variety of reasons for this approach. The stated
reason in most of the telephone interviews that the author conducted in connection with
this article was that the WTO provided the most efficient mechanism for achieving liber-
alization due to its broad-based membership. If WTO Members continue to make liberal-
izing commitments under the FSA in future negotiating rounds and if additional coun-
tries like China, which represent large new markets for U.S. financial firms, are successful
in becoming WTO Members, the gains for the United States could be very substantial.
Another possible reason for this policy orientation is that, for the time being, the regional
initiatives may have run their course. The current absence of fast-track negotiating
authority and the widening global financial crises of recent months seem to have placed
regional efforts by the United States on hold. As in the case of free trade in goods, which
took almost fifty years of negotiations within the GATT forum to achieve, it can be
expected that financial services trade liberalization will be accomplished only gradually
and often in fits and starts. Chapter 14 of NAFTA and the FSA represent the beginning of
the process of liberalizing trade in financial services.
